Summary
In debates about the welfare of animals, different people have tended to emphasize
different concerns. Some emphasize the basic health and functioning of animals, especially
freedom from disease and injury. Others emphasize the "affective states" of animals
– states like pain, distress and pleasure that are experienced as positive or negative.
Others emphasize the ability of animals to live reasonably natural lives by carrying
out natural behaviour and having natural elements in their environment. These concerns
constitute different criteria that people use to assess animal welfare. The criteria
overlap substantially but are sufficiently independent that the single-minded pursuit
of any one criterion may lead to poor welfare as judged by the others. The different
criteria reflect different sets of values that have been in conflict since the early
debates about human welfare during the Industrial Revolution, with one side valuing
a simple, natural life while the other values progress, productivity, and a life improved
by science and technology. Scientific research on animal welfare has been based on
the various criteria of welfare. Such research has helped to identify and solve animal
welfare problems through improved housing and management of animals. However, the
research has not resolved the differences attributable to the different criteria of
animal welfare. Rather, the different criteria have provided the rationale for diverse
approaches to animal welfare research. Thus, our understanding of animal welfare is
both values-based and science-based. In this respect, animal welfare is like many
other topics of "mandated" science such as food safety and environmental sustainability
where the tools of science are used within a framework of values.
A dilemma
To understand animal welfare and its scientific assessment, let us begin with a dilemma
that threatened to throw animal welfare science into disarray.
In 1997 a scientific committee of the European Union reviewed the literature on the
welfare of intensively kept pigs. The committee asked, among other questions, whether
welfare problems are caused by housing sows in "gestation stalls" where the animals
are unable to walk, socialize, or perform most other natural behaviour during the
majority of pregnancy. The review concluded that, "Some serious welfare problems for
sows persist even in the best stall-housing system" [1], and with this review in hand
the European Union passed a directive to ban the gestation stall as of 2013.
Not long after, a group of Australian scientists reviewed much the same literature
and asked much the same question, but came up with essentially the opposite conclusion.
They concluded that, "Both individual (i.e. stalls) and group housing can meet the
welfare requirements of pigs." They also cautioned "public perceptions may result
in difficulties with the concept of confinement housing" but that "the issue of public
perception should not be confused with welfare" [2]. The swine industry in the United
States has used that review, plus a similar one, to argue that there is no scientific
basis for eliminating the gestation stall.
Very accomplished and capable scientists did both of these reviews with great thoroughness,
and both groups likely felt that they had done the best and most objective job possible.
What, then, went wrong? How could two groups of scientists review the same scientific
literature and come up with opposite conclusions? If we can solve this dilemma, the
solution will take us a long way toward understanding animal welfare and its scientific
assessment.
Different views of animal welfare
To solve this problem, we need to go back to the debate that arose several decades
ago when concerns were first expressed about the welfare of animals in the then-new
confinement systems of animal production.
The first major criticism of confinement systems came in the book Animal Machines,
by the English animal advocate Ruth Harrison [3]. She described cages for laying hens
and crates for veal calves, and she claimed that these systems are so unnatural that
they cause animals to lead miserable and unhealthy lives. She went on to ask:
"How far have we the right to take our domination of the animal world? Have we the
right to rob them of all pleasure in life simply to make more money more quickly out
of their carcasses? A decade later, in Animal Liberation, Australian philosopher Peter
Singer [4] based his criticism of confinement production on the principle that actions
should be judged right or wrong on the basis of the pain or pleasure that they cause.
He claimed:
"There can be no moral justification for regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals
feel as less important than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans."
In these and other quotations a key concern centred on words like "pleasure", "pain",
"suffering", and "happiness". There is no simple English word to capture this class
of concepts. They are sometimes called "feelings", but that term seems too insubstantial
for states like pain and suffering. They are sometimes called "emotions", but emotions
do not include states like hunger and thirst. Perhaps the most accurate, if rather
technical, term is "affective states", a term that refers to emotions and other feelings
that are experienced as pleasant or unpleasant rather than hedonically neutral.
In discussing confinement systems, however, some people put the emphasis elsewhere.
