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      COVID-19 Trends Among Persons Aged 0–24 Years — United States, March 1–December 12, 2020

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          Abstract

          Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) case and electronic laboratory data reported to CDC were analyzed to describe demographic characteristics, underlying health conditions, and clinical outcomes, as well as trends in laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 incidence and testing volume among U.S. children, adolescents, and young adults (persons aged 0–24 years). This analysis provides a critical update and expansion of previously published data, to include trends after fall school reopenings, and adds preschool-aged children (0–4 years) and college-aged young adults (18–24 years) ( 1 ). Among children, adolescents, and young adults, weekly incidence (cases per 100,000 persons) increased with age and was highest during the final week of the review period (the week of December 6) among all age groups. Time trends in weekly reported incidence for children and adolescents aged 0–17 years tracked consistently with trends observed among adults since June, with both incidence and positive test results tending to increase since September after summer declines. Reported incidence and positive test results among children aged 0–10 years were consistently lower than those in older age groups. To reduce community transmission, which will support schools in operating more safely for in-person learning, communities and schools should fully implement and strictly adhere to recommended mitigation strategies, especially universal and proper masking, to reduce COVID-19 incidence. Children, adolescents, and young adults were stratified into five age groups: 0–4, 5–10, 11–13, 14–17, and 18–24 years to align with educational groupings (i.e., pre-, elementary, middle, and high schools, and institutions of higher education), and trends in these groups were compared with those in adults aged ≥25 years. Confirmed COVID-19 cases, defined as positive real-time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test results for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, were identified from individual-level case reports submitted by state and territorial health departments during March 1–December 12, 2020.* COVID-19 case data for all confirmed cases were analyzed to examine demographic characteristics, underlying health conditions, † and outcomes. Trends in COVID-19 incidence were analyzed using a daily 7-day moving average, aggregated by week, § and expressed as cases per 100,000 persons. ¶ Trends in laboratory testing volume and percentage of positive test results were assessed using COVID-19 electronic laboratory reporting data. SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test results for May 31–December 12, 2020 were obtained from electronic laboratory reporting data submitted to CDC by health departments from 44 states, the District of Columbia, two territories, and one freely associated state; when information was unavailable in state-submitted data, records submitted directly by public health, commercial, and reference laboratories were used.** Data represent test results, not number of persons receiving tests; test result date was used for analyses. The weekly percentage of positive SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test results was calculated as the number of positive test results divided by the sum of positive and negative test results. Because some data elements are incomplete for more than 47% of cases, percentages were calculated only from among those with available information. This project was deemed nonresearch public health practice by the CDC and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy. †† Analyses were conducted using R software (version 4.0.2; The R Foundation). During March 1–December 12, 2020, a total of 2,871,828 laboratory-confirmed cases of COVID-19 in children, adolescents, and young adults aged 0–24 years were reported in the United States. Among these cases, the majority (57.4%) occurred among young adults aged 18–24 years; children and adolescents aged 14–17 years accounted for 16.3% of cases, those 11–13 years for 7.9%, those 5–10 years for 10.9%, and those 0–4 years for 7.4% (Table). Overall, 51.8% of cases occurred in females. Among the 1,504,165 (52.4%) children, adolescents, and young adults with COVID-19 with complete information on race/ethnicity, 50.2% were non-Hispanic White, 27.4% were Hispanic/Latino (Hispanic), and 11.7% were non-Hispanic Black. The proportion of cases among Hispanic persons decreased with increasing age from 34.4% among those aged 0–4 years to 24.6% among those aged 18–24 years. §§ TABLE Demographic characteristics and underlying conditions among persons aged 0–24 years with positive test results for SARS-CoV-2 — United States, March 1–December 12, 2020 Characteristic Age group, yrs, no. (%) 0–24 0–17 0–4 5–10 11–13 14–17 18–24 Total 2,871,828 (100) 1,222,023 (42.6) 212,879 (7.4) 313,913 (10.9) 227,238 (7.9) 467,993 (16.3) 1,649,805 (57.4) Sex Female 1,469,744 (51.8) 603,948 (50.0) 100,935 (48.2) 152,494 (49.1) 111,683 (49.7) 238,836 (51.6) 865,796 (53.1) Male 1,367,271 (48.2) 603,029 (50.0) 108,457 (51.8) 157,769 (50.8) 112,930 (50.3) 223,873 (48.4) 764,242 (46.9) Other 53 (<0.1) 18 (<0.1) 2 (<0.1) 3 (<0.1) 2 (<0.1) 11 (<0.1) 35 (<0.1) Missing/Unknown 34,760 (N/A) 15,028 (N/A) 3,485 (N/A) 3,647 (N/A) 2,623 (N/A) 5,273 (N/A) 19,732 (N/A) Median age (years) 19 9 2 8 12 16 21 Symptom Status Yes 1,247,552 (94.1) 524,390 (91.9) 87,646 (90.4) 126,010 (88.9) 97,831 (91.8) 212,903 (94.5) 723,162 (95.8) No 77,899 (5.9) 46,166 (8.1) 9,281 (9.6) 15,720 (11.1) 8,736 (8.2) 12,429 (5.5) 31,733 (4.2) Missing/Unknown* 1,546,377 (N/A) 651,467 (N/A) 115,952 (N/A) 172,183 (N/A) 120,671 (N/A) 242,661 (N/A) 894,910 (N/A) Race/Ethnicity† Hispanic/Latino 411,775 (27.4) 200,397 (31.0) 38,553 (34.4) 54,457 (33.0) 38,094 (32.0) 69,293 (27.8) 211,378 (24.6) White, non-Hispanic 754,801 (50.2) 292,930 (45.4) 42,384 (37.8) 68,887 (41.8) 53,772 (45.1) 127,887 (51.3) 461,871 (53.8) Black, non-Hispanic 176,059 (11.7) 79,291 (12.3) 16,355 (14.6) 21,308 (12.9) 14,228 (11.9) 27,400 (11.0) 96,768 (11.3) Asian/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic 