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      Payforperformance in New Zealand primary health care

      e-literature-review

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          Abstract

          Purpose

          This paper aims to describe the introduction of payforperformance in New Zealand primary health care compare this policy development with analogous English initiatives discuss the risk of unintended, adverse consequences of the New Zealand programme and consider key lessons for the policy development of payforperformance in health care.

          Designmethodologyapproach

          This article is based on description and analysis of policy developments for performance management in New Zealand and England.

          Findings

          It is not clear that the New Zealand Programme appropriately reflects the values and goals of primary health care providers. It encourages slow, incremental change by paying bonuses to Primary Health Organisations, rather than practices, for meeting targets on a small number of performance indicators. The bonuses account for a tiny proportion of the total income of PHOs and in general are for service improvement rather than to supplement practitioner incomes. It is important to align performance incentives with stakeholders' values and goals.

          Originalityvalue

          The paper discusses New Zealand developments in payforperformance in the context of English policy initiatives and considers lessons for all health systems.

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          Most cited references13

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          Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United Kingdom.

          In 2004, after a series of national initiatives associated with marked improvements in the quality of care, the National Health Service of the United Kingdom introduced a pay-for-performance contract for family practitioners. This contract increases existing income according to performance with respect to 146 quality indicators covering clinical care for 10 chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient experience. We analyzed data extracted automatically from clinical computing systems for 8105 family practices in England in the first year of the pay-for-performance program (April 2004 through March 2005), data from the U.K. Census, and data on characteristics of individual family practices. We examined the proportion of patients deemed eligible for a clinical quality indicator for whom the indicator was met (reported achievement) and the proportion of the total number of patients with a medical condition for whom a quality indicator was met (population achievement), and we used multiple regression analysis to determine the extent to which practices achieved high scores by classifying patients as ineligible for quality indicators (exception reporting). The median reported achievement in the first year of the new contract was 83.4 percent (interquartile range, 78.2 to 87.0 percent). Sociodemographic characteristics of the patients (age and socioeconomic features) and practices (size of practice, number of patients per practitioner, age of practitioner, and whether the practitioner was medically educated in the United Kingdom) had moderate but significant effects on performance. Exception reporting by practices was not extensive (median rate, 6 percent), but it was the strongest predictor of achievement: a 1 percent increase in the rate of exception reporting was associated with a 0.31 percent increase in reported achievement. Exception reporting was high in a small number of practices: 1 percent of practices excluded more than 15 percent of patients. English family practices attained high levels of achievement in the first year of the new pay-for-performance contract. A small number of practices appear to have achieved high scores by excluding large numbers of patients by exception reporting. More research is needed to determine whether these practices are excluding patients for sound clinical reasons or in order to increase income. Copyright 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society.
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            A Taxonomy of Organizational Justice Theories

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              What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health care?

              Despite more than a decade of bench-marking and public reporting of quality problems in the health care sector, changes in medical practice have been slow to materialize. To accelerate quality improvement, many private and public payers have begun to offer financial incentives to physicians and hospitals based on their performance on clinical and service quality measures. The authors review the empirical literature on paying for quality in health care and comparable interventions in other sectors. They find little evidence to support the effectiveness of paying for quality. The absence of findings for an effect may be attributable to the small size of the bonuses studied and the fact that payers often accounted for only a fraction of the targeted provider's panel. Even in non-health settings, however, where the institutional features are more favorable to a positive impact, the literature contains mixed results on the effectiveness of analogous pay-for-performance schemes.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                jhom
                10.1108/jhom
                Journal of Health Organization and Management
                Emerald Publishing
                1477-7266
                21 March 2008
                : 22
                Issue : 1 Issue title : Incentives in health systems developing theory, investigating practice Issue title : Incentives in health systems
                : 36-47
                Affiliations
                University of York and University of Dundee
                Department of General Practice and Primary Health Care, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
                Article
                0250220103.pdf 0250220103
                10.1108/14777260810862399
                18488518
                35abcf08-a0b0-4a85-96f5-fa5961b47cc6
                © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
                History
                Categories
                e-literature-review, Literature review
                cat-HSC, Health & social care
                cat-HMAN, Healthcare management
                Custom metadata
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                yes
                included

                Health & Social care
                Performance management,Primary care,New Zealand,Performance related pay
                Health & Social care
                Performance management, Primary care, New Zealand, Performance related pay

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