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      Migrant workers and COVID-19

      brief-report
      1 , 2 ,
      Occupational and Environmental Medicine
      BMJ Publishing Group
      occupational health practice, migrant workers

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          Abstract

          Objectives

          Daily numbers of COVID-19 in Singapore from March to May 2020, the cause of a surge in cases in April and the national response were examined, and regulations on migrant worker accommodation studied.

          Methods

          Information was gathered from daily reports provided by the Ministry of Health, Singapore Statues online and a Ministerial statement given at a Parliament sitting on 4 May 2020.

          Results

          A marked escalation in the daily number of new COVID-19 cases was seen in early April 2020. The majority of cases occurred among an estimated 295 000 low-skilled migrant workers living in foreign worker dormitories. As of 6 May 2020, there were 17 758 confirmed COVID-19 cases among dormitory workers (88% of 20 198 nationally confirmed cases). One dormitory housing approximately 13 000 workers had 19.4% of residents infected. The national response included mobilising several government agencies and public volunteers. There was extensive testing of workers in dormitories, segregation of healthy and infected workers, and daily observation for fever and symptoms. Twenty-four dormitories were declared as ‘isolation areas’, with residents quarantined for 14 days. New housing, for example, vacant public housing flats, military camps, exhibition centres, floating hotels have been provided that will allow for appropriate social distancing.

          Conclusion

          The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted migrant workers as a vulnerable occupational group. Ideally, matters related to inadequate housing of vulnerable migrant workers need to be addressed before a pandemic.

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          Most cited references3

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          Public Health Responses to COVID-19 Outbreaks on Cruise Ships — Worldwide, February–March 2020

