17
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment

      research-article

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Human cooperation is enigmatic, as organisms are expected, by evolutionary and economic theory, to act principally in their own interests. However, cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice resources for each other's benefit. We conducted a series of novel experiments in a foraging society where social institutions make the study of social image and punishment particularly salient. Participants played simple cooperation games where they could punish non-cooperators, promote a positive social image or do so in combination with one another. We show that although all these mechanisms raise cooperation above baseline levels, only when social image alone is at stake do average economic gains rise significantly above baseline. Punishment, either alone or combined with social image building, yields lower gains. Individuals' desire to establish a positive social image thus emerges as a more decisive factor than punishment in promoting human cooperation.

          Abstract

          Cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice individual rewards for group benefits. Here, Grimalda, Pondorfer and Tracer show in a foraging society of Papua New Guinea that social image building is a more powerful motivator of social cooperation than altruistic punishment.

          Related collections

          Most cited references45

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting.

          We examined the effect of an image of a pair of eyes on contributions to an honesty box used to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room. People paid nearly three times as much for their drinks when eyes were displayed rather than a control image. This finding provides the first evidence from a naturalistic setting of the importance of cues of being watched, and hence reputational concerns, on human cooperative behaviour.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            The coevolution of parochial altruism and war.

            Altruism-benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself-and parochialism-hostility toward individuals not of one's own ethnic, racial, or other group-are common human behaviors. The intersection of the two-which we term "parochial altruism"-is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one's payoffs by comparison to what one would gain by eschewing these behaviors. But parochial altruism could have evolved if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in these conflicts. Our game-theoretic analysis and agent-based simulations show that under conditions likely to have been experienced by late Pleistocene and early Holocene humans, neither parochialism nor altruism would have been viable singly, but by promoting group conflict, they could have evolved jointly.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: not found
              • Article: not found

              Nobody's watching?

                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Nat Commun
                Nat Commun
                Nature Communications
                Nature Publishing Group
                2041-1723
                09 August 2016
                2016
                : 7
                : 12288
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Institute for the World Economy , Kiellinie 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany
                [2 ]Universitat Jaume I, Avenida Sos Baynat , 12071 Castelló de la Plana, Spain
                [3 ]Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen , Schifferstrasse 196, 47059 Duisburg, Germany
                [4 ]Department of Health and Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado Denver , Campus Box 188, PO Box 173364, Denver, Colorado 80217-3364, USA
                Author notes
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5605-5591
                Article
                ncomms12288
                10.1038/ncomms12288
                4980489
                27504898
                269b0b23-948c-43a0-80ce-ff083f12be72
                Copyright © 2016, The Author(s)

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

                History
                : 10 November 2015
                : 20 June 2016
                Categories
                Article

                Uncategorized
                Uncategorized

                Comments

                Comment on this article