A British committee that was formed to evaluate the welfare of farm animals concluded:
"In principle we disapprove of a degree of confinement of an animal which necessarily
frustrates most of the major activities which make up its natural behaviour." [5]
Astrid Lindgren, the famous author of the Pippi Longstocking stories and a driving
force behind animal welfare reform in Sweden, proposed:
"Let [farm animals] see the sun just once, get away from the murderous roar of the
fans. Let them get to breathe fresh air for once, instead of manure gas." [6]
And American philosopher Bernard Rollin insisted that we need:
"... a much increased concept of welfare. Not only will welfare mean control of pain
and suffering, it will also entail nurturing and fulfilment of the animals' natures."
[7]
In these quotations, although affective states were often involved implicitly or explicitly,
the central concern was for a degree of "naturalness" in the lives of animals: that
animals should be able to perform their natural behaviour, that there should be natural
elements in their environment, and that we should respect the "nature" of the animals
themselves. All of the above quotations reflected the views of social critics and
philosophers, but when farmers and veterinarians engaged in the debate, they brought
a different focus. For example, one veterinarian defended confinement systems this
way:
"My experience has been that ... by-and-large the standard of welfare among animals
kept in the so called "intensive" systems is higher. On balance I feel that the animal
is better cared for; it is certainly much freer from disease and attack by its mates;
it receives much better attention from the attendants, is sure of shelter and bedding
and a reasonable amount of good food and water." [8]
Or as the veterinary educator David Sainsbury put it:
"Good health is the birthright of every animal that we rear, whether intensively or
otherwise. If it becomes diseased we have failed in our duty to the animal and subjected
it to a degree of suffering that cannot be readily estimated." [9]
Here the primary emphasis is on the fairly traditional concerns of veterinarians and
animal producers that animals should have freedom from disease and injury, plus food,
water, shelter and other necessities of life – concerns that we might sum up as the
basic health and functioning of the animals.
In these various quotations, then, we see a variety of concerns that can be grouped
roughly under three broad headings: one centres on the affective states of animals,
one on the ability of animals to lead reasonably natural lives, and one emphasizes
basic health and functioning. These are not, of course, completely separate or mutually
exclusive; in fact, they often go hand in hand. Harrison and Lindgren clearly believed
that allowing animals to live a more natural life would make them more happy and healthy;
Sainsbury clearly believed that unhealthy animals would suffer.
Nonetheless, the different areas of emphasis are sufficiently independent that the
pursuit of any one does not necessarily improve animal welfare as judged by the other
criteria. Fifty years ago the American psychologist Harry Harlow wanted to create
a colony of disease-free monkeys for research purposes. To do this Harlow separated
infant rhesus macaques from their mothers a few hours after birth, and raised them
in individual cages where they could be isolated from pathogens. The monkeys could
see and hear each other but they had no physical contact. The method produced monkeys
with excellent physical health, but as the animals matured Harlow realized that they
were, in his words, "emotionally disturbed":
"As a group they exhibit abnormalities of behavior rarely seen in animals born in
the wild and brought to the laboratory as preadolescents or adolescents, even after
the latter have been housed in individual cages for many years. The laboratory-born
monkeys sit in their cages and stare fixedly into space, circle their cages in a repetitive
stereotyped manner and clasp their heads in their hands or arms and rock for long
periods of time." [10]
In this example, the single-minded pursuit of physical health led to animals that
had very unnatural and seemingly unhappy lives.
What if we pursue only naturalness? Various studies of outdoor rearing systems show
that animals may have plenty of fresh air and freedom to perform their natural behaviour,
but may also be challenged by parasites, predators, and harsh weather that could be
better controlled in more artificial conditions. Examples of problems include high
neonatal mortality in outdoor pig units [11], and high levels of parasitism among
chickens on organic farms [12].
Much the same is true of the pursuit of happiness. Well-fed Labrador Retrievers may
never suffer from hunger but are likely to develop heart problems from being over-weight
[13], and human smokers may feel miserable when they try to stop smoking even though
they accept that this painful process is good for their health.
Given this complexity, we are left with a conception of animal welfare shown in Figure
1 which provides a summary of three key points: that animal welfare involves different
components that can be grouped roughly under three headings; that these involve considerable
but imperfect overlap; and that the pursuit of any one criterion does not guarantee
a high level of welfare as judged by the others.
Figure 1
Three conceptions of animal welfare, adapted from Michael Appleby [21] and Vonne Lund
[21].
A debate about values
The different views of animal welfare do not necessarily involve disagreements about
facts. An intensive animal producer might conclude that welfare is good in a high-health
confinement system because the animals are healthy and growing well; a critic might
draw the opposite conclusion because the animals are crowded together in barren pens
and develop abnormal behaviour. The two parties may agree on factual issues such as
the amount of space per animal and the incidence of disease. Their disagreement is
about values – specifically about what they consider more important or less important
for animals to have good lives.
