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      El argumento de sustracción para universales trascendentes

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          Abstract

          Este trabajo presenta el argumento de sustracción para defender los universales trascendentes, esto es, universales que no se encuentran instanciados. El argumento depende de dos premisas fundamentales: (i) la contingencia de las diferentes instanciaciones de un universal, y (ii) la independencia ontológica entre estas instanciaciones. Por la primera premisa se pueden postular mundos metafísicamente posibles en donde las instanciaciones dadas de un universal son sustraídas. Se puede considerar, luego, un mundo posible en donde sólo un objeto instancia el universal. Por el principio (ii) de independencia, interpretado de un modo particular, se puede postular en este punto un mundo posible en donde ningún objeto instancia el universal. Se argumenta que la tesis de independencia (ii) es demasiado fuerte para el defensor de los universales inmanentes, quien puede entenderla de un modo más moderado, compatible con la dependencia genérica de los universales a tener una u otra instancia.

          Translated abstract

          This work presents the subtraction argument for transcendent universals, i.e., for universals that are not instantiated. The argument depends on two main premises: (i) the contingency of the different instantiations of a universal, and (ii) the ontological independence between these instantiations. By the first premise one can postulate metaphysically possible worlds where given instantiations of a universal are subtracted. One can consider, then, a possible world where only one object instantiates a universal. By the principle (ii) of independence, construed in a particular way, one can postulate in this point a possible world where no object instantiates the universal. It is contended that the independence thesis (ii) is too strong for the defender of immanent universal, who can construe it in a milder guise, compatible with the generic dependence of universals to having some or other instance.

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          Most cited references 20

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          A world of states of affairs

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            On the Plurality of Worlds

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: ND
                Journal
                s_kr
                Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
                Kriterion
                Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG (Belo Horizonte )
                0100-512X
                June 2012
                : 53
                : 125
                : 263-279
                Affiliations
                [1 ] Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Chile
                Article
                S0100-512X2012000100013
                10.1590/S0100-512X2012000100013

                http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

                Product
                Product Information: SciELO Brazil

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