Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication

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Abstract

We propose a decoy-pulse method to overcome the photon-number-splitting attack for Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol in the presence of high loss: A legitimate user intentionally and randomly replaces signal pulses by multiphoton pulses (decoy pulses). Then they check the loss of the decoy pulses. If the loss of the decoy pulses is abnormally less than that of signal pulses, the whole protocol is aborted. Otherwise, to continue the protocol, they estimate the loss of signal multiphoton pulses based on that of decoy pulses. This estimation can be done with an assumption that the two losses have similar values. We justify that assumption.

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Conjugate coding

Stephen Wiesner (1983)

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Limitations on practical quantum cryptography

Gilles Brassard, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Tal Mor … (2000)

We provide limits to practical quantum key distribution, taking into account channel losses, a realistic detection process, and imperfections in the "qubits" sent from the sender to the receiver. As we show, even quantum key distribution with perfect qubits might not be achievable over long distances when the other imperfections are taken into account. Furthermore, existing experimental schemes (based on weak pulses) currently do not offer unconditional security for the reported distances and signal strength. Finally we show that parametric down-conversion offers enhanced performance compared to its weak coherent pulse counterpart.