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      COVID-19: Travel health and the implications for sub -Saharan Africa

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          Abstract

          Dear Editor The global health response to COVID-19, coordinated by the World Health Organization which led to its eventual classification as a public health emergency of international concern has inadvertently affected global travel [1]. With ongoing debates for/against travel restrictions, some countries have implemented these restrictions to protect their citizens in response to the global rise in cases [2]. Conversely, in countries with many confirmed cases, it appears more people are trying to travel out of those cities, whether from panic, legitimate reasons or ignorance [1]. Travel may be necessitated for planned, legitimate or emergency reasons which may include: conferences, family, work or vacation, which did not factor in the occurrence of a global outbreak. Contacts of cases may not be self-aware of the risk they portend, especially when they are not symptomatic, putting many more people at risk. COVID-19 has affected not just travelers, but also airlines, some of which have experienced dips in their revenues with the possibility of their staff being at risk and has also affected global trade/stock markets. In some countries, gatherings of over a thousand people, conferences, festivals have all been cancelled due to this outbreak which is still spreading and expected to peak in a few weeks [3]. The losses to travel agencies, families who may have delayed reunions, conference organizers, airline investors and the huge burden on the health care system, including morbidities and mortalities among health care personnel has necessitated some focus on travel health. In the response to such global outbreaks, like the COVID-19, the majority of the attention is focused on building on the pre-existent preparedness measures, response, and mitigation; however, due to the ease of travel, a country that previously had no cases, can within a week begin to manage hundreds of cases. While information regarding the outbreak is being disseminated via credible public health organizations, social media and rumors in communities during this outbreak also provide sometimes, unverified and untrue information [4]. This becomes more important for low- and middle-income countries, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, who may for the first time need to issue travel advisories and provide travel health services, sometimes in cities or countries where they may have been previously non-existent. The COVID-19 outbreak has shown that travel health and medicine are vital in supporting the outbreak response, and more needs to be done in sub-Saharan Africa for capacity building and infrastructure not just for the present but in preparing for any potential outbreaks in the future. From academics to traders in the sub - region, updated, evidence - based information regarding what countries not to travel to, how to travel safely, symptoms to look out for, self-quarantine, their country embassies at the travel destination and a fair estimate of their risk if they decide to travel. Knowledge regarding the disease is evolving, and citizens need to be constantly informed to make safe travels. For several reasons including limited resources for competing priorities especially across Africa, travel health is not given required attention, the recent Covid-19 outbreak shows this status quo is untenable. The International Society of Travel Medicine appears to have no country in sub-Saharan Africa listed as a member [5], while many countries in the sub-region continue to have very few trained and licensed professionals, much less than required to address global outbreaks in the places where they are most needed. We need to re-examine the scientific basis of prescriptions around travel during communicable disease outbreak. When is travel restriction justified and to what extent? What is the minimum evidence threshold that justify travel restriction? How do we incorporate available evidence into preparedness and response in order to minimize contagion during travel in the face of infections like SARS-CoV2 with many unknowns? Most importantly how do we get individual countries to align global health interest along with national interests for travel health decision making. Furthermore, what should we be telling travelers to and from regions like Africa – with limited capacity - either as a preparedness or response measure? How do we fit the communications related to travel into the overall risk communication strategies? These are relevant scientific and operational questions that will enhance global health security as it pertains to travel health. While we may not have answers to some of these questions, it is a good starting point to inform public health actions now and in the foreseeable future in a contextually relevant manner. This information can be deployed in crafting travel health information (which can be tailored to specific demographics and disseminated via the appropriate media to those groups). A synergy between a travel health infrastructure and risk communication structures already in place for Covid-19 can ensure that evidence-based information reaches a wider audience across communities in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, we recommend capacity building for travel health in the sub - region as this will greatly enhance the management of the current COVID-19 outbreak and assist with potential outbreaks in the future. In conclusion, there is a need to enhance travel health practice and infrastructure, and its integration into all structures and processes of disease preparedness and response including risk communication. CRediT authorship contribution statement Oluwatomi Iken: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing, Supervision, Writing - original draft. Uzoma Abakporo: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing, Supervision. Olaniyi Ayobami: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing, Supervision. Timothy Attoye: Writing - review & editing, Supervision. Declaration of competing interest We declare that there are none.

