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      A multi-dimensional framework for prosthetic embodiment: a perspective for translational research

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          Abstract

          The concept of embodiment has gained widespread popularity within prosthetics research. Embodiment has been claimed to be an indicator of the efficacy of sensory feedback and control strategies. Moreover, it has even been claimed to be necessary for prosthesis acceptance, albeit unfoundedly. Despite the popularity of the term, an actual consensus on how prosthetic embodiment should be used in an experimental framework has yet to be reached. The lack of consensus is in part due to terminological ambiguity and the lack of an exact definition of prosthetic embodiment itself. In a review published parallel to this article, we summarized the definitions of embodiment used in prosthetics literature and concluded that treating prosthetic embodiment as a combination of ownership and agency allows for embodiment to be quantified, and thus useful in translational research. Here, we review the potential mechanisms that give rise to ownership and agency considering temporal, spatial, and anatomical constraints. We then use this to propose a multi-dimensional framework where prosthetic embodiment arises within a spectrum dependent on the integration of volition and multi-sensory information as demanded by the degree of interaction with the environment. This framework allows for the different experimental paradigms on sensory feedback and prosthetic control to be placed in a common perspective. By considering that embodiment lays along a spectrum tied to the interactions with the environment, one can conclude that the embodiment of prosthetic devices should be assessed while operating in environments as close to daily life as possible for it to become relevant.

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          Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see.

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            Touching a rubber hand: feeling of body ownership is associated with activity in multisensory brain areas.

            In the "rubber-hand illusion," the sight of brushing of a rubber hand at the same time as brushing of the person's own hidden hand is sufficient to produce a feeling of ownership of the fake hand. We shown previously that this illusion is associated with activity in the multisensory areas, most notably the ventral premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004). However, it remains to be demonstrated that this illusion does not simply reflect the dominant role of vision and that the premotor activity does not reflect a visual representation of an object near the hand. To address these issues, we introduce a somatic rubber-hand illusion. The experimenter moved the blindfolded participant's left index finger so that it touched the fake hand, and simultaneously, he touched the participant's real right hand, synchronizing the touches as perfectly as possible. After approximately 9.7 s, this stimulation elicited an illusion that one was touching one's own hand. We scanned brain activity during this illusion and two control conditions, using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Activity in the ventral premotor cortices, intraparietal cortices, and the cerebellum was associated with the illusion of touching one's own hand. Furthermore, the rated strength of the illusion correlated with the degree of premotor and cerebellar activity. This finding suggests that the activity in these areas reflects the detection of congruent multisensory signals from one's own body, rather than of visual representations. We propose that this could be the mechanism for the feeling of body ownership.
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              Moving a Rubber Hand that Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency

              During voluntary hand movement, we sense that we generate the movement and that the hand is a part of our body. These feelings of control over bodily actions, or the sense of agency, and the ownership of body parts are two fundamental aspects of the way we consciously experience our bodies. However, little is known about how these processes are functionally linked. Here, we introduce a version of the rubber hand illusion in which participants control the movements of the index finger of a model hand, which is in full view, by moving their own right index finger. We demonstrated that voluntary finger movements elicit a robust illusion of owning the rubber hand and that the senses of ownership and agency over the model hand can be dissociated. We systematically varied the relative timing of the finger movements (synchronous versus asynchronous), the mode of movement (active versus passive), and the position of the model hand (anatomically congruent versus incongruent positions). Importantly, asynchrony eliminated both ownership and agency, passive movements abolished the sense of agency but left ownership intact, and incongruent positioning of the model hand diminished ownership but did not eliminate agency. These findings provide evidence for a double dissociation of ownership and agency, suggesting that they represent distinct cognitive processes. Interestingly, we also noted that the sense of agency was stronger when the hand was perceived to be a part of the body, and only in this condition did we observe a significant correlation between the subjects’ ratings of agency and ownership. We discuss this in the context of possible differences between agency over owned body parts and agency over actions that involve interactions with external objects. In summary, the results obtained in this study using a simple moving rubber hand illusion paradigm extend previous findings on the experience of ownership and agency and shed new light on their relationship.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                maxo@chalmers.se
                Journal
                J Neuroeng Rehabil
                J Neuroeng Rehabil
                Journal of NeuroEngineering and Rehabilitation
                BioMed Central (London )
                1743-0003
                11 November 2022
                11 November 2022
                2022
                : 19
                : 122
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Center for Bionics and Pain Research, Mölndal, Sweden
                [2 ]GRID grid.5371.0, ISNI 0000 0001 0775 6028, Department of Electrical Engineering, , Chalmers University of Technology, ; Gothenburg, Sweden
                [3 ]GRID grid.511294.a, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, , McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ; Cambridge, MA USA
                [4 ]GRID grid.1649.a, ISNI 000000009445082X, Operational Area 3, , Sahlgrenska University Hospital, ; Gothenburg, Sweden
                [5 ]GRID grid.8761.8, ISNI 0000 0000 9919 9582, Department of Orthopaedics, Institute of Clinical Sciences, , Sahlgrenska Academy, University of Gothenburg, ; Gothenburg, Sweden
                Article
                1102
                10.1186/s12984-022-01102-7
                9652836
                36369004
                3a5021bc-09a4-498b-a6a3-fba2bb58e3ad
                © The Author(s) 2022

                Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.

                History
                : 5 February 2022
                : 25 October 2022
                Funding
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100009389, Stiftelsen Promobilia;
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003849, IngaBritt och Arne Lundbergs Forskningsstiftelse;
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004359, Vetenskapsrådet;
                Funded by: Chalmers University of Technology
                Categories
                Review
                Custom metadata
                © The Author(s) 2022

                Neurosciences
                embodiment,prosthetics,ownership,agency,body representation,phenomenology
                Neurosciences
                embodiment, prosthetics, ownership, agency, body representation, phenomenology

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