When closely examined, several biological mechanisms reveal themselves as implementing
a physical and dynamical two-way link or coupling between the organism and the world.
In these cases, some mechanisms' components can either physically cross the body-world
boundary or are brought by the organism's motor actions onto specific sensory surfaces.
As with any biological phenomenon, the historical contingencies of these sensorimotor
activities generate plastic changes within the organism, that in turn determine its
capacities at any given time. Body-world coupling instances are evident in examples
that we will describe later, such as breathing, sensori-motor activities, and others.
In the present piece, we attempt to position social cognitive phenomena as the result
of the mechanisms involved in the organism's coupling history with its world. This
coupling constitutes one of the cornerstones of the so called 4E approach to cognition
(Newen et al., 2018), from which we will also draw concepts and distinctions in our
effort to relate coupling mechanisms with social phenomena. Even though reviewing
the 4E approach to cognition escapes the scope of the present piece, we can briefly
state that the 4E cognition framework wants to bring multiple approaches together
under a sole emblem. It understands cognition as a natural phenomenon, embodied in
the biophysics of the body which is embedded both phylo- and ontogenically into the
animal's ecological niche. To the 4E approach, cognition is also opportunistic and
promiscuous as can be extended toward the world with objects both material (e.g.,
technology) and conceptual (e.g., institutions). Finally, the 4E approach thinks cognition
as intended for action in an ongoing interactional sense-making process; an enactive
phenomenon. The 4E cognition framework owes its current form to several landmark work
such as the “enactive approach” (Varela et al., 2017), the “distributed cognition
branch of cognitive science” (Flor and Hutchins, 1991; Hutchins, 1995), and the “extended
mind” proposal (Clark and Chalmers, 1998), among others.
Despite decades of conceptual development of the 4E approach and its diverse subfields,
there are many questions regarding its particular implications for neuroscience (e.g.,
how can neuroscientists can actually implement the 4E approach directly into their
research agendas? Is one-person neuroscience necessary?, etc.) (Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2012; Willems and Francken, 2012). As experimental neuroscientists interested in the
interactional nature of cognition, we would like to extract the mechanistic implications
of the 4E approach: components, activities, and processes (What?, How?, When?), their
context (When?, How?) and their weights (How important?). Epistemologically, we concur
with the view that conceives mechanisms as models of the phenomena to explain and
consider the building of mechanistic models a fundamental explanatory aim of neuroscience
(Craver, 2007). Without a mechanistic picture of the ways in which the 4Es constitute
and/or affect cognitive processes, we are left with few tools to further empirical
research.
We start by considering relevant distinctions provided by De Jaegher et al. (2010),
where constitutive, enabling, and contextual factors can be identified as the “set
of circumstances” which are phenomena themselves. A contextual factor modulates the
phenomenon, whilst an enabling one is necessary for the phenomenon to occur. Finally,
constitutive factors are processes, parts, and/or pieces that produce the phenomenon
itself. What happens if we add a dynamic and mechanistic framework to the De Jaegher,
Di Paolo, and Gallagher's proposal? The phenomenon to explain -at any scale (from
action potentials to social interaction)- can be understood as the result of the dynamic
operation of one or more mechanisms. Such mechanisms comprise components, their activities
and the processes in which they participate, whose structural and functional organization
in certain conditions produce the phenomenon (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver,
2007). Thus, we suggest that constitutive factors are processes that can be composed
of different components of a mechanism under consideration at different moments of
time. Examples of components participating in a constitutive fashion are ion channels,
for the phenomenon of the action potential, and participating agents for social interaction.
In contrast, contextual and enabling factors are better understood here as elements
which interact with mechanisms' components and can change its operation regime. Examples
of enabling factors are the existence of ionic gradients across the membrane, for
the action potential, and the alertness level of a participant, for social interaction.
Examples of contextual factors are, a specific ion channel type for the action potential,
and a given environmental setting, for social interaction. It is important to note
here that the constitutive, enabling, or contextual quality of a given factor it is
not fixed, but can change throughout the organism's ontogeny or history of structural
change.
We think our mechanistic view is compatible with the original proposal of De Jaegher
et al. (2010). In what follows, we consider the above mentioned points in some detail.
We start by examining different mechanisms of body-world coupling, to then propose
ways to extend this viewpoint into social-cognitive phenomena, considering the organism's
ontogeny.