          An estimated 30 million passengers are transported on 272 cruise ships worldwide each year* ( 1 ). Cruise ships bring diverse populations into proximity for many days, facilitating transmission of respiratory illness ( 2 ). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and has since spread worldwide to at least 187 countries and territories. Widespread COVID-19 transmission on cruise ships has been reported as well ( 3 ). Passengers on certain cruise ship voyages might be aged ≥65 years, which places them at greater risk for severe consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection ( 4 ). During February–March 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks associated with three cruise ship voyages have caused more than 800 laboratory-confirmed cases among passengers and crew, including 10 deaths. Transmission occurred across multiple voyages of several ships. This report describes public health responses to COVID-19 outbreaks on these ships. COVID-19 on cruise ships poses a risk for rapid spread of disease, causing outbreaks in a vulnerable population, and aggressive efforts are required to contain spread. All persons should defer all cruise travel worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic. During February 7–23, 2020, the largest cluster of COVID-19 cases outside mainland China occurred on the Diamond Princess cruise ship, which was quarantined in the port of Yokohama, Japan, on February 3 ( 3 ). On March 6, cases of COVID-19 were identified in persons on the Grand Princess cruise ship off the coast of California; that ship was subsequently quarantined. By March 17, confirmed cases of COVID-19 had been associated with at least 25 additional cruise ship voyages. On February 21, CDC recommended avoiding travel on cruise ships in Southeast Asia; on March 8, this recommendation was broadened to include deferring all cruise ship travel worldwide for those with underlying health conditions and for persons aged ≥65 years. On March 13, the Cruise Lines International Association announced a 30-day voluntary suspension of cruise operations in the United States ( 5 ). CDC issued a level 3 travel warning on March 17, recommending that all cruise travel be deferred worldwide. † Diamond Princess On January 20, 2020, the Diamond Princess cruise ship departed Yokohama, Japan, carrying approximately 3,700 passengers and crew (Table). On January 25, a symptomatic passenger departed the ship in Hong Kong, where he was evaluated; testing confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. On February 3, the ship returned to Japan, after making six stops in three countries. Japanese authorities were notified of the COVID-19 diagnosis in the passenger who disembarked in Hong Kong, and the ship was quarantined. Information about social distancing and monitoring of symptoms was communicated to passengers. On February 5, passengers were quarantined in their cabins; crew continued to work and, therefore, could not be isolated in their cabins ( 6 ). Initially, travelers with fever or respiratory symptoms and their close contacts were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). All those with positive test results were disembarked and hospitalized. Testing was later expanded to support a phased disembarkation of passengers, prioritizing testing of older persons, those with underlying medical conditions, and those in internal cabins with no access to the outdoors. During February 16–23, nearly 1,000 persons were repatriated by air to their home countries, including 329 persons who returned to the United States and entered quarantine or isolation. § , ¶ TABLE Demographic characteristics of passengers and crew members on board two cruise ships with COVID-19 outbreaks January 20–March 8, 2020 Characteristic Diamond Princess (total 3,711 persons) Grand Princess, voyage B(total 3,571 persons) Crew Passengers Crew Passengers Total no. 1,045 2,666 1,111 2,460 Age median (interquartile range), yrs 36 (29–43) 69 (62–73) 36 (30–43) 68 (61–74) Total nations represented 48 36 44 24 Country of residence of passengers, no. (%) Japan N/A 1,281 (48) N/A 3 (1) United States N/A 416 (16) N/A 2,008 (82) Hong Kong N/A 260 (10) N/A 0 (0) Canada N/A 251 (9) N/A 231 (9) Australia N/A 223 (8) N/A 1 (0) United Kingdom N/A 57 (2) N/A 113 (4) Other countries or unknown N/A 178 (7) N/A 104 (4) Country of residence of crew members, no. (%) Philippines 531 (51) N/A 529 (48) N/A India 132 (13) N/A 131 (12) N/A Indonesia 78 (7) N/A 57 (5) N/A Other countries or unknown 304 (29) N/A 394 (35) N/A Sex, no. (%) Male 843 (81) 1,189 (45) 928 (84) 1,120 (46) Female 202 (19) 1,477 (55) 183 (16) 1,340 (54) No. of persons per cabin, mean (range) 1.73 (1–3) 1.98 (1–4) 1.75 (1–4) 1.95 (1–4) Abbreviation: N/A = not applicable. The remaining passengers who had negative SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test results,** no respiratory symptoms, and no close contact with a person with a confirmed case of COVID-19 completed a 14-day ship-based quarantine before disembarkation. Those passengers who had close contact with a person with a confirmed case completed land-based quarantine, with duration determined by date of last contact. After disembarkation of all passengers, crew members either completed a 14-day ship-based quarantine, were repatriated to and managed in their home country, or completed a 14-day land-based quarantine in Japan. Overall, 111 (25.9%) of 428 U.S. citizens and legal residents did not join repatriation flights either because they had been hospitalized in Japan or for other reasons. To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 importation into the United States, CDC used temporary “Do Not Board” restrictions ( 7 ) to prevent commercial airline travel to the United States, †† and the U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security restricted travel to the United States for non-U.S. travelers. Among 3,711 Diamond Princess passengers and crew, 712 (19.2%) had positive test results for SARS-CoV-2 (Figure 1). Of these, 331 (46.5%) were asymptomatic at the time of testing. Among 381 symptomatic patients, 37 (9.7%) required intensive care, and nine (1.3%) died ( 8 ). Infections also occurred among three Japanese responders, including one nurse, one quarantine officer, and one administrative officer ( 9 ). As of March 13, among 428 U.S. passengers and crew, 107 (25.0%) had positive test results for COVID-19; 11 U.S. passengers remain hospitalized in Japan (median age = 75 years), including seven in serious condition (median age = 76 years). FIGURE 1 Cumulative number of confirmed coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases* by date of detection — Diamond Princess cruise ship, Yokohama, Japan, February 3–March 16, 2020 Source: World Health Organization (WHO) coronavirus disease (COVID-2019) situation reports. https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/. * Decline in cumulative number of cases on February 13 and February 25 due to correction by WHO for cases that had been counted twice. The figure is a line chart showing cumulative number of confirmed COVID-19 cases by date of detection on board the Diamond Princess cruise ship in Yokohama, Japan, during February 3–March 16, 2020. Grand Princess During February 11–21, 2020, the Grand Princess cruise ship sailed roundtrip from San Francisco, California, making four stops in Mexico (voyage A). Most of the 1,111 crew and 68 passengers from voyage A remained on board for a second voyage that departed San Francisco on February 21 (voyage B), with a planned return on March 7 (Table). On March 4, a clinician in California reported two patients with COVID-19 symptoms who had traveled on voyage A, one of whom had positive test results for SARS-CoV-2. CDC notified the cruise line, which began cancelling group activities on voyage B. More than 20 additional cases of