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      Bad science: International organizations and the indirect power of global benchmarking

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          Abstract

          The production of transnational knowledge that is widely recognized as legitimate is a major source of influence for international organizations. To reinforce their expert status, international organizations increasingly produce global benchmarks that measure national performance across a range of issue areas. This article illustrates how international organization benchmarking is a significant source of indirect power in world politics by examining two prominent cases in which international organizations seek to shape the world through comparative metrics: (1) the World Bank–International Finance Corporation Ease of Doing Business ranking; and (2) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. We argue that the legitimacy attached to these benchmarks because of the expertise of the international organizations that produce them is highly problematic for two reasons. First, both benchmarks oversimplify the evaluation of relative national performance, misrepresenting contested political values drawn from a specific transnational paradigm as empirical facts. Second, they entrench an arbitrary division in the international arena between ‘ideal’ and ‘pathological’ types of national performance, which (re)produces social hierarchies among states. We argue that the ways in which international organizations use benchmarking to orient how political actors understand best practices, advocate policy changes and attribute political responsibility thus constitutes ‘bad science’. Extending research on processes of paradigm maintenance and the influence of international organizations as teachers of norms or judges of norm compliance, we show how the indirect power that international organizations exercise as evaluators of relative national performance through benchmarking can be highly consequential for the definition of states’ policy priorities.

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          Transfer agents and global networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of policy

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            International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and science policy

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              International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs

              Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance. One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely “enforcement” mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Eur J Int Relat
                Eur J Int Relat
                EJT
                spejt
                European Journal of International Relations
                SAGE Publications (Sage UK: London, England )
                1354-0661
                1460-3713
                31 July 2017
                September 2018
                : 24
                : 3
                : 514-539
                Affiliations
                [1-1354066117719320]University of Warwick, UK
                [2-1354066117719320]University of Warwick, UK
                [3-1354066117719320]University of Warwick, UK
                Author notes
                [*]André Broome, University of Warwick, Social Sciences Building, Coventry, CV47AL, UK. Email: a.j.broome@ 123456warwick.ac.uk
                Article
                10.1177_1354066117719320
                10.1177/1354066117719320
                6077871
                30111983
                1ba8a93a-301f-4307-b9cd-60d96182d7db
                © The Author(s) 2017

                This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License ( http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page ( https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

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                business regulation,foreign direct investment,global benchmarking,global governance,indirect power,international organizations

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