Body-World Coupling
Active Coupling Through Sensorimotor Activities
An example of body-world coupling is represented by an animal's sensory-motor activities.
In situations where the sensory processes are important for the organism, there is
usually a profound interplay between the animal's actions and the operation of its
sensors (Rojas-Líbano et al., 2014). This is evident in motor actions associated with
sensory sampling of the environment: touching, sniffing, echolocating, whisking, visual
scanning. These actions allow the animal to bring stimuli to sensory surfaces. In
most of these cases, stimuli sampling takes place in the wider context of adaptive
and context-sensitive behavior. The animal actively moves its sensory systems to make
decisions about navigation, small displacements, further explorations, language actions,
and the like (Ganguly and Kleinfeld, 2004; Hayhoe and Ballard, 2005; Rojas-Líbano
and Kay, 2012; Clark, 2013; Arce-McShane et al., 2016).
The appropriate interplay or coordination between motor actions and sensory activations
requires the participation of certain components of the world in the sensory-motor
mechanism. Therefore, cognitive activities involving any type of movement will demand
some environmental components to become participants of a mechanism (i.e., a transiently
constitutive factor). If we manipulate world conditions that interfere with this loop,
we can potentially destroy the organism's coupling in the sense that we decrease its
ability to interact coherently with its world. Examples are everywhere. Sniffs manipulate
the number of odor molecules drawn onto the olfactory epithelium, as well as the rate
(i.e., flow) at which those molecules travel through the nose (Rojas-Líbano and Kay,
2012). Tactile (e.g., whisker, finger) movements are coordinated with body movements
and control the spatiotemporal frequency at which mechanical stimuli contact the skin
cutaneous receptors (Kurnikova et al., 2017). Eye/head/body movements effectively
displace the photoreceptor surface so as to receive photons coming from specific objects
from the visual scene (Schroeder et al., 2010), and mechanisms such as the accommodation
reflex modify the amount and direction of light that reaches the retina, via the modification
of pupil size and lens width (Michael-Titus et al., 2010). All these motor activities
manipulate world components and -through this manipulation- cause changes onto sensory
surfaces (Figures 1A,B). Thus, world components continuously move back and forth from
participating in processes contextual or enabling to constitutive factors for a given
point in time and a given sensorimotor act.
Figure 1
Illustration of body-world coupling, sensorimotor mechanisms, and the ontogeny of
social cognition. Circles represent mechanisms' components internal to the organism
(C
i
), and crossed circles depict world components (C
w
). Arrows represent causal effects between components. (A) In non-sensorimotor body-world
couplings, an organism's motor activities capture world's components and makes them
interact with body components. (B) In sensorimotor body-world couplings, through active
motor sampling activities (e.g., sniffing, touching, fixating) the organism dynamically
brings world components onto sensory surfaces. During ontogeny, the occurrence (or
not) of specific sensorimotor activities produces plastic changes in body components,
represented here as weighted arrows and circles. (C) Social cognition as a process
grounded in sensorimotor coupling. World components relevant to sensorimotor coupling
could well be stimuli produced by another organism, such as physical stimuli resulting
from communication processes, and different agents coupled with shared world components
can lead to social cognitive phenomena. This kind of sensorimotor coupling might entail
different plastic processes within each organism (represented as different weighted
arrows inside each agent). S, sensory; Mm, motor actions for movement; Ms, motor actions
for sampling.
Other Examples of Coupling
Some mechanisms are part of the basic autonomy of a living being and can be independent
of active volitional control. There are many examples, such as coupling through circadian
rhythms or, at the cellular scale, through membrane potential maintenance, nutrient
exchange, and structural interactions with the extracellular matrix. However, for
the sake of simplicity, let us specifically focus on mammalian breathing as a non-sensorimotor
example of a mechanism that allows an organism to functionally couple with its world.
We know a fairly good deal of the neural mechanisms that implement breathing in mammals
(Feldman and Del Negro, 2006). In this process, the animal actively exchanges components
with its world, specifically air volumes with different amounts of oxygen and carbon
dioxide. Neurons in the brainstem periodically fire impulses that eventually send
activity down the phrenic nerve, delivering acetylcholine onto the muscle cells of
the diaphragm. The diaphragm then contracts, expanding the thoracic cavity and increasing
lung volume. This expansion draws air from the organism's surroundings into the lungs.
