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      Association Between Food and Drug Administration Advisory Committee Recommendations and Agency Actions, 2008–2015

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          Abstract

          Policy Points

          • Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committee recommendations and the agency's final actions exhibit high rates of agreement, with cases of disagreement tending to reflect the proposed action type and degree of advisory committee consensus.

          • In the case of disagreements, the FDA tended to be less likely than its advisory committees to approve new products, approve new supplemental indications, or enact new safety changes.

          • These findings raise important issues regarding the factors that differentially shape decision making by advisory committees and the FDA as an agency, including institutional or reputational concerns.

          Context

          The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) convenes advisory committees to provide external scientific counsel on potential agency actions and to inform regulatory decision making. The degree to which advisory committees and their respective agency divisions disagree on recommendations has not been well characterized across product and action types.

          Methods

          We examined public documents from FDA advisory committee meetings and medical product databases for all FDA advisory committee meetings from 2008 through 2015. We classified the 376 voting meetings in that period by medical product, regulatory, and advisory committee meeting characteristics. We used multivariable logistic regression to determine the associations between these characteristics and discordance between the advisory committee's recommendations and the FDA's final actions.

          Findings

          Twenty‐two percent of the FDA's final actions were discordant with the advisory committee's recommendations. Of these, 75% resulted in the FDA making more restrictive decisions after favorable committee recommendations, and 25% resulted in the agency making less restrictive decisions after unfavorable committee recommendations. Discordance was associated with lower degrees of advisory committee consensus and was more likely for agency actions focused on medical product safety than for novel approvals or supplemental indications. Statements by public speakers, advisory committee conflicts of interest, and media coverage were not associated with discordance between the committee and the agency.

          Conclusions

          The FDA disagrees with the recommendation of its advisory committees a minority of the time, and in these cases it tends to be less likely to approve new products or supplemental indications and take safety actions. Deviations from recommendations thus offer an opportunity to understand the factors influencing decisions made by both the agency and its expert advisory groups.

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          Most cited references15

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          Financial conflict of interest disclosure and voting patterns at Food and Drug Administration Drug Advisory Committee meetings.

          In January 2002, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a draft guidance requiring more detailed financial conflict of interest disclosure at advisory committee meetings. To characterize financial conflict disclosures at drug-related meetings, and to assess the relationship between conflicts and voting behavior at meetings that considered specific products. Cross-sectional study using agendas and transcripts from all FDA Drug Advisory Committee meetings (2001-2004) listed on the FDA Web site. Conflict rates, type, and size. The relationship between having a conflict and voting in favor of the index drug was described for each voter using Mantel-Haenszel relative risks and Monte Carlo simulations; Spearman rho was used for a meeting-level analysis comparing rates of conflict with voting patterns. The impact of the removal of persons with conflicts of interest on the vote margins was also evaluated. A total of 221 meetings held by 16 advisory committees were included in the study. In 73% of the meetings, at least 1 advisory committee member or voting consultant disclosed a conflict; only 1% of advisory committee members were recused. For advisory committee members (n = 1957) and voting consultants combined (n = 990), 28% (n = 825) disclosed a conflict. The most commonly specified conflicts were consulting arrangements, contracts/grants, and investments. Nineteen percent of consulting arrangements involved over 10,000 dollars, 23% of contracts/grants exceeded 100,000 dollars, and 30% of investments were over 25,000 dollars. The meeting-level analysis did not show a statistically significant relationship between conflict rates ("index conflict," "competitor conflict," or "any conflict") and voting patterns, but a weak, statistically significant positive relationship was apparent for competitor conflict and any conflict in the Mantel-Haenszel analyses. The Monte Carlo analyses produced similar findings in the competitor conflict analysis only. In all 3 conflict categories, the exclusion of advisory committee members and voting consultants with conflicts would have produced margins less favorable to the index drug in the majority of meetings, but this would not have changed whether the majority favored or opposed the drug. Disclosures of conflicts of interest at drug advisory committee meetings are common, often of considerable monetary value, and rarely result in recusal of advisory committee members. A weak relationship between certain types of conflicts and voting behaviors was detected, but excluding advisory committee members and voting consultants with conflicts would not have altered the overall vote outcome at any meeting studied.
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            Promoting Agency Reputation through Public Advice: Advisory Committee Use in the FDA

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              Revisiting financial conflicts of interest in FDA advisory committees.

              The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Safety and Innovation Act has recently relaxed conflict-of-interest rules for FDA advisory committee members, but concerns remain about the influence of members' financial relationships on the FDA's drug approval process. Using a large newly available data set, this study carefully examined the relationship between the financial interests of FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) advisory committee members and whether members voted in a way favorable to these interests.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                joseph.ross@yale.edu
                Journal
                Milbank Q
                Milbank Q
                10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0009
                MILQ
                The Milbank Quarterly
                John Wiley and Sons Inc. (Hoboken )
                0887-378X
                1468-0009
                14 July 2019
                September 2019
                : 97
                : 3 ( doiID: 10.1111/milq.v97.3 )
                : 796-819
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ] New York University School of Medicine
                [ 2 ] Yale School of Medicine
                [ 3 ] Yale School of Public Health
                [ 4 ] Center for Outcomes Research and Evaluation, Yale–New Haven Hospital
                Author notes
                [*] [* ] Address correspondence to: Joseph S. Ross, Yale University School of Medicine, Section of General Internal Medicine, PO Box 208093, New Haven, CT 06520‐8093 (email: joseph.ross@ 123456yale.edu ).
                Article
                PMC6739629 PMC6739629 6739629 MILQ12403
                10.1111/1468-0009.12403
                6739629
                31304643
                fdea8ae6-1889-4bff-991f-7ba92a99ebed
                © 2019 Milbank Memorial Fund
                History
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 5, Pages: 24, Words: 6435
                Funding
                Funded by: Food and Drug Administration
                Award ID: U01FD004585
                Funded by: Yale–Mayo Clinic Center for Excellence in Regulatory Science and Innovation
                Award ID: U01FD005938
                Funded by: Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services
                Award ID: HHSM‐500‐2013‐13018I
                Funded by: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
                Award ID: R01HS022882
                Funded by: Collaboration for Research Integrity and Transparency
                Funded by: Laura and John Arnold Foundation
                Award ID: U01FD005938
                Funded by: National Institutes of Health
                Award ID: R01HS025164
                Award ID: G13LM012460
                Categories
                Original Scholarship
                Original Scholarship
                Custom metadata
                2.0
                milq12403
                September 2019
                Converter:WILEY_ML3GV2_TO_NLMPMC version:5.6.9 mode:remove_FC converted:12.09.2019

                consumer product safety,device approval,US Food and Drug Administration,drug approval,advisory committees

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