50,224 (3.3) 21,243 (3.3) 4,716 (4.2) 6,109 (3.7) 3,556 (3.0) 6,862 (2.8) 28,981 (3.4) American Indian/Alaska Native, non-Hispanic 23,396 (1.6) 12,887 (2.0) 2,249 (2.0) 3,653 (2.2) 2,610 (2.2) 4,375 (1.8) 10,509 (1.2) Multiracial/Other race 87,910 (5.8) 38,923 (6.0) 7,860 (7.0) 10,490 (6.4) 6,911 (5.8) 13,662 (5.5) 48,987 (5.7) Missing/Unknown* 1,367,663 (N/A) 576,352 (N/A) 100,762 (N/A) 149,009 (N/A) 108,067 (N/A) 218,514 (N/A) 791,311 (N/A) Underlying condition § Any 114,934 (30.3) 43,388 (27.6) 6,334 (23.7) 10,203 (26.4) 8,206 (28.8) 18,645 (29.5) 71,546 (32.2) None 264,313 (69.7) 113,621 (72.4) 20,426 (76.3) 28,386 (73.6) 20,280 (71.2) 44,529 (70.5) 150,692 (67.8) Missing/Unknown* 2,492,581 (N/A) 1,065,014 (N/A) 186,119 (N/A) 275,324 (N/A) 198,752 (N/A) 404,819 (N/A) 1,427,567 (N/A) Known condition¶ 421,078 (14.7) 176,766 (14.5) 30,665 (14.4) 43,765 (13.9) 32,122 (14.1) 70,214 (15.0) 244,312 (14.8) Chronic lung disease 26,937 (6.4) 10,521 (6) 786 (2.6) 2,495 (5.7) 2,316 (7.2) 4,924 (7.0) 16,416 (6.7) Disability** 4,162 (1.0) 1,992 (1.1) 243 (0.8) 497 (1.1) 411 (1.3) 841 (1.2) 2,170 (0.9) Immunosuppression 3,495 (0.8) 1,373 (0.8) 196 (0.6) 323 (0.7) 237 (0.7) 617 (0.9) 2,122 (0.9) Diabetes mellitus 4,030 (1.0) 1,104 (0.6) 63 (0.2) 133 (0.3) 237 (0.7) 671 (1.0) 2,926 (1.2) Psychological 3,055 (0.7) 1,176 (0.7) 23 (0.1) 153 (0.3) 231 (0.7) 769 (1.1) 1,879 (0.8) Cardiovascular disease 3,103 (0.7) 1,133 (0.6) 266 (0.9) 239 (0.5) 163 (0.5) 465 (0.7) 1,970 (0.8) Current/Former smoker 15,362 (3.6) 798 (0.5) 37 (0.1) 42 (0.1) 39 (0.1) 680 (1.0) 14,564 (6.0) Severe obesity†† 1,865 (0.4) 566 (0.3) 32 (0.1) 109 (0.2) 121 (0.4) 304 (0.4) 1,299 (0.5) Chronic kidney disease 796 (0.2) 336 (0.2) 80 (0.3) 77 (0.2) 44 (0.1) 135 (0.2) 460 (0.2) Hypertension 1,788 (0.4) 272 (0.2) 43 (0.1) 20 (0) 29 (0.1) 180 (0.3) 1,516 (0.6) Autoimmune disease 919 (0.2) 305 (0.2) 17 (0.1) 45 (0.1) 56 (0.2) 187 (0.3) 614 (0.3) Chronic liver disease 407 (0.1) 137 (0.1) 22 (0.1) 24 (0.1) 22 (0.1) 69 (0.1) 270 (0.1) Substance abuse/use 355 (0.1) 72 (<0.1) 1 (<0.1) 1 (<0.1) 6 (<0.1) 64 (0.1) 283 (0.1) Other 10,100 (2.4) 3,511 (2.0) 665 (2.2) 725 (1.7) 581 (1.8) 1,540 (2.2) 6,589 (2.7) Outcome Hospitalized Yes 30,229 (2.5) 11,882 (2.3) 4,294 (4.6) 1,983 (1.5) 1,598 (1.6) 4,007 (2.0) 18,347 (2.7) No 1,172,310 (97.5) 514,834 (97.7) 88,786 (95.4) 132,108 (98.5) 96,021 (98.4) 197,919 (98.0) 657,476 (97.3) Missing/Unknown* 1,669,289 (N/A) 695,307 (N/A) 119,799 (N/A) 179,822 (N/A) 129,619 (N/A) 266,067 (N/A) 973,982 (N/A) ICU admission Yes 1,973 (0.8) 866 (0.8) 288 (1.8) 168 (0.6) 131 (0.6) 279 (0.6) 1,107 (0.8) No 252,961 (99.2) 109,234 (99.2) 16,091 (98.2) 25,968 (99.4) 20,574 (99.4) 46,601 (99.4) 143,727 (99.2) Missing/Unknown* 2,616,894 (N/A) 1,111,923 (N/A) 196,500 (N/A) 287,777 (N/A) 206,533 (N/A) 421,113 (N/A) 1,504,971 (N/A) Died Yes 654 (<0.1) 178 (<0.1) 52 (<0.1) 30 (<0.1) 27 (<0.1) 69 (<0.1) 476 (0.1) No 1,409,626 (100) 620,989 (100) 111,437 (100) 162,971 (100) 115,664 (100) 230,917 (100) 788,637 (99.9) Missing/Unknown* 1,461,548 (N/A) 600,856 (N/A) 101,390 (N/A) 150,912 (N/A) 111,547 (N/A) 237,007 (N/A) 860,692 (N/A) Abbreviations: ICU = intensive care unit; N/A = not available. * Data are missing for more than 47% of cases. Percentages are calculated from among those with available information only. † Cases reported as Hispanic or Latino were categorized as “Hispanic/Latino” regardless of availability of race data. § Underlying conditions were defined based on the categories included in the COVID-19 Case Report Form including diabetes mellitus, hypertension, severe obesity, cardiovascular disease, chronic renal disease, chronic liver disease, chronic lung disease (asthma, emphysema, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [COPD]), other (specified) chronic diseases, other (specified) underlying condition or risk behavior, immunosuppressive conditions, autoimmune conditions, being a current or former smoker, substance abuse or misuse, disability, and psychological/psychiatric condition. Although obesity in children is defined using body mass index percentile, these data are drawn from the COVID-19 Case Report Form, in which severe obesity is defined as noted. ¶ Status of underlying health conditions were known for 421,078 persons aged 0–24 years. Condition status was classified as “known” if any of the conditions included in the COVID-19 Case Report Form were reported as present or absent. Proportion of cases with each individual condition were calculated among persons with known condition status. ** Disability included neurologic or neurodevelopmental disorders, intellectual or physical disability, and vision or hearing impairment. †† Body mass index ≥40 kg/m2. Although obesity in children is defined using body mass index percentile, these data are drawn from the COVID-19 Case Report Form, in which severe obesity is defined as noted. Among persons aged 0–24 years, weekly incidence was higher in each successively increasing age group; weekly incidence among adults aged 25–64 years and ≥65 years exceeded that among children and adolescents aged 0–13 years throughout the review period (Figure 1). Weekly incidence was highest during the final week of the review period (the week of December 6) in all age groups: 99.9 per 100,000 (0–4 years), 131.4 (5–10 years), 180.6 (11–13 years), 255.6 (14–17 years), and 379.3 (18–24 years). Trends in weekly incidence for all age groups aged 0–17 years paralleled those observed among adults since June. The trend in incidence among young adults aged 18–24 years had a distinct and more prominent peak during the week of September 6. FIGURE 1 COVID-19 weekly incidence, * ,† by age group — United States, March 1–December 12, 2020§ Abbreviation: COVID-19 = coronavirus disease 2019. * The 7-day moving average of new cases (current day + 6 preceding days/7) was calculated to smooth expected variation in daily case counts. † Incidence was calculated per 100,000 population using 2019 U.S. Census population estimates obtained from Kids Count Data Center (https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data). § Data included through December 12, 2020, so that each week has a full 7 days of data. The figure is a line chart showing COVID-19 weekly incidence, by age group in the United States during March 1–December 12, 2020. Weekly