Why should people hold such different views about what constitutes a good life for
animals? To understand this disagreement, it helps to review a debate that erupted
over the welfare of humans. During the Industrial Revolution, the so-called "factory
system" became the predominant way of producing textiles and other goods throughout
much of Europe. Thousands of factories were erected, and they proved so efficient
that traditional, hand production disappeared almost completely. Workers moved from
villages and rural areas into cities; and instead of working at hand looms in their
homes, people operated machinery in the factories. It was a profound social change,
and it touched off an intense debate over whether the new industrial system was good
or bad for the quality of human life [14].
On one side of the debate were critics who insisted that the factory system caused
people to lead miserable and unwholesome lives. Critics claimed that the cities created
cramped, unhealthy living conditions for the workers, and deprived people of contact
with nature. The machines themselves caused many injuries, and (critics claimed) they
often led to physical deformities because they placed an unnatural strain on the body.
Perhaps worst of all, it was claimed that repetitive work with machines made the workers
themselves like machines and led to an erosion of their human nature and moral character.
But the factory system also had staunch defenders. Instead of imposing unnatural strains,
automation (the defenders claimed) relieved workers of much of the drudgery that manual
handicrafts required. Far from being unnatural, the factory system represented a step
in the natural progression from a time of human labour to a time when automation would
make labour unnecessary. Moreover, the wise factory owner would take care to have
healthy, happy workers because maximum productivity would not otherwise be achieved.
In fact, the productivity of the system was seen as proof that the factories were
actually well suited to human workers.
Because the effects of industrialization were so profound, the debate engaged some
of the leading intellectuals of the day, and from their writing we can build up a
picture of the very different values and world views that lay behind their arguments.
The world-view of the anti-industrial critics might roughly be called Romantic/Agrarian,
and it reflects a set of values that we see extending from the rural poetry of the
Latin author Virgil, through to the Pastoralist and Romantic poets and painters of
the 1600s to 1800s. This world-view values a simple, natural life. It sees nature
as an ideal state that we should strive to emulate. It values emotional experience
and the freedom of the individual. And it looks back to a Golden Age in the past when
people lived in harmony with nature.
The world-view of the pro-industrialists was more a product of the Enlightenment when
people looked to reason and science to replace superstition and ignorance. This world-view
involved two concepts that were relatively new to Western thought.
One of these was productivity. Adam Smith opened his book The Wealth of Nations by
claiming that the quality of life in a nation depends on the goods that are available
to supply the citizens with what they need and want. Increasing the productivity of
the work force, and thus increasing the supply of goods, should therefore improve
the lives of a nation's people. Hence the factory system, whereby automation and specialization
lead to greater productivity, would ultimately make life better [15].
The second idea was progress – the idea that human history moves irreversibly in the
direction of improvement. As historian Sydney Pollard points out, belief in progress
began with science, because in science each generation was seen as building on the
work of earlier generations so that knowledge constantly improves. But during the
1700s the idea of progress took wing, and by 1800, in the words of Pollard, "firm
convictions had been expressed about the inevitability of progress in wealth, in civilization,
in social organization, in art and literature, even in human nature and biological
make-up." [16].
And a belief that change represents progress, and that we cannot "stand in the way
of progress", has remained a common theme in Western thought ever since.
Thus, the Rational/Industrial world-view was very different from the Romantic/Agrarian
world-view. Instead of valuing a simple, natural life, it valued a life improved through
science and technology. It viewed nature not as an ideal state that we should emulate,
but as an imperfect state that we should control and improve. It valued rationality
rather than irrational emotion, and the productivity of the well organized enterprise
more than the freedom of the individual. And instead of looking back to a Golden Age
of harmony with nature, it looked forward to a Golden Age in the future when progress
through science and technology would lead to a better life.
The debate over human welfare during the Industrial Revolution has obvious parallels
with the debate over animal welfare during the intensification of animal agriculture.
In fact, much of the disagreement over animal welfare can be traced to the continued
influence of the contrasting world-views.
People who lean more toward a Romantic/Agrarian world-view will see a good life for
animals as (primarily) a natural life, to be achieved by emulating nature through
such means as free-range systems and access to the outdoors. They will emphasize the
emotions of animals (are they suffering? are they happy?), and attach importance to
their freedom. For these various reasons, people who favour a Romantic/Agrarian world-view
are likely to see confinement systems as inherently incompatible with a high level
of welfare, and they may look back to traditional, non-confinement systems as an ideal
that we should try to return to.
