Altruistic Learning

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms. Evolutionary models and empirical evidence indicate that such altruistic punishment has been a decisive force in the evolution of human cooperation. We used H2 15O positron emission tomography to examine the neural basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange. Subjects could punish defection either symbolically or effectively. Symbolic punishment did not reduce the defector's economic payoff, whereas effective punishment did reduce the payoff. We scanned the subjects' brains while they learned about the defector's abuse of trust and determined the punishment. Effective punishment, as compared with symbolic punishment, activated the dorsal striatum, which has been implicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions. Moreover, subjects with stronger activations in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. Our findings support the hypothesis that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations and that the activation in the dorsal striatum reflects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors.

Emotions are multifaceted, but a key aspect of emotion involves the assessment of the value of environmental stimuli. This article reviews the many psychological representations, including representations of stimulus value, which are formed in the brain during Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning tasks. These representations may be related directly to the functions of cortical and subcortical neural structures. The basolateral amygdala (BLA) appears to be required for a Pavlovian conditioned stimulus (CS) to gain access to the current value of the specific unconditioned stimulus (US) that it predicts, while the central nucleus of the amygdala acts as a controller of brainstem arousal and response systems, and subserves some forms of stimulus-response Pavlovian conditioning. The nucleus accumbens, which appears not to be required for knowledge of the contingency between instrumental actions and their outcomes, nevertheless influences instrumental behaviour strongly by allowing Pavlovian CSs to affect the level of instrumental responding (Pavlovian-instrumental transfer), and is required for the normal ability of animals to choose rewards that are delayed. The prelimbic cortex is required for the detection of instrumental action-outcome contingencies, while insular cortex may allow rats to retrieve the values of specific foods via their sensory properties. The orbitofrontal cortex, like the BLA, may represent aspects of reinforcer value that govern instrumental choice behaviour. Finally, the anterior cingulate cortex, implicated in human disorders of emotion and attention, may have multiple roles in responding to the emotional significance of stimuli and to errors in performance, preventing responding to inappropriate stimuli.