The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets

Recent substantive reforms to the English National Health Service expanded patient choice and encouraged hospitals to compete within a market with fixed prices. This study investigates whether these reforms led to improvements in hospital quality. We use a difference-in-difference-style estimator to test whether hospital quality (measured using mortality from acute myocardial infarction) improved more quickly in more competitive markets after these reforms came into force in 2006. We find that after the reforms were implemented, mortality fell (i.e. quality improved) for patients living in more competitive markets. Our results suggest that hospital competition can lead to improvements in hospital quality.

We evaluate the choices of elders across their insurance options under the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug plan, using a unique data set of prescription drug claims matched to information on the characteristics of choice sets. We document that elders place much more weight on plan premiums than on expected out of pocket costs; value plan financial characteristics beyond any impacts on their own financial expenses or risk; and place almost no value on variance reducing aspects of plans. Partial equilibrium welfare analysis implies that welfare would have been 27% higher if patients had all chosen rationally.