SARS-CoV-2 laboratory testing among children, adolescents, and young adults increased 423.3% from 435,434 tests during the week beginning May 31 to 2,278,688 tests during the week beginning December 6 (Figure 2). ¶¶ At their peak during the week of November 15, tests conducted among children and adolescents aged 0–17 years represented 9.5% of all tests performed, and tests among young adults aged 18–24 years represented 15.3% (Supplementary Figure 1, URL https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/100246). As observed in trends in incidence, weekly percentage of positive test results among children and adolescents paralleled those of adults, declining between July and September, and then increasing through December (Supplementary Figure 2, URL https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/100246). Percentage of positive test results among young adults aged 18–24 years peaked earlier in June and increased slightly in late August; this was not observed among other age groups. In contrast to incidence, percentage of positive test results among children and adolescents aged 11–17 years exceeded that among younger children for all weeks and that of all age groups since the week beginning September 6; test volumes over time were lowest among children and adolescents aged 11–13 years, suggesting incidence among these age groups might be underestimated. FIGURE 2 Weekly test volume and percentage of SARS-CoV-2-positive test results * among persons aged 0–24 years, by age group — United States, May 31–December 12, 2020 † * By reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction testing. † Data included through December 12, 2020, so that each week has a full 7 days of data. The figure is a combination bar and line chart showing weekly test volume and percentage of SARS-CoV-2-positive test results among persons aged 0–24 years, by age group, in the United States during May 31–December 12, 2020. Among cases reviewed, data were available for 41.9%, 8.9%, and 49.1% of cases for hospitalizations, intensive care unit (ICU) admissions, and deaths, respectively. Among children, adolescents, and young adults with available data for these outcomes, 30,229 (2.5%) were hospitalized, 1,973 (0.8%) required ICU admission, and 654 (<0.1%) died (Table), compared with 16.6%, 8.6%, and 5.0% among adults aged ≥25 years, respectively. Among children, adolescents, and young adults, the largest percentage of hospitalizations (4.6%) and ICU admissions (1.8%) occurred among children aged 0–4 years. Among 379,247 (13.2%) children, adolescents, and young adults with COVID-19 and available data on underlying conditions, at least one underlying condition or underlying health condition was reported for 114,934 (30.3%), compared with 836,774 (60.4%) among adults aged ≥25 years. Discussion Reported weekly incidence of COVID-19 and percentage of positive test results among children, adolescents, and young adults increased during the review period, with spikes in early summer, followed by a decline and then steeply increased in October through December. In general, trends in incidence and percentage of positive test results among preschool-aged children (0–4 years) and school-aged children and adolescents (5–17 years) paralleled those among adults throughout the summer and fall, including during the months that some schools were reopening or open for in-person education. In addition, reported incidence among children, adolescents, and young adults increased with age; among children aged 0–10 years, incidence and percentage of positive test results were consistently lower than they were among older age groups. Case data do not indicate that increases in incidence or percentage of positive test results among adults were preceded by increases among preschool- and school-aged children and adolescents. In contrast, incidence among young adults (aged 18–24 years) was higher than that in other age groups throughout the summer and fall, with peaks in mid-July and early September that preceded increases among other age groups, suggesting that young adults might contribute more to community transmission than do younger children. Findings from national case and laboratory surveillance data complement available evidence regarding risk for transmission in school settings. As of December 7, nearly two thirds (62.0%) of U.S. kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12) school districts offered either full or partial (hybrid with virtual) in-person learning.*** Despite this level of in-person learning, reports to CDC of outbreaks within K–12 schools have been limited, ††† and as of the week beginning December 6, aggregate COVID-19 incidence among the general population in counties where K–12 schools offer in-person education (401.2 per 100,000) was similar to that in counties offering only virtual/online education (418.2 per 100,000).§§§ Several U.S. school districts with routine surveillance of in-school cases report lower incidence among students than in the surrounding communities ¶¶¶ ( 2 ), and a recent study found no increase in COVID-19 hospitalization rates associated with in-person education ( 3 ). In contrast to the evidence regarding K–12 school reopenings, previous studies provide evidence for increased community incidence in counties where institutions of higher education reopened for in-person instruction ( 4 ), and presented case surveillance data showed unique trends. Success in preventing introduction and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in schools depends upon both adherence to mitigation strategies in schools and controlling transmission in communities ( 5 ). In settings with low community incidence, where testing and effective mitigation strategies were in place, studies of in-school transmission have provided preliminary evidence of success in controlling secondary transmission in child care centers and schools ( 6 – 8 ). Schools provide a structured environment that can support adherence to critical mitigation measures to help prevent and slow the spread of COVID-19. When community transmission is high, cases in schools should be expected, and as with any group setting, schools can contribute to COVID-19 transmission ( 5 – 7 ), especially when mitigation measures, such as universal and proper masking, are not implemented or