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Abstract
Human social interaction requires the recognition that other people are governed by
the same types of mental states-beliefs, desires, intentions-that guide one's own
behavior. We used functional neuroimaging to examine how perceivers make mental state
inferences when such self-other overlap can be assumed (when the other is similar
to oneself) and when it cannot (when the other is dissimilar from oneself). We observed
a double dissociation such that mentalizing about a similar other engaged a region
of ventral mPFC linked to self-referential thought, whereas mentalizing about a dissimilar
other engaged a more dorsal subregion of mPFC. The overlap between judgments of self
and similar others suggests the plausibility of "simulation" accounts of social cognition,
which posit that perceivers can use knowledge about themselves to infer the mental
states of others.