In contrast, those who lean more toward a Rational/Industrial world-view will tend
to see a good life for animals as (primarily) a healthy life, to be achieved by preventing
disease and avoiding other vicissitudes of nature. They will value the rationality
and scientific basis of the system more than the freedom of the individual animals,
and they will see a high level of productivity as evidence that the animals are doing
well. Thus, such people are likely to see confinement systems as a form of progress
that improves both animal and human welfare, and they may look upon older, non-confinement
systems as outmoded models that need to be improved upon.
Animal welfare and science
When these value-based disagreements began to emerge in the debate about confinement
production systems, many people thought that science would provide the way to decide
among the different views of animal welfare and tell us which is right and which is
wrong. However, scientists themselves are influenced by the different world-views
that are present in our culture. In fact, when we examine the wide range of scientific
methods used to study animal welfare, we can see that the different criteria of animal
welfare provided the rationale for some of the different scientific approaches.
Some scientists have used the basic health and functioning of animals as a basis for
assessing and improving animal welfare. As one classic example Ragnar Tauson and co-workers
improved the welfare of laying hens by studying the basic health of birds in cages
of different types and then developing cage designs that would prevent the various
health problems they observed [17]. The scientists found that the birds developed
foot lesions if the floor was too steeply sloped, and neck lesions if the feed trough
was too deep and installed too high for comfortable access. There was often feather
damage that could be reduced by using solid side partitions, and overgrown claws that
could be prevented by installing abrasive strips. Thus, just by focusing on injuries
it was possible to make large improvements in animal welfare, and these results formed
the basis of regulations on cage design in Sweden and later in the European Union.
Other scientists have tried to improve animal welfare by focusing on natural behaviour
and natural living conditions for animals. For example, as a basis for designing better
housing for pigs Alex Stolba and David Wood-Gush began by observing pigs that they
had released in a hilly, wooded area [18]. They found that the pigs showed certain
characteristic types of behaviour: they rooted in the soil, exercised their neck muscles
by levering against fallen logs, built nests in secluded areas before giving birth,
and used dunging areas well removed from their resting areas. Stolba and Wood-Gush
then designed a complex commercial pen that allowed the animals to behave in these
ways. It included an area with peat moss for rooting, logs for levering, and an activity
area with a rubbing post, a separate dunging area, and secluded areas at the back
where a sow could be enclosed to farrow. The authors claimed that the complex pen
significantly improved the animals' welfare.
However, because some aspects of basic health (especially neonatal survival) were
not as good in this system as in well-run confinement systems, some people disagreed
with that conclusion.
In less radical approaches, scientists have incorporated simple elements of natural
behaviour into existing rearing systems. On many commercial dairy farms, calves are
separated from their mothers within the first day after birth, and are fed milk from
a bucket, usually twice per day. With such infrequent meals the total intake has to
be limited so that the calf does not receive too much milk at one time. Under natural
conditions, cows stay fairly close to the calves for the first two weeks, and the
calf will feed many times per day in smaller meals. Although it is normally not feasible
to leave calves with the cow on a diary farm, feeding systems can still be made to
correspond more closely to the animals' natural behaviour. If the calves are fed more
frequently (as they are by the cow), then they can drink more milk per day without
developing digestive problems; and if the calves suck from an artificial teat rather
than drinking from a pail, the action of sucking leads to a greater release of certain
digestive hormones. As might be expected, therefore, calves fed frequently by teat
gain substantially more weight than calves fed twice daily by bucket [19].
In other cases, scientists have based animal welfare research on the affective states
of animals. Dairy calves are commonly dehorned by a variety of methods including surgical
removal of the horn bud or the use of a hot iron to burn through the nerves and blood
vessels that allow the horn to develop. In many countries these procedures are done
without any form of pain management. A research group in New Zealand used plasma cortisol
levels as an indicator of the pain caused by dehorning. They found that dehorning
is followed immediately by a large increase in cortisol, but that the reaction is
blocked if a local anaesthetic is used to freeze the area. In the treated calves,
however, cortisol levels showed a marked increase several hours after the dehorning,
probably because the injury remained inflamed and painful when the anaesthetic had
worn off. If the calves also received an analgesic, the second peak in cortisol could
also be eliminated. Thus the research showed that management of the pain of dehorning
requires both a local anaesthetic and an analgesic [20].