followed. The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, COVID-19 incidence is likely underestimated among children and adolescents because testing volume among these age groups was lower than that for adults, the rate of positive test results was generally higher among children and adolescents (particularly those aged 11–17 years) than that among adults, and testing frequently prioritized persons with symptoms; asymptomatic infection in children and adolescents occurs frequently ( 9 ). Second, data on race/ethnicity, symptom status, underlying conditions, and outcomes are incomplete, and completeness varied by jurisdiction; therefore, results for these variables might be subject to reporting biases and should be interpreted with caution. Future reporting would be enhanced by prioritizing completeness of these indicators for all case surveillance efforts. Third, the reporting of laboratory data differs by jurisdiction and might underrepresent the actual volume of laboratory tests performed; as well, reporting of laboratory and case data are not uniform.**** Finally, the presented analysis explores case surveillance data for children, adolescents, and young adults; trends in cases among teachers and school staff members are not available because cases are not routinely reported nationally by occupations other than health care workers. Lower incidence among younger children and evidence from available studies ( 2 – 8 ) suggest that the risk for COVID-19 introduction and transmission among children associated with reopening child care centers and elementary schools might be lower than that for reopening high schools and institutions of higher education. However, for schools to operate safely to accommodate in-person learning, communities should fully implement and strictly adhere to multiple mitigation strategies, especially universal and proper masking, to reduce COVID-19 incidence within the community as well as within schools to protect students, teachers, and staff members. CDC recommends that K–12 schools be the last settings to close after all other mitigation measures have been employed and the first to reopen when they can do so safely ( 10 ). CDC offers tools †††† to help child care programs, schools, colleges and universities, parents, and caregivers plan, prepare, and respond to COVID-19, thereby helping to protect students, teachers, and staff members and slowing community spread of COVID-19. Summary What is already known about this topic? Studies have consistently shown that children, adolescents, and young adults are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infections. Children and adolescents have had lower incidence and fewer severe COVID-19 outcomes than adults. What is added by this report? COVID-19 cases in children, adolescents, and young adults have increased since summer 2020, with weekly incidence higher in each successively increasing age group. Trends among children and adolescents aged 0–17 years paralleled those among adults. What are the implications for public health practice? To enable safer in-person learning, schools and communities should fully implement and strictly adhere to multiple mitigation strategies, especially universal and proper mask wearing, to reduce both school and community COVID-19 incidence to help protect students, teachers, and staff members from COVID-19.

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          Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Australian educational settings: a prospective cohort study

          Summary Background School closures have occurred globally during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, empiric data on transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children and in educational settings are scarce. In Australia, most schools have remained open during the first epidemic wave, albeit with reduced student physical attendance at the epidemic peak. We examined SARS-CoV-2 transmission among children and staff in schools and early childhood education and care (ECEC) settings in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW). Methods Laboratory-confirmed paediatric (aged ≤18 years) and adult COVID-19 cases who attended a school or ECEC setting while considered infectious (defined as 24 h before symptom onset based on national guidelines during the study period) in NSW from Jan 25 to April 10, 2020, were investigated for onward transmission. All identified school and ECEC settings close contacts were required to home quarantine for 14 days, and were monitored and offered SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid testing if symptomatic. Enhanced investigations in selected educational settings included nucleic acid testing and SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing in symptomatic and asymptomatic contacts. Secondary attack rates were calculated and compared with state-wide COVID-19 rates. Findings 15 schools and ten ECEC settings had children (n=12) or adults (n=15) attend while infectious, with 1448 contacts monitored. Of these, 633 (43·7%) of 1448 had nucleic acid testing, or antibody testing, or both, with 18 secondary cases identified (attack rate 1·2%). Five secondary cases (three children; two adults) were identified (attack rate 0·5%; 5/914) in three schools. No secondary transmission occurred in nine of ten ECEC settings among 497 contacts. However, one outbreak in an ECEC setting involved transmission to six adults and seven children (attack rate 35·1%; 13/37). Across all settings, five (28·0%) of 18 secondary infections were asymptomatic (three infants [all aged 1 year], one adolescent [age 15 years], and one adult). Interpretation SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates were low in NSW educational settings during the first COVID-19 epidemic wave, consistent with mild infrequent disease in the 1·8 million child population. With effective case-contact testing and epidemic management strategies and associated small numbers of attendances while infected, children and teachers did not contribute significantly to COVID-19 transmission via attendance in educational settings. These findings could be used to inform modelling and public health policy regarding school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Funding NSW Government Department of Health.
