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      Adherence and Association of Digital Proximity Tracing App Notifications With Earlier Time to Quarantine: Results From the Zurich SARS-CoV-2 Cohort Study

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          Abstract

          Objectives: We aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the SwissCovid digital proximity tracing (DPT) app in notifying exposed individuals and prompting them to quarantine earlier compared to individuals notified only by manual contact tracing (MCT).

          Methods: A population-based sample of cases and close contacts from the Zurich SARS-CoV-2 Cohort was surveyed regarding SwissCovid app use and SARS-CoV-2 exposure. We descriptively analyzed app adherence and effectiveness, and evaluated its effects on the time between exposure and quarantine among contacts using stratified multivariable time-to-event analyses.

          Results: We included 393 SARS-CoV-2 infected cases and 261 close contacts. 62% of cases reported using SwissCovid and among those, 88% received and uploaded a notification code. 71% of close contacts were app users, of which 38% received a warning. Non-household contacts notified by SwissCovid started quarantine 1 day earlier and were more likely to quarantine earlier than those not warned by the app (HR 1.53, 95% CI 1.15–2.03).

          Conclusion: These findings provide evidence that DPT may reach exposed contacts faster than MCT, with earlier quarantine and potential interruption of SARS-CoV-2 transmission chains.

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          Most cited references24

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          Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts

          Summary Background Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control depends on characteristics of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19. Methods We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R 0), the delay from symptom onset to isolation, the probability that contacts were traced, the proportion of transmission that occurred before symptom onset, and the proportion of subclinical infections. We assumed isolation prevented all further transmission in the model. Outbreaks were deemed controlled if transmission ended within 12 weeks or before 5000 cases in total. We measured the success of controlling outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum number of cases traced to measure feasibility of public health effort. Findings Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R 0 of 1·5, and 0% transmission before symptom onset could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability; however, the probability of controlling an outbreak decreased with the number of initial cases, when R 0 was 2·5 or 3·5 and with more transmission before symptom onset. Across different initial numbers of cases, the majority of scenarios with an R 0 of 1·5 were controllable with less than 50% of contacts successfully traced. To control the majority of outbreaks, for R 0 of 2·5 more than 70% of contacts had to be traced, and for an R 0 of 3·5 more than 90% of contacts had to be traced. The delay between symptom onset and isolation had the largest role in determining whether an outbreak was controllable when R 0 was 1·5. For R 0 values of 2·5 or 3·5, if there were 40 initial cases, contact tracing and isolation were only potentially feasible when less than 1% of transmission occurred before symptom onset. Interpretation In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts. Funding Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.
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            Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing

            The newly emergent human virus SARS-CoV-2 is resulting in high fatality rates and incapacitated health systems. Preventing further transmission is a priority. We analyzed key parameters of epidemic spread to estimate the contribution of different transmission routes and determine requirements for case isolation and contact-tracing needed to stop the epidemic. We conclude that viral spread is too fast to be contained by manual contact tracing, but could be controlled if this process was faster, more efficient and happened at scale. A contact-tracing App which builds a memory of proximity contacts and immediately notifies contacts of positive cases can achieve epidemic control if used by enough people. By targeting recommendations to only those at risk, epidemics could be contained without need for mass quarantines (‘lock-downs’) that are harmful to society. We discuss the ethical requirements for an intervention of this kind.
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              Impact of delays on effectiveness of contact tracing strategies for COVID-19: a modelling study

              Summary Background In countries with declining numbers of confirmed cases of COVID-19, lockdown measures are gradually being lifted. However, even if most physical distancing measures are continued, other public health measures will be needed to control the epidemic. Contact tracing via conventional methods or mobile app technology is central to control strategies during de-escalation of physical distancing. We aimed to identify key factors for a contact tracing strategy to be successful. Methods We evaluated the impact of timeliness and completeness in various steps of a contact tracing strategy using a stochastic mathematical model with explicit time delays between time of infection and symptom onset, and between symptom onset, diagnosis by testing, and isolation (testing delay). The model also includes tracing of close contacts (eg, household members) and casual contacts, followed by testing regardless of symptoms and isolation if testing positive, with different tracing delays and coverages. We computed effective reproduction numbers of a contact tracing strategy (R CTS) for a population with physical distancing measures and various scenarios for isolation of index cases and tracing and quarantine of their contacts. Findings For the most optimistic scenario (testing and tracing delays of 0 days and tracing coverage of 100%), and assuming that around 40% of transmissions occur before symptom onset, the model predicts that the estimated effective reproduction number of 1·2 (with physical distancing only) will be reduced to 0·8 (95% CI 0·7–0·9) by adding contact tracing. The model also shows that a similar reduction can be achieved when testing and tracing coverage is reduced to 80% (R CTS 0·8, 95% CI 0·7–1·0). A testing delay of more than 1 day requires the tracing delay to be at most 1 day or tracing coverage to be at least 80% to keep R CTS below 1. With a testing delay of 3 days or longer, even the most efficient strategy cannot reach R CTS values below 1. The effect of minimising tracing delay (eg, with app-based technology) declines with decreasing coverage of app use, but app-based tracing alone remains more effective than conventional tracing alone even with 20% coverage, reducing the reproduction number by 17·6% compared with 2·5%. The proportion of onward transmissions per index case that can be prevented depends on testing and tracing delays, and given a 0-day tracing delay, ranges from up to 79·9% with a 0-day testing delay to 41·8% with a 3-day testing delay and 4·9% with a 7-day testing delay. Interpretation In our model, minimising testing delay had the largest impact on reducing onward transmissions. Optimising testing and tracing coverage and minimising tracing delays, for instance with app-based technology, further enhanced contact tracing effectiveness, with the potential to prevent up to 80% of all transmissions. Access to testing should therefore be optimised, and mobile app technology might reduce delays in the contact tracing process and optimise contact tracing coverage. Funding ZonMw, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, and EU Horizon 2020 RECOVER.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Int J Public Health
                Int J Public Health
                Int J Public Health
                International Journal of Public Health
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1661-8556
                1661-8564
                16 August 2021
                2021
                16 August 2021
                : 66
                : 1603992
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ]Epidemiology, Biostatistics and Prevention Institute, University of Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland
                [ 2 ]Department of Infectious Diseases and Hospital Epidemiology, University Hospital Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
                [ 3 ]Department of Visceral and Transplantation Surgery, University Hospital Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
                [ 4 ]Institute for Implementation Science in Health Care, University of Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland
                Author notes

                Edited by: Salvatore Panico, University of Naples Federico II, Italy

                Reviewed by: Joanna Masel, University of Arizona, United States

                *Correspondence: Viktor von Wyl, viktor.vonwyl@ 123456uzh.ch

                This article was submitted to, a section of the journal International Journal of Public Health

                Article
                1603992
                10.3389/ijph.2021.1603992
                8404355
                34471402
                02b2917d-d0d3-4344-b99e-699910ebeccd
                Copyright © 2021 Ballouz, Menges, Aschmann, Domenghino, Fehr, Puhan and von Wyl.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 23 January 2021
                : 02 July 2021
                Categories
                Public Health Archive
                Original Article

                Public health
                sars-cov-2,dpt,digital proximity tracing,contact tracing,quarantine,close contacts
                Public health
                sars-cov-2, dpt, digital proximity tracing, contact tracing, quarantine, close contacts

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