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      The Political Economy of Personnel Expenditures: Brazilian States, 1965-1994 Translated title: A Política Econômica dos Gastos com Pessoal: Estados Brasileiros, 1964-1994

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      , ,
      Brazilian Journal of Political Economy
      Editora 34
      Patronage, state politics, Brazil, Patronagem, política estadual, Brasil

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          Abstract

          ABSTRACT The main purpose of the paper is to test a model that explains variation in the ratio of expenditure with personnel in Brazilian states from 1965 to 1994. The independent variables include indicators of the political environment in the distinct states, such as number of veto players and level of political competition. Furthermore, variables that model the business electoral cycle and institutional changes during the period were also included in the model. The budgetary, electoral and legislative data were collected for 22 states from 1965 to 1995. OLS Regression with panel corrected standard errors was used to test the main hypotheses. Results indicate that the impact of political variables appears to be conditioned by the broader national institutional framework. During the authoritarian period expenditures with personnel were influenced by the electoral business cycle and by the presence of more than one party in the state legislature. In the democratic period, electoral vulnerability of state legislators and the electoral cycle are the most important political factors influencing expenditures with personnel.

          Translated abstract

          RESUMO O principal objetivo do trabalho é testar um modelo que explique a variação na razão de gastos com pessoal nos estados brasileiros de 1965 a 1994. As variáveis independentes incluem indicadores do ambiente político nos estados distintos, como número de veto jogadores e nível de competição política. Além disso, variáveis que modelam o ciclo eleitoral empresarial e mudanças institucionais durante o período também foram incluídas no modelo. Os dados orçamentários, eleitorais e legislativos foram coletados para 22 estados de 1965 a 1995. A regressão OLS com erros-padrão corrigidos em painel foi usada para testar as principais hipóteses. Os resultados indicam que o impacto das variáveis políticas parece estar condicionado pelo quadro institucional nacional mais amplo. Durante o período autoritário, os gastos com pessoal foram influenciados pelo ciclo de negócios eleitoral e pela presença de mais de um partido na legislatura estadual. No período democrático, a vulnerabilidade eleitoral dos legisladores estaduais e o ciclo eleitoral são os fatores políticos mais importantes que influenciam os gastos com pessoal.

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          Most cited references15

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          Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities

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            Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis

            This article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase in the ideological difference between current and previous government. These propositions are tested with legislative data (both laws and government decrees) on working time and working conditions identified in two legislative sources: the NATLEX computerized database in Geneva (produced by the International Labour organization) and Blanpain'sInternational Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations.The data cover fifteen West European countries for the period 1981–91. The evidence corroborates the proposed hypotheses.
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              The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96

              David Mayhew'sDivided We Govern(1991) sparked an industry of scholars who alternately challenge or confirm the work on theoretical and empirical grounds. Still, we lack a definitive account of the proportions and causes of legislative gridlock. I revisit the effects of elections and institutions on policy outcomes to propose an alternative theory of gridlock: The distribution of policy preferences within the parties, between the two chambers, and across Congress more broadly is central to explaining the dynamics of gridlock. To test the model, I construct a measure that assesses legislative output in proportion to the policy agenda. Using newspaper editorials to identify every salient legislative issue between 1947 and 1996, I generate Congress-by-Congress gridlock scores and use them to test competing explanations. The results suggest that intrabranch conflict—perhaps more than interbranch rivalry—is critical in shaping deadlock in American politics.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: ND
                Role: ND
                Role: ND
                Journal
                rep
                Brazilian Journal of Political Economy
                Brazil. J. Polit. Econ.
                Editora 34 (São Paulo, SP, Brazil )
                0101-3157
                1809-4538
                March 2005
                : 25
                : 1
                : 53-73
                Affiliations
                [1] Pittsburgh orgnameUniversity of Pittsburgh orgdiv1Department of Political Science United States barrya@ 123456pitt.edu
                [3] Tucson Arizona orgnameUniversity of Arizona orgdiv1Center for Latin American Studies United States lucio_renno@ 123456yahoo.com
                [2] Pittsburgh orgnameUniversity of Pittsburgh orgdiv1Department of Political Science United States tahst47@ 123456pitt.edu
                Article
                S0101-31572005000100004
                10.1590/0101-35172005-1282
                14f6f27d-c155-428b-9c64-8cc6ee9bd6be

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

                History
                : February 2003
                : March 2004
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 38, Pages: 21
                Product

                SciELO Brazil

                Categories
                Articles

                Brazil,Brasil,política estadual,Patronagem,state politics,Patronage

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