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      Historiese perspektief: Redes vir en gevolge van die betrokkenheid van groot moondhede in die Suezkanaal (Egipte), in besonder voor 1956 (Deel I) Translated title: Historical perspective: Reasons for and consequences of the involvement by great powers in the Suez Canal (Egypt), in particular before 1956 (Part I)

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          Abstract

          In hierdie eerste van drie artikels word die geopolitieke belangrikheid van Egipte en die geostrategiese ligging van die landengte van Suez (Ismus) en daarná die kanaal self bespreek. Ook word gefokus op die bou van die kanaal en die noodsaaklikheid om beheer daaroor te verkry en te behou. In die laat 1700s en dwarsdeur die 19de eeu tot die middel van 1956 het Europese moondhede om verskeie redes in Egipte en dus ook die kanaal belanggestel. Intriges en konflik het by tye hoogty gevier. Baie was op die spel, gegewe die feit dat hierdie landengte en waar die kanaal later gebou sou word 'n besonder strategiese rol speel as verbindingslinie tussen Europa en die Ooste en ook die Indiese Oseaan. Dit het toenemend belangriker geword vir Brittanje om oor hierdie verbinding te beskik. Frankryk se betrokkenheid in Egipte begin in 1798 met Napoleon Bonaparte en later met Ferdinand de Lesseps wat die vergunning bekom het om die Suezkanaal te bou. Dit is in 1869 geopen en het 'n omwenteling in die verskeping van goedere tussen Brittanje en sy kolonies teweeggebring. Nadat Brittanje aanvanklik teen die bou van die kanaal gekant was, het hulle tog later 'n aandeel daarin verkry. In die toepassing van sy buitelandse beleid het Otto von Bismarck van Duitsland weinig belangstelling in Egipte getoon. Britse troepe word in 1882 in Egipte ontplooi om 'n nasionalistiese opstand te onderdruk. Die troepe bly aan tot na die Eerste Wereldoorlog. Die Entente Cordiale wat 40 jaar van bitter mededinging tussen Brittanje en Frankryk beëindig, het ook vir Brittanje 'n vrye hand in Egipte en vir Frankryk een in Marokko gegee. In 1922 het Egipte onafhanklik geword, maar Britse magte het aangebly om die Suezkanaal steeds te beskerm. Ná die Tweede Wereldoorlog het Brittanje sy militêre teenwoordigheid in die omstreke van die Suezkanaal aansienlik verhoog - iets wat Egiptenare geensins aangestaan het. Brittanje het min van die voordele wat uit die gebruik van die kanaal voortgespruit het aan Egipte oorgedra. 'n Reeks mislukkings in Brittanje se toepassing van sy buitelandse beleid het die basis vir die steeds groeiende en veelvlakkige konflik tussen Brittanje en Egipte aangevuur. Op 23 Julie 1952 word koning Faroek onttroon in 'n militêre staatsgreep waarin die jong kolonel Gamal Abdul Nasser die leidende rol speel. Daarná is Egipte nie meer dieselfde nie. Nasser het homself as 'n besondere leier nie net in Egipte nie, maar ook internasionaal gevestig, met een van die uitvloeisels van sy leierskap die nasionalisering van die Suezkanaal op 26 Julie 1956. Die gevolg hiervan strek vêr en wyd. In die tweede artikel word meer breedvoerig hierop ingegaan, terwyl die derde artikel oor die gevolge van die kanaalsluiting vir Suid-Afrika handel. Daar word gelet op die internasionale aandag wat op die seeroete om die Kaap gevestig is; die hersluiting van die kanaal in 1967 en Brittanje se oordrag van die vlootbasis by Simonstad in die laat 1950's aan Suid-Afrika.