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          COVID-19 control in China during mass population movements at New Year

          The outbreak of novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) continues to spread rapidly in China. 1 The Chinese Lunar New Year holiday, the start of which coincided with the emergence of COVID-19, is the most celebratory time of the year in China, during which a massive human migration takes place as individuals travel back to their hometowns. People in China are estimated to make close to 3 billion trips over the 40-day travel period, or Chunyun, of the Lunar New Year holiday. 2 About 5 million people left Wuhan, 3 the capital city of Hubei province and epicentre of the COVID-19 epidemic, before the start of the travel ban on Jan 23, 2020. About a third of those individuals travelled to locations outside of Hubei province. 4 Limiting the social contacts of these individuals was crucial for COVID-19 control, because patients with no or mild symptoms can spread the virus. 5 Government policies enacted during the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday are likely to have helped reduce the spread of the virus by decreasing contact and increasing physical distance between those who have COVID-19 and those who do not. As part of these social distancing policies, the Chinese Government encouraged people to stay at home; discouraged mass gatherings; cancelled or postponed large public events; and closed schools, universities, government offices, libraries, museums, and factories.6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Only limited segments of urban public transport systems remained operational and all cross-province bus routes were taken out of service. As a result of these policies and public information and education campaigns, Chinese citizens started to take measures to protect themselves against COVID-19, such as staying at home as far as possible, limiting social contacts, and wearing protective masks when they needed to move in public. Social distancing has been effective in past disease epidemics, curbing human-to-human transmission and reducing morbidity and mortality.11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 A single social distancing policy can cut epidemic spread, but usually multiple such policies—including more restrictive measures such as isolation and quarantine—are implemented in combination to boost effectiveness. For example, during the 1918–19 influenza pandemic, the New York City Department of Health enforced several social distancing policies at the same time, including staggered business hours, compulsory isolation, and quarantine, which likely led to New York City suffering the lowest death rate from influenza on the eastern seaboard of the USA. 17 During the current outbreak of COVID-19, government officials and researchers were concerned that the mass movement of people at the end of the Lunar New Year holiday on Jan 31, 2020, would exacerbate the spread of COVID-19 across China. Moreover, individuals typically return from their Lunar New Year holiday after only 1 week, which is shorter than the longest suspected incubation period of the disease. 18 Many of the 5 million people who left Wuhan before the travel ban was put into place 3 could still have been latently infected when their holiday ended. This situation, together with the resumed travel activities, would make it difficult to contain the outbreak. Facing these concerns, the Chinese Government extended the Lunar New Year holiday. The holiday end date was changed to March 10 for Hubei province 19 and Feb 9 for many other provinces, so that the duration of the holiday would be sufficiently long to fully cover the suspected incubation period of COVID-19.20, 21, 22 In addition, people diagnosed with COVID-19 were isolated in hospitals. In Wuhan, where the largest number of infected people live, those with mild and asymptomatic infection were also quarantined in so-called shelter or “Fang Cang” hospitals, which are public spaces such as stadiums and conference centres that have been repurposed for medical care. Finally, the Chinese Government encouraged and supported grassroots activities for routine screening, contact tracing, and early detection and medical care of COVID-19 patients, and it promoted hand washing, surface disinfection, and the use of protective masks through social marketing and media. As a result of the extended holiday and the additional measures, many people with asymptomatic infection from Hubei province who had travelled to other provinces remained in their homes until they developed symptoms, at which point they received treatment. It is this home-based quarantine of people who had been to the epicentre of the epidemic and travelled to other locations in China that is likely to have been especially helpful in curbing the spread of the virus to the wider community. © 2020 Kevin Frayer/Stringer/Getty Images 2020 Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active. There are several lessons that can be drawn from China's extension of the Lunar New Year holiday. First, countries facing potential spread of COVID-19, or a similar outbreak in the future, should consider outbreak-control “holidays” or closure periods—ie, periods of recommended or mandatory closure of non-essential workplaces and public institutions—as a first-line social distancing measure to slow the rate of transmission. Second, governments should tailor the design of such outbreak-control closure periods to the specific epidemic characteristics of the novel disease, such as the incubation period and transmission routes. Third, a central goal of an outbreak-control closure period is to prevent people with asymptomatic infections from spreading the disease. As such, governments should use the closure period for information and education campaigns, community screening, active contact tracing, and isolation and quarantine to maximise impact. Such a combination approach is also supported by studies of responses to previous outbreaks, which showed that reductions in the cumulative attack rate were more pronounced when social distancing policies were combined with other epidemic control measures to block transmission. 23 As for COVID-19 in China, this combination of an outbreak-control closure period for social distancing and a range of accompanying epidemic control measures seems to have prevented new infections, especially in provinces other than Hubei, where new infections have been declining for more than 2 weeks. 1 As fearsome and consequential as the COVID-19 outbreak has been, China's vigorous, multifaceted response is likely to have prevented a far worse situation. Future empirical research will establish the full impact of the social distancing and epidemic control policies during the extended Chinese Lunar New Year holiday. As travel and work slowly resume in China, the country should consider at least partial continuation of these policies to ensure that the COVID-19 outbreak is sustainably controlled.
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            Do not violate the International Health Regulations during the COVID-19 outbreak