COVID-19 among persons who did not travel on voyage B have been identified from Grand Princess voyage A, the majority in California. One death has been reported. On March 5, a response team was transported by helicopter to the ship to collect specimens from 45 passengers and crew with respiratory symptoms for SARS-CoV-2 testing; 21 (46.7%), including two passengers and 19 crew, had positive test results. Passengers and symptomatic crew members were asked to self-quarantine in their cabins, and room service replaced public dining until disembarkation. Following docking in Oakland, California, on March 8, passengers and crew were transferred to land-based sites for a 14-day quarantine period or isolation. Persons requiring medical attention for other conditions or for symptoms consistent with COVID-19 were evaluated, tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection, and hospitalized if indicated. During land-based quarantine in the United States, all persons were offered SARS-CoV-2 testing. As of March 21, of 469 persons with available test results, 78 (16.6%) had positive test results for SARS-CoV-2. Repatriation flights for foreign nationals were organized by several governments in coordination with U.S. federal and California state government agencies. Following disinfection of the vessel according to guidance from CDC’s Vessel Sanitation Program, remaining foreign nationals will complete quarantine on board. The quarantine will be managed by the cruise company, with technical assistance provided by public health experts. On February 21, five crew members from voyage A transferred to three other ships with a combined 13,317 passengers on board. No-sail orders §§ were issued by CDC for these ships until medical logs were reviewed and the crew members tested negative for SARS-CoV-2. Additional Ships The Diamond Princess and Grand Princess had more than 800 total COVID-19 cases, including 10 deaths. During February 3–March 13, in the United States, approximately 200 cases of COVID-19 were confirmed among returned cruise travelers from multiple ship voyages, including the Diamond Princess and Grand Princess, accounting for approximately 17% of total reported U.S. cases at the time ( 10 ). Cases linked with cruise travel have been reported to CDC in at least 15 states. Since February, multiple international cruises have been implicated in reports of COVID-19 cases, including at least 60 cases in the United States from Nile River cruises in Egypt (Figure 2). Secondary community-acquired cases linked to returned passengers on cruises have also been reported (CDC, unpublished data, 2020). FIGURE 2 Cruise ships with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases requiring public health responses — worldwide, January–March 2020 The figure is a map that shows cruise ships with COVID-19 cases requiring public health responses worldwide during January–March 2020. Discussion Public health responses to COVID-19 outbreaks on cruise ships were aimed at limiting transmission among passengers and crew, preventing exportation of COVID-19 to other communities, and assuring the safety of travelers and responders. These responses required the coordination of stakeholders across multiple sectors, including U.S. Government departments and agencies, foreign ministries of health, foreign embassies, state and local public health departments, hospitals, laboratories, and cruise ship companies. At the time of the Diamond Princess outbreak, it became apparent that passengers disembarking from cruise ships could be a source of community transmission. Therefore, aggressive efforts to contain transmission on board and prevent further transmission upon disembarkation and repatriation were instituted. These efforts included travel restrictions applied to persons, movement restrictions applied to ships, infection prevention and control measures, (e.g., use of personal protective equipment for medical and cleaning staff), disinfection of the cabins of persons with suspected COVID-19, provision of communication materials, notification of state health departments, and investigation of contacts of cases identified among U.S. returned travelers. Cruise ships are often settings for outbreaks of infectious diseases because of their closed environment, contact between travelers from many countries, and crew transfers between ships. On the Diamond Princess, transmission largely occurred among passengers before quarantine was implemented, whereas crew infections peaked after quarantine ( 6 ). On the Grand Princess, crew members were likely infected on voyage A and then transmitted SARS-CoV-2 to passengers on voyage B. The results of testing of passengers and crew on board the Diamond Princess demonstrated a high proportion (46.5%) of asymptomatic infections at the time of testing. Available statistical models of the Diamond Princess outbreak suggest that 17.9% of infected persons never developed symptoms ( 9 ). A high proportion of asymptomatic infections could partially explain the high attack rate among cruise ship passengers and crew. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was identified on a variety of surfaces in cabins of both symptomatic and asymptomatic infected passengers up to 17 days after cabins were vacated on the Diamond Princess but before disinfection procedures had been conducted (Takuya Yamagishi, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, personal communication, 2020). Although these data cannot be used to determine whether transmission occurred from contaminated surfaces, further study of fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 aboard cruise ships is warranted. During the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Diamond Princess was the setting of the largest outbreak outside mainland China. Many other cruise ships have since been implicated in SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Factors that facilitate spread on cruise ships might include mingling of travelers from multiple geographic regions and the closed nature of a cruise ship environment. This is particularly concerning for older passengers, who are at increased risk for serious complications of COVID-19 ( 4 ). The Grand Princess was an example of perpetuation of transmission from crew members across multiple consecutive voyages and the potential introduction of the virus to passengers and crew on other ships. Public health responses to cruise ship outbreaks require extensive resources. Temporary suspension of cruise ship travel during the current phase of the COVID-19 pandemic has been partially implemented by cruise lines through voluntary suspensions of operations, and by CDC through its unprecedented use of travel notices and warnings for conveyances to limit disease transmission ( 5 ). Summary What is already known about this topic? Cruise ships are often settings for outbreaks of infectious diseases because of their closed environment and contact between travelers from many countries. What is added by this report? More than 800 cases of laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases occurred during outbreaks on three cruise ship voyages, and cases linked to several additional cruises have been reported across the United States. Transmission occurred across multiple voyages from ship to ship by crew members; both crew members and passengers were affected; 10 deaths associated with cruise ships have been reported to date. What are the implications for public health practice? Outbreaks of COVID-19 on cruise ships pose a risk for rapid spread of disease beyond the voyage. Aggressive efforts are required to contain spread. All persons should defer all cruise travel worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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            Prisons and custodial settings are part of a comprehensive response to COVID-19