          Translated abstract

          This first of three articles discusses the geopolitical importance of Egypt, the geostrategic location of the Isthmus of Suez and the channel itself. It also focuses on the construction of the canal and the imperatives to both control and retain possession of it. In the late 1700s and throughout the 19th century, up until mid-1956, European powers were interested in Egypt for various reasons, including the canal. Intermittent intrigues and conflict occurred from time to time. Much was at stake, given the fact that this Isthmus and where the canal would later be constructed, has a particular strategic significance in connecting Europe and the East and also the Indian Ocean. It became increasingly more important for Britain to control this link. France's involvement in Egypt began in 1798 with Napoleon Bonaparte and later with Ferdinand de Lesseps who was granted permission to build the Suez Canal. It was opened in 1869 and it revolutionised the shipment of goods between Britain and its colonies. Initially, Britain was opposed to the construction of the canal, but later acquired a share in it. Given the execution of his foreign policy, Germany's Otto von Bismarck showed little interest in Egypt. In 1882, British troops were deployed in Egypt to suppress a nationalist uprising. The troops stayed on until after World War I. The Entente Cordiale ended 40 years of bitter rivalry between Britain and France. It granted Britain a free hand in Egypt and France the same in Morocco. In 1922, Egypt became independent, but British forces still stayed on to protect the Suez Canal. After the Second World War, Britain increased its military presence in the vicinity of the Suez Canal considerably, but Egyptians were dissatisfied about that arrangement. Britain transferred few of the advantages derived from the use of the canal to Egypt. A series of failures by Britain in the application of its foreign policy fuelled the ever growing and multifaceted conflict between Britain and Egypt. On 23 July 1952, King Farouk was dethroned in a military coup d'état in which the young Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser played the leading role. After that Egypt was not the same anymore. Nasser established himself as an exceptional leader, not only in Egypt, but also internationally, and as one of the outcomes of his leadership, the canal was nationalised on 26 July 1956. The consequences stretched far and wide. The second article addresses such consequences in general, while the third focuses, in particular, on the effect(s) closure of the canal has had for South Africa. Attention is paid to the sea route around the Cape, as well as the closure of the canal in 1967, bearing in mind Britain's transference of its naval base, Simonstown to South Africa in the late 1950s.

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          Most cited references63

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              SUEZ AND BRITAIN'S DECLINE AS A WORLD POWER

              The Suez crisis is widely believed to have contributed significantly to Britain's decline as a world power. Eden's miscalculation of American reaction to the attack on Egypt was damaging to Britain's reputation and fatal to his career. However, his actions were contrary to received wisdom in Whitehall. The crisis merely confirmed Britain's dependence on the United States and had no lasting impact on Anglo-American relations. Britain's relationship with its informal and formal empire was already changing before 1956, and the turn from the commonwealth to Europe owed little to Suez. Examination of policy reviews in Whitehall before and after the Suez crisis shows that the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, and Colonial Office were slow to accept the need for change in Britain's world role. Insofar as they did from 1959 it was because of Treasury arguments about the effect of high defence expenditure on the economy, and slow growth of the United Kingdom's population compared with the United States, the European Economic Community, and the Soviet Union.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                tvg
                Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe
                Tydskr. geesteswet.
                Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns (Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa )
                0041-4751
                2224-7912
                June 2023
                : 63
                : 2
                : 420-451
                Affiliations
                [01] orgnameUniversiteit van Johannesburg orgdiv1Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe Suid-Afrika reksteen@ 123456swakop.com
                Article
                S0041-47512023000200014 S0041-4751(23)06300200014
                10.17159/2224-7912/2023/v63n2a14
                34df90fe-b44c-4992-a712-2c939202de68

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

                History
                : 21 December 2022
                : 12 May 2023
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 64, Pages: 32
                Product

                SciELO South Africa

                Categories
                Navorsings-en oorsigartikels

                Egipte,Eden,Churchill,Brittanje,Britse Ryk,Bismarck,Suez canal,nationalisation,Nasser,Napoleon Bonaparte,Middle-East,India,France,Egypt,coup d'etat,Cape sea route,British Empire,Britain,Suezkanaal,staatsgreep,nasionali-sering,Midde-Ooste,Kaapse seeroete,Indië,Frankryk

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