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      Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization.

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          Abstract

          Human behavior is strongly affected by culturally transmitted norms and values. Certain norms are internalized (i.e., acting according to a norm becomes an end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving certain goals or avoiding social sanctions). Humans' capacity to internalize norms likely evolved in our ancestors to simplify solving certain challenges-including social ones. Here we study theoretically the evolutionary origins of the capacity to internalize norms. In our models, individuals can choose to participate in collective actions as well as punish free riders. In making their decisions, individuals attempt to maximize a utility function in which normative values are initially irrelevant but play an increasingly important role if the ability to internalize norms emerges. Using agent-based simulations, we show that norm internalization evolves under a wide range of conditions so that cooperation becomes "instinctive." Norm internalization evolves much more easily and has much larger effects on behavior if groups promote peer punishment of free riders. Promoting only participation in collective actions is not effective. Typically, intermediate levels of norm internalization are most frequent but there are also cases with relatively small frequencies of "oversocialized" individuals willing to make extreme sacrifices for their groups no matter material costs, as well as "undersocialized" individuals completely immune to social norms. Evolving the ability to internalize norms was likely a crucial step on the path to large-scale human cooperation.

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          Most cited references31

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          Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

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            Evolutionarily singular strategies and the adaptive growth and branching of the evolutionary tree

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              Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment.

              In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable-once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors. Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
                Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
                Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
                1091-6490
                0027-8424
                May 22 2017
                Affiliations
                [1 ] Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996; gavrila@tiem.utk.edu.
                [2 ] Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996.
                [3 ] National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996.
                [4 ] Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, CA 95616.
                Article
                1703857114
                10.1073/pnas.1703857114
                28533363
                d943984e-8733-4b2d-aa53-1a4b85606a02
                History

                conflict,cooperation,evolution,modeling,values
                conflict, cooperation, evolution, modeling, values

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