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            SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission in educational settings: a prospective, cross-sectional analysis of infection clusters and outbreaks in England

            Background Understanding severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection and transmission in educational settings is crucial for ensuring the safety of staff and children during the COVID-19 pandemic. We estimated the rate of SARS-CoV-2 infection and outbreaks among staff and students in educational settings during the summer half-term (June–July, 2020) in England. Methods In this prospective, cross-sectional analysis, Public Health England initiated enhanced national surveillance in educational settings in England that had reopened after the first national lockdown, from June 1 to July 17, 2020. Educational settings were categorised as early years settings (<5-year-olds), primary schools (5–11-year-olds; only years 1 and 6 allowed to return), secondary schools (11–18-year-olds; only years 10 and 12), or mixed-age settings (spanning a combination of the above). Further education colleges were excluded. Data were recorded in HPZone, an online national database for events that require public health management. RT-PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 event rates and case rates were calculated for staff and students, and direction of transmission was inferred on the basis of symptom onset and testing dates. Events were classified as single cases, coprimary cases (at least two confirmed cases within 48 h, typically within the same household), and outbreaks (at least two epidemiologically linked cases, with sequential cases diagnosed within 14 days in the same educational setting). All events were followed up for 28 days after educational settings closed for the summer holidays. Negative binomial regression was used to correlate educational setting events with regional population, population density, and community incidence. Findings A median of 38 000 early years settings (IQR 35 500–41 500), 15 600 primary schools (13 450–17 300), and 4000 secondary schools (3700–4200) were open each day, with a median daily attendance of 928 000 students (630 000–1 230 000) overall. There were 113 single cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection, nine coprimary cases, and 55 outbreaks. The risk of an outbreak increased by 72% (95% CI 28–130) for every five cases per 100 000 population increase in community incidence (p<0·0001). Staff had higher incidence than students (27 cases [95% CI 23–32] per 100 000 per day among staff compared with 18 cases [14–24] in early years students, 6·0 cases [4·3–8·2] in primary schools students, and 6·8 cases [2·7–14] in secondary school students]), and most cases linked to outbreaks were in staff members (154 [73%] staff vs 56 [27%] children of 210 total cases). Probable direction of transmission was staff to staff in 26 outbreaks, staff to student in eight outbreaks, student to staff in 16 outbreaks, and student to student in five outbreaks. The median number of secondary cases in outbreaks was one (IQR 1–2) for student index cases and one (1–5) for staff index cases. Interpretation SARS-CoV-2 infections and outbreaks were uncommon in educational settings during the summer half-term in England. The strong association with regional COVID-19 incidence emphasises the importance of controlling community transmission to protect educational settings. Interventions should focus on reducing transmission in and among staff. Funding Public Health England.
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              Summary of Guidance for Public Health Strategies to Address High Levels of Community Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and Related Deaths, December 2020

              In the 10 months since the first confirmed case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was reported in the United States on January 20, 2020 ( 1 ), approximately 13.8 million cases and 272,525 deaths have been reported in the United States. On October 30, the number of new cases reported in the United States in a single day exceeded 100,000 for the first time, and by December 2 had reached a daily high of 196,227.* With colder weather, more time spent indoors, the ongoing U.S. holiday season, and silent spread of disease, with approximately 50% of transmission from asymptomatic persons ( 2 ), the United States has entered a phase of high-level transmission where a multipronged approach to implementing all evidence-based public health strategies at both the individual and community levels is essential. This summary guidance highlights critical evidence-based CDC recommendations and sustainable strategies to reduce COVID-19 transmission. These strategies include 1) universal face mask use, 2) maintaining physical distance from other persons and limiting in-person contacts, 3) avoiding nonessential indoor spaces and crowded outdoor spaces, 4) increasing testing to rapidly identify and isolate infected persons, 5) promptly identifying, quarantining, and testing close contacts of persons with known COVID-19, 6) safeguarding persons most at risk for severe illness or death from infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, 7) protecting essential workers with provision of adequate personal protective equipment and safe work practices, 8) postponing travel, 9) increasing room air ventilation and enhancing hand hygiene and environmental disinfection, and 10) achieving widespread availability and high community coverage with effective COVID-19 vaccines. In combination, these strategies can reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission, long-term sequelae or disability, and death, and mitigate the pandemic’s economic impact. Consistent implementation of these strategies improves health equity, preserves health care capacity, maintains the function of essential businesses, and supports the availability of in-person instruction for kindergarten through grade 12 schools and preschool. Individual persons, households, and communities should take these actions now to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission from its current high level. These actions will provide a bridge to a future with wide availability and high community coverage of effective vaccines, when safe return to more everyday activities in a range of settings will be possible. Recommended Public Health Strategies Universal use of face masks. Consistent and correct use of face masks is a public health strategy critical to reducing respiratory transmission of SARS-CoV-2, particularly in light of estimates that approximately one half of new infections are transmitted by persons who have no symptoms ( 2 , 3 ). Compelling evidence now supports the benefits of cloth face masks for both source control (to protect others) and, to a lesser extent, protection of the wearer. † To preserve the supply of N95 respirators for health care workers and other medical first responders, CDC recommends nonvalved, multilayer cloth masks or nonmedical disposable masks for community use. § Face mask use is most important in indoor spaces and outdoors when physical distance of ≥6 feet cannot be maintained. Within households, face masks should be used when a member of the household is infected or has had recent potential COVID-19 exposure (e.g., known close contact or potential exposure related to occupation, crowded public settings, travel, or nonhousehold members in your house). A community-level plan for distribution of face masks to specific populations, such as those who might experience barriers to access, should be developed (Table). TABLE Individual- and community-level public health strategies to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission* Recommended public health strategies Individual- and household-level strategies Community-level strategies (at state or local level) Links to guidance Universal use of face masks Consistent and correct use of face masks, including within the household if there is a COVID-19 case or a person with a known or possible exposure in the household Issue policies or directives mandating universal use of face masks in indoor (nonhousehold) settings Considerations for wearing masks: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover-guidance.html Plan for provision of face masks for specific populations if needed Caring for someone sick at home, when to wear a mask or gloves: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/care-for-someone.html#face-covering Protect your home: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/protect-your-home.html