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      Cyber security analysis of Web-of-Cells energy architectures

      proceedings-article
      1 , 1 , 2
      5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018 (ICS-CSR 2018)
      ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research
      29 - 30 August 2018
      Smart Grids, ICT Architectures, Cyber Security Assessment, Control Strategies, Distributed Energy Resources, We-of-Cells
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            Abstract

            The evolution of the power grid toward a distributed architecture requires rethinking of the traditional control strategies. From a hierarchical structure the future grid moves on to a decentralized organization where the Distributed Energy Resources are spread over the whole infrastructure. The control strategies need to implement new functionalities where the ICT (Information and Communication Technology) components represent essential assets and the cyber security issues have to be addressed very carefully. This paper presents a methodology for the cyber security analysis of an ICT architecture implementing the Web-of-Cells (WoC) concept for the control of the future power grid as proposed by the ELECTRA EU project. Starting from a WoC architecture, a realistic Cell network topology is modelled by the securiCAD tool. The model comprises cells where the main ICT assets (hosts, network nodes, programs, services and data flows) contain vulnerabilities allowing that possible attack steps are deployed to perform a cyber attack. To contrast the attack process, specific cyber security measures can be included in the model. The cyber security analysis is performed by means of the securiCAD tool implementing the proposed methodology for the evaluation of the attack graphs and the computation of the TTC (Time To Compromise) indicator. TTC represents the expected time an attacker would take to compromise every single asset in the modelled ICT infrastructure. The methodology allows to perform a sensitivity analysis estimating the efficacy of the applied mitigation measures by comparing the TTC values in the different model setups. The cyber security analysis described in this paper addresses the cyber threat assessment of a sample multi phase attack process by evaluating the possible attack paths and obtaining the TTC values for the attack target assets

            Content

            Author and article information

            Contributors
            Conference
            August 2018
            August 2018
            : 41-50
            Affiliations
            [1 ]RSE SpA Italy
            [2 ]KTH Sweden
            Article
            10.14236/ewic/ICS2018.5
            d501ed4d-c3a4-4690-ae7e-2333e492efdc
            © Terruggia et al. Published by BCS Learning and Development Ltd. Proceedings of ICS & SCADA 2018

            This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

            5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018
            ICS-CSR 2018
            5
            University of Hamburg, Germany
            29 - 30 August 2018
            Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)
            ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research
            History
            Product

            1477-9358 BCS Learning & Development

            Self URI (article page): https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.14236/ewic/ICS2018.5
            Self URI (journal page): https://ewic.bcs.org/
            Categories
            Electronic Workshops in Computing

            Applied computer science,Computer science,Security & Cryptology,Graphics & Multimedia design,General computer science,Human-computer-interaction
            We-of-Cells,Smart Grids,ICT Architectures,Cyber Security Assessment,Control Strategies,Distributed Energy Resources

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