Human dignity and the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras

Abstract

In this work I present a detailed critique of the dignity-related arguments that have been advanced against the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras that could possess human-like mental capacities. My main claim is that the arguments so far advanced are incapable of grounding a principled objection against the creation of such creatures. I conclude that these arguments have one, or more, of the following problems: (a) they confuse the ethical assessment of the creation of chimeras with the ethical assessment of how such creatures would be treated in specific contexts (e.g. in the laboratory), (b) they misrepresent how a being could be treated solely as means towards others’ ends, (c) they fall short of demonstrating how humanity’s dignity would be violated by the creation of such entities, and (d) they fail to properly characterise the moral responsibilities that moral agents have towards other moral agents and sentient beings.