Physical distancing and limiting contacts Maintain physical distance (≥6 feet) from other persons when possible, and limit number of contacts with persons outside the immediate household Physical barriers and visual reminders might promote adherence to maintaining physical distance Social distancing: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html Personal and social activities: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/personal-social-activities.html Avoid nonessential indoor spaces and crowded outdoor settings Avoid nonessential indoor spaces and crowded outdoor settings Issue policies or directives restricting some nonessential indoor spaces that pose the highest risk for transmission Daily activities and going out: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/going-out.html Promoting flexible worksites (e.g., telework); apply limits to occupancy of indoor spaces and to the size of social gatherings Considerations for events and gatherings: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/large-events/considerations-for-events-gatherings.html Increased testing, diagnosis, and isolation Persons with a known exposure to someone with COVID-19, with possible exposure, or who experience symptoms should promptly seek testing; symptomatic or infected persons should isolate promptly; exposed persons should quarantine Increase access to testing, including expanded screening testing of prioritized persons/groups, prioritizing those with many interactions (or interactions with persons at high risk) based on their occupational or residential setting Testing: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/testing/index.html Expanded screening testing: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/expanded-screening-testing.html Promptly report test results to the person tested and to public health authorities Isolate if you are sick: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/isolation.html Guidance for health departments about COVID-19 testing in the community: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/testing.html Prompt case investigation and contact tracing to identify, quarantine, and test close contacts Persons with diagnosed COVID-19 should provide names of known contacts; close contacts should anticipate a call from the health department, answer the call, adhere to quarantine, seek testing, and encourage their household members to quarantine When incidence is high and overwhelms capacity, prioritize case investigation and contact tracing to promptly quarantine and test close contacts, based on time since sample collection and risk for spread to others (e.g., those working in high-density settings) When to quarantine: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/quarantine.html Contact tracing (your health): https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/contact-tracing.html Contact tracing (health departments): https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/open-america/contact-tracing/index.html Prioritizing case investigation and contact tracing: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/prioritization.html Quarantine: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/scientific-brief-options-to-reduce-quarantine.html Safeguarding persons most at risk for severe illness or death Persons with underlying medical conditions or risk factors that place them at increased risk for severe illness or death should minimize contact with nonhousehold members and nonessential indoor spaces Protect persons most at risk for severe illness or death through 1) identifying populations at high risk in the community and 2) expanding access to testing, provision of support services, and messaging People at increased risk: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/index.html Protecting essential workers Essential workers should employ all available public health strategies to reduce their risk (e.g., wear face masks and keep physical distance) Protect essential workers through policies directing administrative and structural prevention as well as expanded testing Essential services and critical infrastructure: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/workplaces-businesses/essential-services.html COVID-19 critical infrastructure sector response planning: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/critical-infrastructure-sectors.html CISA guidance on the essential critical infrastructure workforce: https://www.cisa.gov/publication/guidance-essential-critical-infrastructure-workforce Postponing travel Travel should be postponed. Those who choose to travel internationally should be tested with a viral test 1–3 days before departure and retested 3–5 days after arrival; domestic travelers should also consider getting tested Issue policies or directives mandating universal use of face masks on all modes of public transportation Travel: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/index.html Travelers should stay home or reduce nonessential activities before and after travel and be diligent about mask wearing, physical distancing, hand hygiene, and symptom monitoring When not to travel: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/when-to-delay-travel.html Wear face masks on public transportation conveyances and at transportation hubs: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/face-masks-public-transportation.html Mask and travel guidance: https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/masks/mask-travel-guidance.html Domestic travel: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-during-covid19.html Testing and international air travel: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/testing-air-travel.html Increased room air ventilation, enhanced hand hygiene, and cleaning and disinfection Increase room air ventilation Enhance ventilation and cleaning and disinfection, particularly of essential indoor spaces SARS-CoV-2 and potential airborne transmission: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/scientific-brief-sars-cov-2.html Frequent handwashing Ensure provision of adequate hand sanitation supplies Ventilation: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/general-business-faq.html#Ventilation When and how to wash your hands: https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/when-how-handwashing.html Cleaning and disinfecting: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/clean-disinfect/index.html Widespread availability and coverage with effective vaccines Seek vaccine when appropriate following ACIP recommendations Plan for distribution and administration of vaccines to achieve high community coverage Vaccines: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/index.html Continue to follow all mitigation measures until community vaccination coverage is adequate Communicate that mitigation measures still need to be followed until community vaccination coverage is determined to be adequate Vaccination planning: https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/planning/index.html Abbreviations: ACIP = Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices; COVID-19 = coronavirus disease 2019. * https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/communication/guidance-list.html . Physical distancing and limiting contacts. Maintaining physical distance (≥6 feet) lowers the risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection through exposure to infectious respiratory droplets and aerosols and is important, even if no symptoms are apparent, because transmission can occur from asymptomatic infected persons ¶ ( 2 , 3 ). Outside the household setting, close physical contact, shared meals, and being in enclosed spaces have all been associated with an increased infection risk ( 4 – 7 ). Although the impact of physical distancing is difficult to disaggregate from other interventions, one study estimated that physical distancing decreased the average number of daily contacts by as much as 74% and reduced the reproductive number (R0, a measure of transmission, which describes the average number of persons infected by one infectious person) to 40% of persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 might be asymptomatic, and transmission from presymptomatic persons (those who are not symptomatic at the time they transmit infection, but who later experience symptoms) and asymptomatic persons (infected persons who never experience symptoms) is estimated to account for >50% of all transmission ( 2 , 3 ). Therefore, reliance on symptom screening to identify infected persons is inadequate ( 12 ). Increased testing is an important strategy to interrupt