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      Lack of SARS Transmission among Healthcare Workers, United States

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          Abstract

          Healthcare workers accounted for a large proportion of persons with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) during the worldwide epidemic of early 2003. We conducted an investigation of healthcare workers exposed to laboratory-confirmed SARS patients in the United States to evaluate infection-control practices and possible SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) transmission. We identified 110 healthcare workers with exposure within droplet range (i.e., 3 feet) to six SARS-CoV–positive patients. Forty-five healthcare workers had exposure without any mask use, 72 had exposure without eye protection, and 40 reported direct skin-to-skin contact. Potential droplet- and aerosol-generating procedures were infrequent: 5% of healthcare workers manipulated a patient’s airway, and 4% administered aerosolized medication. Despite numerous unprotected exposures, there was no serologic evidence of healthcare-related SARS-CoV transmission. Lack of transmission in the United States may be related to the relative absence of high-risk procedures or patients, factors that may place healthcare workers at higher risk for infection.

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          A novel coronavirus associated with severe acute respiratory syndrome.

          A worldwide outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been associated with exposures originating from a single ill health care worker from Guangdong Province, China. We conducted studies to identify the etiologic agent of this outbreak. We received clinical specimens from patients in seven countries and tested them, using virus-isolation techniques, electron-microscopical and histologic studies, and molecular and serologic assays, in an attempt to identify a wide range of potential pathogens. None of the previously described respiratory pathogens were consistently identified. However, a novel coronavirus was isolated from patients who met the case definition of SARS. Cytopathological features were noted in Vero E6 cells inoculated with a throat-swab specimen. Electron-microscopical examination revealed ultrastructural features characteristic of coronaviruses. Immunohistochemical and immunofluorescence staining revealed reactivity with group I coronavirus polyclonal antibodies. Consensus coronavirus primers designed to amplify a fragment of the polymerase gene by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) were used to obtain a sequence that clearly identified the isolate as a unique coronavirus only distantly related to previously sequenced coronaviruses. With specific diagnostic RT-PCR primers we identified several identical nucleotide sequences in 12 patients from several locations, a finding consistent with a point-source outbreak. Indirect fluorescence antibody tests and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays made with the new isolate have been used to demonstrate a virus-specific serologic response. This virus may never before have circulated in the U.S. population. A novel coronavirus is associated with this outbreak, and the evidence indicates that this virus has an etiologic role in SARS. Because of the death of Dr. Carlo Urbani, we propose that our first isolate be named the Urbani strain of SARS-associated coronavirus. Copyright 2003 Massachusetts Medical Society
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            Comparative full-length genome sequence analysis of 14 SARS coronavirus isolates and common mutations associated with putative origins of infection

            Summary Background The cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been identified as a new coronavirus. Whole genome sequence analysis of various isolates might provide an indication of potential strain differences of this new virus. Moreover, mutation analysis will help to develop effective vaccines. Methods We sequenced the entire SARS viral genome of cultured isolates from the index case (SIN2500) presenting in Singapore, from three primary contacts (SIN2774, SIN2748, and SIN2677), and one secondary contact (SIN2679). These sequences were compared with the isolates from Canada (TOR2), Hong Kong (CUHK-W1 and HKU39849), Hanoi (URBANI), Guangzhou (GZ01), and Beijing (BJ01, BJ02, BJ03, BJ04). Findings We identified 129 sequence variations among the 14 isolates, with 16 recurrent variant sequences. Common variant sequences at four loci define two distinct genotypes of the SARS virus. One genotype was linked with infections originating in Hotel M in Hong Kong, the second contained isolates from Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Beijing with no association with Hotel M (p<0.0001). Moreover, other common sequence variants further distinguished the geographical origins of the isolates, especially between Singapore and Beijing. Interpretation Despite the recent onset of the SARS epidemic, genetic signatures are emerging that partition the worldwide SARS viral isolates into groups on the basis of contact source history and geography. These signatures can be used to trace sources of infection. In addition, a common variant associated with a non-conservative aminoacid change in the S1 region of the spike protein, suggests that immunological pressures might be starting to influence the evolution of the SARS virus in human populations. Published online May 9, 2003 http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03art4454web.pdf
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              Clinical progression and viral load in a community outbreak of coronavirus-associated SARS pneumonia: a prospective study.

              We investigated the temporal progression of the clinical, radiological, and virological changes in a community outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). We followed up 75 patients for 3 weeks managed with a standard treatment protocol of ribavirin and corticosteroids, and assessed the pattern of clinical disease, viral load, risk factors for poor clinical outcome, and the usefulness of virological diagnostic methods. Fever and pneumonia initially improved but 64 (85%) patients developed recurrent fever after a mean of 8.9 (SD 3.1) days, 55 (73%) had watery diarrhoea after 7.5 (2.3) days, 60 (80%) had radiological worsening after 7.4 (2.2) days, and respiratory symptoms worsened in 34 (45%) after 8.6 (3.0) days. In 34 (45%) patients, improvement of initial pulmonary lesions was associated with appearance of new radiological lesions at other sites. Nine (12%) patients developed spontaneous pneumomediastinum and 15 (20%) developed acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) in week 3. Quantitative reverse-transcriptase (RT) PCR of nasopharyngeal aspirates in 14 patients (four with ARDS) showed peak viral load at day 10, and at day 15 a load lower than at admission. Age and chronic hepatitis B virus infection treated with lamivudine were independent significant risk factors for progression to ARDS (p=0.001). SARS-associated coronavirus in faeces was seen on RT-PCR in 65 (97%) of 67 patients at day 14. The mean time to seroconversion was 20 days. The consistent clinical progression, shifting radiological infiltrates, and an inverted V viral-load profile suggest that worsening in week 2 is unrelated to uncontrolled viral replication but may be related to immunopathological damage.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Emerg Infect Dis
                Emerging Infect. Dis
                EID
                Emerging Infectious Diseases
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                1080-6040
                1080-6059
                February 2004
                : 10
                : 2
                : 217-224
                Affiliations
                [* ]Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
                []Philadelphia Department of Public Health, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
                []New Mexico Department of Health, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA
                Author notes
                Address for correspondence: L. Clifford McDonald, Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, Mailstop A35, Atlanta GA, 30333, USA; fax: 404-639-2647; email: ljm3@ 123456cdc.gov
                Article
                03-0793
                10.3201/eid1002.030793
                3322937
                15030686
                03efbe6b-b9ea-4392-9050-97d3ef3865d4
                History
                Categories
                Research

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                healthcare workers,severe acute respiratory distress syndrome,nosocomial,transmission

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