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      Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money

      1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5
      Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
      The Royal Society

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          Abstract

          Previous research emphasizes people's dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (pay-offs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people's moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement.

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          Most cited references21

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          Why Americans Hate Welfare

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            The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market

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              Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.

              Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
                Proc. R. Soc. B
                The Royal Society
                0962-8452
                1471-2954
                December 22 2014
                December 22 2014
                December 22 2014
                December 22 2014
                : 281
                : 1797
                : 20142112
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA
                [2 ]Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
                [3 ]Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
                [4 ]Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
                [5 ]Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
                Article
                10.1098/rspb.2014.2112
                4240999
                25355480
                13183bb1-1941-460b-bfe7-837865eabcb6
                © 2014
                History

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