silent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from asymptomatic and presymptomatic persons. However, because the sensitivity of available tests and the time since exposure varies, a negative test might provide false reassurance; thus, all prevention strategies should continue to be followed including use of face masks and maintaining physical distance. A comparative analysis of data from six large countries demonstrated that high levels of testing, combined with robust contact tracing, can substantially reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 ( 13 ). Frequent testing and contact tracing, combined with other mitigation measures, effectively limited SARS-CoV-2 transmission on a college campus ( 14 ). In addition to testing symptomatic persons and those with known exposure, a strategy of routinely testing certain population groups with high numbers of interactions with other persons, based on their occupational or residential setting, can more rapidly identify asymptomatic and presymptomatic infectious persons and their close contacts for isolation and quarantine. ¶¶ Communities with high or increasing SARS-CoV-2 transmission should increase screening testing, focusing on persons at increased risk for exposure (e.g., workers in high-density worksites) or persons who might have the potential to transmit infection to large numbers of other persons (e.g., persons working in congregate settings) or to transmit to persons at risk for severe COVID-19–associated illness or death (e.g., staff members in nursing homes). Expanded screening testing should be implemented in a manner that promotes health equity for persons with limited resources or other barriers to accessing health care. In addition, prompt reporting of test results to the person tested and to public health authorities can facilitate rapid isolation, case investigation and contact tracing, and accurate monitoring of COVID-19 in the community. Prompt case investigation and contact tracing to identify, quarantine, and test close contacts. Case investigation is the process of obtaining comprehensive information about persons with a diagnosis of COVID-19 and is followed by contact tracing, which includes identifying and communicating with persons exposed to SARS-CoV-2 (i.e., close contacts***) to inform them of their exposure, educate them about risks for and symptoms of COVID-19, and encourage them to quarantine, seek testing, and monitor themselves for signs or symptoms of illness. ††† Quarantine is used to keep a person who was exposed to SARS-CoV-2 away from others. §§§ Contact tracing is most feasible when the incidence of COVID-19 in the community or workplace is low or declining, when testing and reporting of results can occur quickly ( 15 ), and when most contacts can be reached and quarantined ( 16 ). When one or more of these conditions is not met or when local capacity is overwhelmed, health departments should narrow the scope of contact tracing activities and emphasize community mitigation measures. Investigations should prioritize persons who most recently received positive SARS-CoV-2 test results, as well as identify and quarantine household contacts and persons exposed in a congregate living facility, high-density workplace, or other setting (or event) with potential extensive transmission. ¶¶¶ Because the risk for household transmission is high and occurs rapidly in the absence of face masks or other protective behaviors, household members of persons with diagnosed COVID-19 should be quarantined, and, in the event that they experience symptoms or receive a positive test result, they should be isolated ( 9 , 17 ). Eliciting and reaching contacts in a timely manner is challenging ( 18 , 19 ), and quarantine can impose economic and financial burdens ( 20 ); adherence to quarantine might require provision of appropriate support services.**** Persons who receive positive SARS-COV-2 test results should also be encouraged to serve as their own contact tracers by informing close contacts that they have been exposed and encouraging those persons to quarantine, monitor for symptoms, and seek testing. Safeguarding persons most at risk for severe illness or death. To protect those who are at highest risk for severe COVID-19–associated outcomes, universal mitigation efforts are needed. SARS-CoV-2 infection can be completely asymptomatic or can manifest as a life-threatening illness; disease can result in postacute and long-term sequelae or disability among survivors. Risk for severe illness increases with age and is highest for those aged ≥85 years. †††† In the United States, approximately 80% of reported COVID-19 deaths have occurred in patients aged ≥65 years. Certain underlying medical conditions also increase risk for severe illness or death for persons of any age with COVID-19. §§§§ Long-term care facilities serve older adults and persons with complex medical conditions; COVID-19 can spread rapidly in these congregate settings, resulting in high rates of morbidity and mortality. To prevent introduction and transmission of SARS-CoV-2, these facilities should implement strict infection prevention and control measures and expanded screening testing of both staff members and residents to rapidly identify and isolate infected persons. ¶¶¶¶ COVID-19 has also disproportionately affected racial and ethnic minority groups.***** An age-standardized analysis of COVID-19–associated deaths reported to the National Vital Statistics System through November 25, 2020, found that Black persons accounted for 26.9% of COVID-19–related deaths, despite representing 12.7% of the U.S. population. ††††† Persons who belong to racial or ethnic minority groups are likewise disproportionately affected by the underlying medical conditions that increase risk for severe COVID-19 illness and death, likely because of long-standing inequities in social determinants of health. Members of racial or ethnic minority groups are more likely to experience lower socioeconomic status, to live in crowded housing, and possibly to be employed in occupations that require in-person work. §§§§§ In addition, access to health care might be limited, including obtaining testing and care for COVID-19. Persons who are at highest risk for severe COVID-19–associated illness or death or who share a household with someone at high risk should minimize their individual and household risk by avoiding nonessential interactions with persons outside their household whenever possible and implementing all recommended public health prevention strategies. Some approaches to safeguarding those with underlying medical conditions include promoting access to and use of telehealth when feasible and appropriate, use of no-contact pickup for groceries or other essential items, and use of online (versus in-person) educational instruction. Protecting essential workers. Essential (critical infrastructure) workers include health care personnel and employees in other essential workplaces (e.g., first responders and grocery store workers). ¶¶¶¶¶ Protecting essential workers requires full implementation of all evidence-based strategies outlined in this guidance. When a COVID-19 vaccine is authorized for use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), essential workers, including health care personnel, are among the populations being considered for initial phased allocation of limited vaccine doses ( 21 ). Implementation of infection prevention and control with adequate supplies and extensive use of telehealth options and nurse-directed triage of patients, as well as screening of all persons entering health care facilities for signs and symptoms of COVID-19, can protect health care personnel and reduce risk for SARS-CoV-2 transmission in health care facilities.****** U.S. food manufacturing and agriculture is another sector that has been substantially affected by COVID-19, especially among workers in meat and poultry processing facilities, with disproportionate effects among persons who belong to racial or ethnic minority groups ( 22 ). CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration released guidance on administrative and engineering controls that should be part of COVID-19 assessment and control plans for these workplaces. †††††† When cessation of operation of a facility might cause serious harm or danger to public health or safety, essential workers who are known close contacts of persons with confirmed COVID-19 might need to return to work as a last resort; however, if they return to work, they should use face masks and maintain physical distancing, and the workplace should be appropriately disinfected. §§§§§§ These persons should only return to work if they are and remain asymptomatic and undergo at least daily active symptom monitoring with immediate removal from the workplace if any signs or symptoms of possible COVID-19 occur; viral testing of all close contacts is recommended, and those with positive test results should not return to work. Postponing travel. Travel increases the likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 exposure and infection and could translocate infection between communities. Postponing travel is the best way to reduce this risk. ¶¶¶¶¶¶ Any traveler who is symptomatic, has had close contact with a person with COVID-19 and has not met criteria for release from quarantine, or has a positive or pending SARS-CoV-2 test result should not travel.