            The International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) 1 govern how 196 countries and WHO collectively address the global spread of disease and avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. Article 43 of this legally binding instrument restricts the measures countries can implement when addressing public health risks to those measures that are supported by science, commensurate with the risks involved, and anchored in human rights. 1 The intention of the IHR is that countries should not take needless measures that harm people or that disincentivise countries from reporting new risks to international public health authorities. 2 In imposing travel restrictions against China during the current outbreak of 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), many countries are violating the IHR. We—16 global health law scholars—came to this conclusion after applying the interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 3 and reaching a jurisprudential consensus on the legal meaning of IHR Article 43 (panel ). Panel International Health Regulations (2005) Article 43.1 to 43.5 on Additional Health Measures 1 These Regulations shall not preclude States Parties from implementing health measures, in accordance with their relevant national law and obligations under international law, in response to specific public health risks or public health emergencies of international concern, which: (a) achieve the same or greater level of health protection than WHO recommendations; or (b) are otherwise prohibited under Article 25, Article 26, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 28, Article 30, paragraph 1(c) of Article 31 and Article 33, provided such measures are otherwise consistent with these Regulations. Such measures shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection. 2 In determining whether to implement the health measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or additional health measures under paragraph 2 of Article 23, paragraph 1 of Article 27, paragraph 2 of Article 28 and paragraph 2(c) of Article 31, States Parties shall base their determinations upon: (a) scientific principles; (b) available scientific evidence of a risk to human health, or where such evidence is insufficient, the available information including from WHO and other relevant intergovernmental organizations and international bodies; and (c) any available specific guidance or advice from WHO. 3 A State Party implementing additional health measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article which significantly interfere with international traffic shall provide to WHO the public health rationale and relevant scientific information for it. WHO shall share this information with other States Parties and shall share information regarding the health measures implemented. For the purpose of this Article, significant interference generally means refusal of entry or departure of international travellers, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, for more than 24 hours. 4 After assessing information provided pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of this Article and other relevant information, WHO may request that the State Party concerned reconsider the application of the measures. 5 A State Party implementing additional health measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article that significantly interfere with international traffic shall inform WHO, within 48 hours of implementation, of such measures and their health rationale unless these are covered by a temporary or standing recommendation. Text is taken from International Health Regulations (2005). 1 We explain our conclusion here. First, under Article 43.2, countries cannot implement additional health measures exclusively as a precaution but must rather ground their decision making in “scientific principles”, “scientific evidence”, and “advice from WHO”. 1 Many of the travel restrictions being implemented during the COVID-19 outbreak are not supported by science or WHO. Travel restrictions for these kinds of viruses have been challenged by public health researchers,4, 5, 6 and WHO has advised against travel restrictions, arguing they cause more harm than good.7, 8 Second, under Article 43.1 any additional health measures implemented by countries “shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives”. 