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      Influenza Pandemic Periodicity, Virus Recycling, and the Art of Risk Assessment

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          Abstract

          Conditions that lead to influenza pandemics are not fully understood.

          Abstract

          Influenza pandemic risk assessment is an uncertain art. The theory that influenza A virus pandemics occur every 10 to 11 years and seroarcheologic evidence of virus recycling set the stage in early 1976 for risk assessment and risk management of the Fort Dix, New Jersey, swine influenza outbreak. Additional data and passage of time proved the theory untenable. Much has been learned about influenza A virus and its natural history since 1976, but the exact conditions that lead to the emergence of a pandemic strain are still unknown. Current avian influenza events parallel those of swine influenza in 1976 but on a larger and more complex scale. Pre- and postpandemic risk assessment and risk management are continuous but separate public health functions.

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          Most cited references26

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          Legionnaires' disease: description of an epidemic of pneumonia.

          An explosive, common-source outbreak of pneumonia caused by a previously unrecognized bacterium affected primarily persons attending an American Legion convention in Philadelphia in July, 1976. Twenty-nine of 182 cases were fatal. Spread of the bacterium appeared to be air borne. The source of the bacterium was not found, but epidemiologic analysis suggested that exposure may have occurred in the lobby of the headquarters hotel or in the area immediately surrounding the hotel. Person-to-person spread seemed not to have occurred. Many hotel employees appeared to be immune, suggesting that the agent may have been present in the vicinity, perhaps intermittently, for two or more years.
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            Origin and evolution of the 1918 "Spanish" influenza virus hemagglutinin gene.

            The "Spanish" influenza pandemic killed over 20 million people in 1918 and 1919, making it the worst infectious pandemic in history. Here, we report the complete sequence of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of the 1918 virus. Influenza RNA for the analysis was isolated from a formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded lung tissue sample prepared during the autopsy of a victim of the influenza pandemic in 1918. Influenza RNA was also isolated from lung tissue samples from two additional victims of the lethal 1918 influenza: one formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded sample and one frozen sample obtained by in situ biopsy of the lung of a victim buried in permafrost since 1918. The complete coding sequence of the A/South Carolina/1/18 HA gene was obtained. The HA1 domain sequence was confirmed by using the two additional isolates (A/New York/1/18 and A/Brevig Mission/1/18). The sequences show little variation. Phylogenetic analyses suggest that the 1918 virus HA gene, although more closely related to avian strains than any other mammalian sequence, is mammalian and may have been adapting in humans before 1918.
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              A revision of the system of nomenclature for influenza viruses: a WHO memorandum.

              In February 1980, the World Health Organization convened a meeting to consider information relevant to the nomenclature of influenza viruses and to make definitive proposals for the revision of the system which has been in use since 1971. The WHO recommendations are based on data derived from double immunodiffusion reactions involving haemagglutinin and neuraminidase antigens. The revised system of nomenclature is similar to the 1971 system in that it consists of two parts: (a) a type and strain designation, and (b) for influenza A viruses, a description of the antigenic specificity (subtype) of the surface antigens (H and N). The strain designation for influenza virus types A, B, and C contains information on the antigenic type of the virus (based on the antigenic specificity of the nucleoprotein), the host of origin (for strains isolated from non-human sources), geographical origin, strain number, and year of isolation. For influenza A viruses, the antigenic description, in parentheses, follows the strain designation and comprises two indices describing the antigenic subtype of the haemagglutinin and of the neuraminidase antigens. For the influenza A viruses from all species, the H antigens are grouped into 12 subtypes, H1-H12, while the N antigens are divided into 9 subtypes, N1-N9. Reference strains of influenza viruses are maintained by the WHO Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on Influenza and the WHO Centres for the Study of Influenza Ecology in Animals, and are made available upon request.There is no provision for describing distinct subtypes of influenza B and C viruses. The existence of antigenic variation among influenza B strains is well established but the available information shows that a division into subtypes is not warranted.This revised system of nomenclature should be used universally from the date of publication of this Memorandum.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Emerg Infect Dis
                EID
                Emerging Infectious Diseases
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                1080-6040
                1080-6059
                January 2006
                : 12
                : 1
                : 34-39
                Affiliations
                [* ]The Task Force for Child Survival and Development, Decatur, Georgia, USA
                Author notes
                Address for correspondence: Walter R. Dowdle, Task Force for Child Survival and Development, 750 Commerce Dr, Ste 400, Decatur, GA 30030, USA; fax: 404-371-1087; email: wdowdle@ 123456taskforce.org
                Article
                05-1013
                10.3201/eid1201.051013
                3291401
                16494714
                005a6023-8bd3-4c09-a49c-2de0126558de
                History
                Categories
                Perspective
                Perspective

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                risk assessment,pandemic,influenza,swine influenza
                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                risk assessment, pandemic, influenza, swine influenza

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