******* For those contemplating international travel, CDC recommends getting tested with a viral test for SARS-CoV-2 1–3 days before departure and getting retested 3–5 days after arrival. ††††††† Domestic travelers should also consider testing. Testing does not eliminate all risk and should be combined with other recommended public health strategies. Both domestic and international travelers should stay home or reduce nonessential activities before travel, and for 7 days after travel if tested, even if test results are negative. If not tested, this period should be extended to 10 days. Travelers should be diligent about mask wearing, physical distancing, hand hygiene, and symptom monitoring. For 14 days after arrival, travelers should avoid close contact with persons at higher risk for severe COVID-19–associated outcomes and wear masks in household spaces shared with those who did not travel. Increased room air ventilation, enhanced hand hygiene, and cleaning and disinfection. Increasing room air ventilation, enhancing hand hygiene, and cleaning and disinfecting frequently touched surfaces might help decrease transmission of SARS-CoV-2 ( 23 ). §§§§§§§ Although the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 suggests that most transmission is close person-to-person, there have been some documented cases of presumed airborne transmission. ¶¶¶¶¶¶¶ Avoiding nonessential indoor spaces can help reduce this risk. For indoor settings, increased room air ventilation can decrease the concentration of small droplets and particles carrying infectious virus suspended in the air and, thereby, presumably decrease the risk for transmission.******** Hand hygiene includes handwashing with soap and water or using alcohol-based hand sanitizer. †††††††† Handwashing mechanically removes pathogens, and laboratory data demonstrate that hand sanitizers that contain at least 60% alcohol inactivate SARS-CoV-2 ( 24 ). These strategies, combined with appropriate cleaning and disinfection of surfaces, might prevent indirect transmission through touching surfaces contaminated with virus from an infected person, followed by touching the mouth, nose, or eyes. Widespread availability and use of effective vaccines. Widespread availability and high community coverage with safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines represent the most important public health strategy to control the pandemic. Many COVID-19 vaccine candidates are currently in clinical trials. Promising products are being manufactured in anticipation of Emergency Use Authorization from the FDA. The federal government has established a centralized system to order, distribute, and track COVID-19 vaccines through states, tribal nations, and territories; these jurisdictions are preparing for vaccination with extensive planning for vaccine distribution and administration.§§§§§§§§ After FDA authorization of the use of one or more COVID-19 vaccines in the United States, the ACIP will review safety and efficacy data for each of the authorized vaccines and will issue recommendations for use to ensure equitable access ( 21 , 25 ). Ensuring transparency in these efforts, monitoring for adverse events, and working with communities to address concerns will be critical to obtaining the confidence and trust of the public and health care providers. CDC and FDA will monitor the effectiveness and safety of all COVID-19 vaccines and update and communicate this information regularly. Vaccinated persons should continue to adhere to all mitigation measures (e.g., mask use, physical distancing, and hand hygiene) until both doses in the series have been received and the duration of immunity provided by vaccines has been sufficiently established. Discussion No single strategy can control the pandemic; rather, a multipronged approach using all available evidence-based strategies at the individual and community levels can break transmission chains and address high levels of community transmission; reduce related illnesses, long-term sequelae, and deaths; and mitigate the pandemic’s economic impact. Because COVID-19 has disproportionately affected persons with certain risk factors (e.g., age and some underlying medical conditions) and racial/ethnic minorities, implementing public health prevention strategies in a manner that assures health equity is imperative to safeguard those who have borne the worst of the pandemic’s impact. The U.S. health care system is being stressed by COVID-19, with multiple jurisdictions establishing expanded or alternative treatment settings. Continuing mitigation efforts will be essential to preserve capacity for adequate treatment of persons with COVID-19 and other urgent health conditions, and to protect essential and preventive services that are not amenable to telehealth. Schools provide numerous benefits beyond education, including school meal programs and social, physical, behavioral, and mental health services. Because of their critical role for all children and the disproportionate impact that school closures can have on those with the least economic means, kindergarten through grade 12 schools should be the last settings to close after all other mitigation measures have been employed and the first to reopen when they can do so safely. ¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶ Similarly, full implementation of public health prevention strategies can help preserve the functioning of essential businesses that supply food to the population, contribute to the health protection of communities and individual persons, and fuel economic recovery. Full implementation of and adherence to these strategies will save lives. As communities respond to high levels of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, these strategies will also provide the necessary bridge to a future with wide availability and high levels of coverage with effective vaccines, and thereby a safe return to more everyday activities in a range of settings. Summary What is already known about this topic? The United States is experiencing high levels of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. What is added by this report? COVID-19 pandemic control requires a multipronged application of evidence-based strategies while improving health equity: universal face mask use, physical distancing, avoiding nonessential indoor spaces, increasing testing, prompt quarantine of exposed persons, safeguarding those at increased risk for severe illness or death, protecting essential workers, postponing travel, enhancing ventilation and hand hygiene, and achieving widespread COVID-19 vaccination coverage. What are the implications for public health practice? These combined strategies will protect health care, essential businesses, and schools, bridging to a future with high community coverage of effective vaccines and safe return to more activities in a range of settings.
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                Journal
                MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
                MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
                WR
                Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                0149-2195
                1545-861X
                22 January 2021
                22 January 2021
                : 70
                : 3
                : 88-94
                Affiliations
                [1 ]CDC COVID-19 Emergency Response Team.
                Author notes
                Corresponding author: Erin K. Sauber-Schatz, ige7@ 123456cdc.gov .
                Article
                mm7003e1
                10.15585/mmwr.mm7003e1
                7821770
                33476314
                16f7a3a5-4e76-4a32-be49-095ca7af1246

                All material in the MMWR Series is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission; citation as to source, however, is appreciated.

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