Finally, the diaphragm relaxes, pushing air from inside the lungs back to the exterior
of the animal's body. Accompanying the volume exchange there is a substance exchange:
inspired air is more enriched in oxygen than expired air, which in turn is more enriched
in carbon dioxide. At a molecular scale, we can conceive the mechanism as a continuous
exchange of molecules. From an outside reservoir enriched in oxygen molecules, the
organism draws oxygen inside and pushes out carbon dioxide. This mechanism operates
as long as the animal preserves its biological autonomy.
Now, consider what happens when we intervene on the external side. Lowering the air
oxygen concentration causes a decrease in blood oxygen, which in turn activates peripheral
and central chemoreceptor neurons (Teppema and Dahan, 2010). The activation of the
latter triggers an increase in drive to the diaphragm, resulting in stronger, and
more frequent breathing cycles. Something similar happens if we prevent molecules
from crossing the boundary, say by occluding the airway. This indicates that by manipulating
the external state of affairs, and/or by preventing physical exchanges across the
body-world boundary, we causally intervene in the mechanism. We propose that this
is a feature of mechanisms that couple body and world. It is also trivially true that
several manipulations of the external conditions can causally affect the body, such
as when the body is hit, for example, by a heavy object. But in those cases the world
component involved was not implicated in a regular mechanism with the organism.
Ontogeny, Social Cognition, and Body-World Coupling Mechanisms
In the cases described above, and in many others, what we see is a physiological mechanism
that contains -as part of its regular components- some element(s) of the world. By
altering either internal or external components, we alter the mechanism operation
(Figures 1A,B).
Let
M
be a (neuro)physiological mechanism (e.g., respiration, sensorimotor operations, circadian
rhythms) containing internal components
Ci
which normally interact with some world's components
Cw
(any processes and/or entities, whether living or not, present outside the organism's
physical body). Traditionally, it is conceived that the operation of
M
depends on
Ci
alone. However, for relevant biological phenomena, such as respiration or sensorimotor
activities,
Cw
are mechanism components, participating in the resulting processes, and therefore
we think is useful to regard them as constitutive
1
. Likewise, other
Cw
would be enabling and/or contextual, depending on the phenomena under consideration.
Considering
Cw
as constitutive and/or enabling elements of a given
M
, we can further state that many organizational principles of the brain -generated
from multiple operating mechanisms- will be much better explained by incorporating
their relationship to the world (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Cosmelli and Thompson,
2010; Parada and Rossi, 2018).
We could also say that the operation of a given
M
will depend on the organism's past and current temporospatial contingencies (i.e.,
both
Ci
and
Cw
). A key notion here is that biological mechanisms are not timeless laws, but historically
contingent processes (Craver, 2007). Consider, as an example, the mechanisms of neural
plasticity. It has been shown that present neuronal properties -both structural and
functional
2
- are dependent on the neuron's previous interactions with its immediate environment
(Rose and Rankin, 2001; Bailey et al., 2015; Andersen et al., 2017; Schulz and Lane,
2017). Importantly, this is not a special feature of neurons, but a general biological
phenomenon. The actual state and capacities of any organism are activity- and ontogeny-dependent,
and are always intertwined with the environment in which ontogeny takes place (Stagg
et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2012; Ganguly and Poo, 2013; Sale et al., 2014; Fields,
2015). Social-cognitive phenomena can be conceived, within this framework, as interactions
occurring through the sharing of some
Cw
between the agents engaged in it (Figure 1C).
Taking into account the dependence on history of biological mechanisms, it is particularly
relevant to distinguish the role of
Cw
at different moments along ontogeny. At different moments, the weight of a
Cw
could play a role as a constitutive, enabling, or contextual factors in a given phenomenon.
For example, the case of behavioral habituation shows that, under sustained interactions,
responses to the same
Cw
can decrease drastically, turning a
Cw
stimulus from a once-constitutive element to a mere contextual perturbation (Brunelli
et al., 1976). In what follows, we use these ideas to propose a link between ontogenic
mechanisms of body-world coupling and social interactions.