All of the approaches described above have been useful for identifying and solving
animal welfare problems. However, instead of the science providing a way to determine
that one conception of animal welfare is correct and others are not, we see that the
different scientists actually adopted the different value-based views of animal welfare
– basic health and functioning, natural living, and affective states – as the rationale
for different scientific approaches to assessing and improving animal welfare.
In summary, animal welfare is clearly a concept that can be studied scientifically,
but our understanding of animal welfare, and even the science that we do to assess
and improve animal welfare, is influenced by value-based ideas about what is important
or desirable for animals to have a good life. Thus, we have a concept that is both
science-based and values-based.
This situation may come as a surprise to scientists who have been taught to think
of science as "value-free". During the 1800s, there was active debate about the boundaries
of science and how science relates to matters of ethics and policy. Scientists like
Max Weber rightly pointed out that science has a fact-finding role that helps to inform
policy, but that research itself does not answer ethical or policy questions [21].
Such thinking obviously has merit, but in its crudest form it gave rise to the idea
that values play no role in science. However, if a concept like animal welfare can
be both science-based and values-based, then clearly we need a more nuanced understanding
of the place of values in science.
The term "mandated science" refers to science that has been commissioned or undertaken
in order to guide actions, decisions and policy. In this sense mandated science differs
from science done simply to understand the natural world. Mandated science includes
research on topics such as health, food safety, agricultural sustainability and animal
welfare. In all these cases, the science is done to address concepts (health, safety,
sustainability, welfare) that incorporate notions of merit or worth. To say that health
or safety or sustainability or welfare has increased implies not merely a change but
a change for the better. Hence, these concepts, while fully amenable to scientific
research, are also rooted in value-based ideas about what people believe to be more
or less desirable.
In the case of animal welfare, then, decisions can be based on a sound, scientific
understanding of animals and how they are affected by housing, management procedures,
and health care measures. However, the data that we choose to collect and consider
when making decisions about animal welfare are determined by value-based ideas about
what elements are important for animals to have a good life.
Conclusion
Let us return to the dilemma that was created when two scientific reviews arrived
at opposite conclusions about the welfare of sows in gestation stalls. If we look
carefully at the reviews, we see that they were based on different conceptions of
animal welfare.
The Australian reviewers based their analysis almost exclusively on the basic health
and functioning of the animals, and they relied especially on what they called "widely
accepted criteria of poor welfare such as health, immunology, injuries, growth rate,
and nitrogen balance". They did not deny that affective states are involved in animal
welfare, but they took the view that all significant risks to welfare would have effects
on health and functioning variables. Thus, by presenting evidence that sows in stalls
are generally no worse than sows in other types of housing in survival, weight gain,
litter size, disease incidence and such variables, they concluded that, "Both individual
and group housing can meet the welfare requirements of pigs".
The European reviewers used a conception of welfare that included affective states
and natural living as well as basic health and functioning. Thus they included evidence
of fear and frustration in their analysis of animal welfare, whether or not the basic
health of the animals was affected. They also considered that the opportunity for
"exploration of a complex environment, rooting in a soft substratum and manipulation
of materials such as straw" is relevant to animal welfare because of its link to natural
behaviour. Using such criteria they conclude: "Some serious welfare problems for sows
persist even in the best stall-housing system".
In this example, what appeared to be a scientific disagreement – the sort of disagreement
that might be resolved by better experiments – was actually due to a difference in
values, specifically about what is important for animals to have good welfare.
Given that there are different conceptions of animal welfare that are not resolved
by scientific research, and that these are based on values and world-views that have
deep roots in our culture, how should we proceed in creating practical programs and
policies to ensure high standards of animal welfare? I think the simplest message
is that actions designed to improve animal welfare are not likely to achieve widespread
support unless they take account of the different conceptions of animal welfare to
at least some degree. Animal producers are not likely to convince their critics that
high-health confinement systems are good for animal welfare if these systems cause
frustration and prevent animals from carrying out most of their natural behaviour.
Free-range producers are not likely to convince their critics that seemingly natural
systems are good for animal welfare if the animals suffer from harsh weather, parasites
and have poor neonatal survival. For actions to be widely accepted as achieving high
animal welfare, in addition to being based on good animal welfare science, they will
need to make a reasonable fit to the major value positions about what constitutes
a good life for animals.