            Prisons are epicentres for infectious diseases because of the higher background prevalence of infection, the higher levels of risk factors for infection, the unavoidable close contact in often overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary facilities, and the poor access to health-care services relative to that in community settings. 1 Infections can be transmitted between prisoners, staff and visitors, between prisons through transfers and staff cross-deployment, and to and from the community. As such, prisons and other custodial settings are an integral part of the public health response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). One of the first documented influenza outbreaks in prison occurred in San Quentin prison in California, USA, during the 1918 influenza pandemic. In three separate instances, infection was introduced by a newly received prisoner, and a single transfer to another prison resulted in an outbreak there. Isolation was central to containment. 2 More recently, prison influenza outbreaks have been described in the USA, Canada, Australia, Taiwan, and Thailand.3, 4 We are unaware of any published reports of influenza outbreaks in youth detention or immigration detention centres, although modelling suggests that outbreaks would progress similarly in these settings. 5 Since early 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks have been documented worldwide, including Iran, where 70 000 prisoners have been released in an effort to reduce in-custody transmission. 6 Prisons concentrate individuals who are susceptible to infection and those with a higher risk of complications. COVID-19 has an increased mortality in older people and in those with chronic diseases or immunosuppression. Notably, multimorbidity is normative among people in prison, often with earlier onset and greater severity than in the general population, and prison populations are ageing in many countries. 7 Furthermore, inadequate investment in prison health, substantial overcrowding in some prison settings, and rigid security processess have the potential to delay diagnosis and treatment. As such, COVID-19 outbreaks in custodial settings are of importance for public health, for at least two reasons: first, that explosive outbreaks in these settings have the potential to overwhelm prison health-care services and place additional demands on overburdened specialist facilities in the community; and second, that, with an estimated 30 million people released from custody each year globally, prisons are a vector for community transmission that will disproportionately impact marginalised communities. What must be done to mitigate the impact of large outbreaks of COVID-19 in prisons? The public health importance of prison responses to influenza outbreaks has been recognised in the USA, 8 where the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have developed a checklist for pandemic influenza preparedness in correctional settings. WHO has also issued prison-specific guidance for responding to COVID-19 (panel ). 9 Panel Prison-specific guidance for responding to COVID-19 Joint planning Include prison health and correctional authorities in the overall public health response, rather than permitting them to plan and operate in isolation. Risk management Design and implement adequate systems for limiting importation and exportation of cases from or to the community, and transmission and spread within prisons. Prevention and control Develop protocols for entry screening, personal protection measures, social distancing, environmental cleaning and disinfection, and restriction of movement, including limitation of transfers and access for non-essential staff and visitors. Treatment Explicitly and transparently align prison health systems with the wider health and emergency planning systems, including transfer protocols for patients requiring specialised care. Isolate cases and contacts if required to control the spread of infection in prisons. However, special consideration of the potentially serious mental health effects of isolation in these settings is essential.10, 11 In high-income countries, maintaining isolation without depriving incarcerated people of human contact might be possible. 12 Information sharing Close collaboration between health and justice ministries should be established to ensure continuity of information, which is a crucial component of an effective, coordinated, whole-of-government response. Governance of prison health by a ministry of health, rather than a ministry of justice or similar, is likely to facilitate timely information sharing. 13 Prison health is public health by definition. Despite this and the very porous borders between prisons and communities, prisons are often excluded or treated as separate from public health efforts. The fast spread of COVID-19 will, like most epidemics, disproportionately affect the most disadvantaged people. Therefore, to mitigate the effects of prison outbreaks on tertiary health-care facilities and reduce morbidity and mortality among society's most marginalised, it is crucial that prisons, youth detention centres, and immigration detention centres are embedded within the broader public health response.
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              Infectious diseases and migrant worker health in Singapore: a receiving country's perspective.