Social interaction starts very early during development, from prenatal experiences
to turn-taking in babies to early verbalizations in infants (Siddiqui and Hägglöf,
2000; Kugiumutzakis, 2017; Quigley et al., 2017). From the point of view of mechanisms
of body-world coupling, these developmental changes correspond to an increment in
the allowed complexity of sensorimotor interactions. Mechanistically, increased sensorimotor
complexity can be reached by reducing the sensorimotor contingencies' dimensionality,
using both history of interactions and sensorimotor function. This is the organism's
current morphological shape, as a product of previous body-world couplings in time,
affords more complex actions contained in appropriate ecological niches. A now-classic
example is the theoretical (Smith et al., 1999) and empirical (Smith and Thelen, 2003)
dynamical systems account of the A-not-B error in infants (Piaget, 1962). Briefly,
the processes underlying the perseverative reaching seen in the A-not-B error are
not only continuously tied to the infant's sensorimotor system but also to her history
of interactions (Spencer et al., 2011). From our perspective, evidence from animal
models suggests a constitutive role of external factors such as maternal state during
gestation (Kofman, 2002), maternal care/physical contact (Cancedda et al., 2004; Sale
et al., 2004), as well as overall environmental conditions (Cai et al., 2009). Similar
effects have been reported in humans; social, cultural, and/or physical environmental
conditions in earlier developmental stages might bias -or even shape- bio-psycho-social
trajectories (Guzzetta et al., 2009; Bowers and Yehuda, 2016; McEwen, 2017). Later
in life, most of these factors can become enabling and/or contextual.
A more speculative example -directly related to social cognition- could be found in
language; a higher-level cognitive phenomenon profoundly sensitive to ontogenic changes
(Peña et al., 2003; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2008; Mampe et al., 2009; Mahmoudzadeh
et al., 2013; Werker and Gervain, 2013; Werker and Hensch, 2015). The available evidence
indicates that human auditory learning starts in the third trimester of gestation
(Shahidullah and Hepper, 1994; Hepper, 1996). We further interpret this evidence as
suggesting a constitutive role for prenatal listening experiences (
Cw
) in the specific physiological and developmental trajectory that gives rise to speech
processing brain structures (
Ci
) (Wermke and Friederici, 2004). Between the 8th and 10th month of age, this body-world
coupling begins its consolidation, allowing infants to extract statistical regularities
(Saffran et al., 1996), which we conceive as a dimensionality reduction of the complex
linguistic world (Werker and Tees, 1984; Maurer and Werker, 2014)
3
. Following our interpretation of these data, listening experiences and verbal interactions
(
Cw
) become contextual factors after the 10th month of age (Werker and Curtin, 2005;
Werker and Hensch, 2015). We further speculate that such change, from constitutive
to contextual, illustrates the dimensionality reduction required for the appearance
of more complex sensorimotor operations, such as actively seeking learning opportunities,
maximizing informative interactions, and the beginning of adult-like social interactions
(Begus et al., 2016). We still lack both data and tools to appropriately model the
role, weight, and influence of external factors (from physical interplay to social
interactions to processes unfolding from them) in the emergence of social-cognitive
functioning and the overall biophysics of human experience.
Closing Remarks
The present opinion piece seeks to facilitate a mechanistic approximation to multi-level
phenomena, grounding social cognition, and social interaction into time-dependent
functional and structural components and their interplay; a goal for the 4E approach
to cognition. Furthermore, it points to the need of modeling, through experimental
manipulations, the weight and influence of both internal [i.e., (neuro)physiological]
and external (i.e., objects, processes, other people) components at a given developmental
period. This modeling can be achieved through tools derived from network science and/or
machine learning techniques (Vespignani, 2011; Boonstra et al., 2015; Sekara et al.,
2016; Shine et al., 2016; Avena-Koenigsberger et al., 2017; Aguilera, 2018; Parada
and Rossi, 2018). Furthermore, implementing scalable experimental paradigms (Parada,
2018; Matusz et al., 2019; Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn, 2019) and generating novel
hypotheses of interacting brain/body systems functioning during natural cognition
(De Jaegher et al., 2010, 2016; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012; Gramann et al., 2014;
Ladouce et al., 2017; Parada, 2018; Parada and Rossi, 2018) are among the most outstanding
challenges for the 4E-cognition research program. We believe that the incorporation
of a mechanistic framework facilitates meeting those challenges and advancing a deeper
understanding of cognitive phenomena, social, and otherwise.
Author Contributions
DR-L and FP conceptualized the present work and wrote the current version for publication.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial
or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.