1 In this case, even if travel restrictions did work, there are so many other more effective measures that countries can take to protect their citizens. WHO has issued COVID-19 technical guidance on several such measures, including risk communication, surveillance, patient management, and screening at ports of entry and exit. 9 Third, and most importantly, Article 3.1 strictly requires all additional health measures to be implemented “with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons”, 1 which in turn must reflect the international law principles of necessity, legitimacy, and proportionality that govern limitations to and derogations from rights and freedoms. 10 Under no circumstances should public health or foreign policy decisions be based on the racism and xenophobia that are now being directed at Chinese people and those of Asian descent. 11 Many of the travel restrictions implemented by dozens of countries during the COVID-19 outbreak are therefore violations of the IHR. 12 Yet, perhaps even more troubling, is that at least two-thirds of these countries have not reported their additional health measures to WHO, 12 which is a further violation of IHR Articles 43.3 and 43.5. Flagrant disregard for the legal requirement to promptly report any additional health measures frustrates WHO's ability to coordinate the world's response to public health emergencies and prevents countries from holding each other accountable for their obligations under the IHR. Some countries argue that they would rather be safe than sorry. But evidence belies the claim that illegal travel restrictions make countries safer.4, 5, 6 In the short term, travel restrictions prevent supplies from getting into affected areas, slow down the international public health response, stigmatise entire populations, and disproportionately harm the most vulnerable among us. In the longer term, countries selecting which international laws to follow encourages other countries to do the same, which in turn undermines the broader rules-based world order. Effective global governance is not possible when countries cannot depend on each other to comply with international agreements. 13 Of course, the IHR is far from perfect. For example, the IHR only governs countries, not corporations and other non-governmental actors. Thus, some countries are finding themselves with de-facto travel restrictions when airlines stop flying to places affected by COVID-19. Additionally, the IHR does not have robust accountability mechanisms for compliance, enforcement, oversight, and transparency. 14 But the IHR is the legally binding system for protecting people worldwide from the global spread of disease. With more than 2·5 billion people travelling between about 4000 airports every year, 15 future outbreaks are inevitable. Responses that are anchored in fear, misinformation, racism, and xenophobia will not save us from outbreaks like COVID-19. Upholding the rule of international law is needed now more than ever. Countries can start by rolling back illegal travel restrictions that have already been implemented and by supporting WHO and each other in implementing the IHR.
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              Author and article information

              Contributors
              Journal
              Travel Med Infect Dis
              Travel Med Infect Dis
              Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease
              Published by Elsevier Ltd.
              1477-8939
              1873-0442
              9 April 2020
              9 April 2020
              : 101645
              Affiliations
              [a ]Department of Community Medicine, University College Hospital Ibadan, Nigeria
              [b ]University of Minnesota, School of Public Health, 215 Oak Grove Street, Minneapolis, MN, 55403, USA
              [c ]Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany
              [d ]Global Health Fellow, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 500 5th Ave. N. Seattle, WA, 98109, USA
              Author notes
              []Corresponding author. ikenoluwatomi@ 123456gmail.com
              Article
              S1477-8939(20)30114-9 101645
              10.1016/j.tmaid.2020.101645
              7144607
              2e8fcec0-cfd1-442e-81af-8e8f17c083c6
              © 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

              Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

              History
              : 12 March 2020
              : 25 March 2020
              : 26 March 2020
              Categories
              Article

              Infectious disease & Microbiology
              Infectious disease & Microbiology

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