Institutional Rebalancing in the Wake of the Covid-19 Pandemic

Abstract The COVID‐19 crisis has shown that European countries still remain poorly prepared for dealing and coping with health crises and for responding in a coordinated way to a severe influenza pandemic. Within the EU, the response to the COVID‐19 virus has a striking diversity in its approach. By focusing on Belgium, France, Germany and Italy, four countries which represent different models of administrative systems in Europe, the analysis shows that major similarities and convergences have become apparent from a cross‐countries perspective. Moreover, coping with the crises has been first and foremost an issue of the national states whereas the European voice has been weak. Hence, the countries' immediate responses has appeared to be Corona‐nationalistic, which we label as Coronationalism. The paper shows to what extent the four countries adopted different crisis management strategies and which factors explain this variance, with a special focus on their institutional settings and administrative systems. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

This book addresses the institutions that were deployed to fight the euro crisis, re-establish financial stability, and prevent contagion beyond Europe. It addresses why European leaders chose to include the International Monetary Fund and provides a detailed account of the decisions of the institutions that make up the “troika” (the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF). The study explains the institutions’ negotiating strategies, the outcomes of their interaction, and the effectiveness of their cooperation. It also explores the strategies of the member states, including Germany and the United States, with respect to the institutions and the advantages they sought in directing them to work together. The book locates the analysis within the framework of regime complexity, clusters of overlapping and intersecting regional and multilateral institutions. It tests conjectures spawned by that literature against the seven cases of financial rescues of euro-area countries that were stricken by crisis during 2010–15. The book concludes that regime complexity is the consequence of a strategy by key states to control “agency drift.” States mediate conflicts among institutions, through informal as well as formal mechanisms, and thereby limit fragmentation of the regime complex and underpin substantive efficacy. In so doing, the book answers several key puzzles, including why (a) Germany and other northern European countries supported IMF inclusion despite substantive positions opposed to their economic preferences, (b) crisis-fighting arrangements endured intense conflicts among the institutions, and (c) the United States and the IMF promoted further steps to “complete” the monetary union.