4
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: not found
      • Article: not found

      Benign moral hazard and the cost-effectiveness analysis of insurance coverage

      ,
      Journal of Health Economics
      Elsevier BV

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisher
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Related collections

          Most cited references1

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          Illness prevention and medical insurance.

          C Phelps (1978)
          A theory of demand for preventive medical services is developed from a model of an expected-ultility-maximizing consumer. Preventive medical care is said to alter the probabilities of illness as well as the final health outcome in sick states. The value of preventive medical care depends upon pure health gains (which directly increase utility), work-loss-time avoided, and out-of-pocket medical expenses avoided. Studies cited from the literature show that many commonly accepted screening procedures have no observable payoff in health status or medical expenses saved. In stark contrast, personal behavioral decisions, such as smoking and dietary patterns, appear to have dramatic effects on health and mortality. Public policy appears to be better directed toward inducement of such health-producing behavior than inducement of further medical preventive procedures.
            Bookmark

            Author and article information

            Journal
            Journal of Health Economics
            Journal of Health Economics
            Elsevier BV
            01676296
            January 1990
            January 1990
            : 9
            : 4
            : 447-461
            Article
            10.1016/0167-6296(90)90005-N
            35e334d0-16e2-40b3-b698-033b6e2e6cbb
            © 1990

            http://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/


            Comments

            Comment on this article