              Approximately 1.4 million migrant workers reside in Singapore, presenting unique infectious disease challenges to both migrants and Singapore.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Occup Environ Med
                Occup Environ Med
                oemed
                oem
                Occupational and Environmental Medicine
                BMJ Publishing Group (BMA House, Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 9JR )
                1351-0711
                1470-7926
                September 2020
                8 June 2020
                8 June 2020
                : 77
                : 9
                : 634-636
                Affiliations
                [1 ] departmentInstitute of Health Sciences , Universiti Brunei Darussalam , Gadong, Brunei Darussalam
                [2 ] departmentSaw Swee Hock School of Public Health , National University of Singapore , Singapore
                Author notes
                [Correspondence to ] Professor David Koh, Institute of Health Sciences, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong BE1410, Brunei Darussalam; david_koh@ 123456nuhs.edu.sg
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6803-7879
                Article
                oemed-2020-106626
                10.1136/oemed-2020-106626
                7476302
                32513832
                37d8084f-3e99-4139-b801-cd268d7dfeb6
                © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.

                This article is made freely available for use in accordance with BMJ’s website terms and conditions for the duration of the covid-19 pandemic or until otherwise determined by BMJ. You may use, download and print the article for any lawful, non-commercial purpose (including text and data mining) provided that all copyright notices and trade marks are retained.

                History
                : 17 April 2020
                : 07 May 2020
                : 29 May 2020
                Categories
                Workplace
                2474
                Short report
                Custom metadata
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                Occupational & Environmental medicine
                occupational health practice,migrant workers
                Occupational & Environmental medicine
                occupational health practice, migrant workers

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