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      Logic, probability, and human reasoning.

      Trends in Cognitive Sciences

      Elsevier BV

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          Abstract

          This review addresses the long-standing puzzle of how logic and probability fit together in human reasoning. Many cognitive scientists argue that conventional logic cannot underlie deductions, because it never requires valid conclusions to be withdrawn - not even if they are false; it treats conditional assertions implausibly; and it yields many vapid, although valid, conclusions. A new paradigm of probability logic allows conclusions to be withdrawn and treats conditionals more plausibly, although it does not address the problem of vapidity. The theory of mental models solves all of these problems. It explains how people reason about probabilities and postulates that the machinery for reasoning is itself probabilistic. Recent investigations accordingly suggest a way to integrate probability and deduction.

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          Most cited references 118

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          On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem

           A Turing (1937)
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            Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.

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              Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate.

              Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory. © The Author(s) 2013.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                25770779
                10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006

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