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      Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations : Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan

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          Abstract

          Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and under-vaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The under-vaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to 1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with pre-existing immunity from a live poliovirus infection, and 2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without pre-existing immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to under-vaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

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          Most cited references41

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          On the definition and the computation of the basic reproduction ratio R 0 in models for infectious diseases in heterogeneous populations

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            New strategies for the elimination of polio from India.

            The feasibility of global polio eradication is being questioned as a result of continued transmission in a few localities that act as sources for outbreaks elsewhere. Perhaps the greatest challenge is in India, where transmission has persisted in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar despite high coverage with multiple doses of vaccine. We estimate key parameters governing the seasonal epidemics in these areas and show that high population density and poor sanitation cause persistence by not only facilitating transmission of poliovirus but also severely compromising the efficacy of the trivalent vaccine. We analyze strategies to counteract this and show that switching to monovalent vaccine may finally interrupt virus transmission.
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              Cessation of Trivalent Oral Poliovirus Vaccine and Introduction of Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine - Worldwide, 2016.

              Since the 1988 World Health Assembly resolution to eradicate poliomyelitis, transmission of the three types of wild poliovirus (WPV) has been sharply reduced (1). WPV type 2 (WPV2) has not been detected since 1999 and was declared eradicated in September 2015. Because WPV type 3 has not been detected since November 2012, WPV type 1 (WPV1) is likely the only WPV that remains in circulation (1). This marked progress has been achieved through widespread use of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs), most commonly trivalent OPV (tOPV), which contains types 1, 2, and 3 live, attenuated polioviruses and has been a mainstay of efforts to prevent polio since the early 1960s. However, attenuated polioviruses in OPV can undergo genetic changes during replication, and in communities with low vaccination coverage, can result in vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) that can cause paralytic polio indistinguishable from the disease caused by WPVs (2). Among the 721 polio cases caused by circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs*) detected during January 2006-May 2016, type 2 cVDPVs (cVDPV2s) accounted for >94% (2). Eliminating the risk for polio caused by VDPVs will require stopping all OPV use. The first stage of OPV withdrawal involved a global, synchronized replacement of tOPV with bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing only types 1 and 3 attenuated polioviruses, planned for April 18-May 1, 2016, thereby withdrawing OPV type 2 from all immunization activities (3). Complementing the switch from tOPV to bOPV, introduction of at least 1 dose of injectable, trivalent inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into childhood immunization schedules reduces risks from and facilitates responses to cVDPV2 outbreaks. All 155 countries and territories that were still using OPV in immunization schedules in 2015 have reported that they had ceased use of tOPV by mid-May 2016.(†) As of August 31, 2016, 173 (89%) of 194 World Health Organization (WHO) countries included IPV in their immunization schedules.(§) The cessation of tOPV use is a major milestone toward the global goal of eradicating polio; however, careful surveillance for polioviruses and prompt, aggressive responses to polio outbreaks are still needed to realize a polio-free world.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Risk Analysis
                Risk Analysis
                Wiley
                02724332
                August 2018
                August 2018
                January 03 2018
                : 38
                : 8
                : 1701-1717
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Kid Risk, Inc; Orlando FL USA
                [2 ]Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Atlanta GA USA
                [3 ]Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Atlanta GA USA
                Article
                10.1111/risa.12962
                7879700
                29314143
                25fd2f13-29f5-4708-8187-ab4f80d9d777
                © 2018

                http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1

                http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor

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