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      Selecting effective incentive structures in health care: A decision framework to support health care purchasers in finding the right incentives to drive performance

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          Abstract

          Background

          The Ontario health care system is devolving planning and funding authority to community based organizations and moving from steering through rules and regulations to steering on performance. As part of this transformation, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) are interested in using incentives as a strategy to ensure alignment – that is, health service providers' goals are in accord with the goals of the health system. The objective of the study was to develop a decision framework to assist policymakers in choosing and designing effective incentive systems.

          Methods

          The first part of the study was an extensive review of the literature to identify incentives models that are used in the various health care systems and their effectiveness. The second part was the development of policy principles to ensure that the used incentive models are congruent with the values of the Ontario health care system. The principles were developed by reviewing the Ontario policy documents and through discussions with policymakers. The validation of the principles and the suggested incentive models for use in Ontario took place at two meetings. The first meeting was with experts from the research and policy community, the second with senior policymakers from the MOHLTC. Based on the outcome of those two meetings, the researchers built a decision framework for incentives. The framework was send to the participants of both meetings and four additional experts for validation.

          Results

          We identified several models that have proven, with a varying degree of evidence, to be effective in changing or enabling a health provider's performance. Overall, the literature suggests that there is no single best approach to create incentives yet and the ability of financial and non-financial incentives to achieve results depends on a number of contextual elements. After assessing the initial set of incentive models on their congruence with the four policy principles we defined nine incentive models to be appropriate for use in Ontario and potentially other health care systems that want to introduce incentives to improve performance. Subsequently, the models were incorporated in the resulting decision framework.

          Conclusion

          The design of an incentive must reflect the values and goals of the health care system, be well matched to the performance objectives and reflect a range of contextual factors that can influence the effectiveness of even well-designed incentives. As a consequence, a single policy recommendation around incentives is inappropriate. The decision framework provides health care policymakers and purchasers with a tool to support the selection of an incentive model that is the most appropriate to improve the targeted performance.

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          Most cited references71

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          The Provision of Incentives in Firms

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            On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.

            Micah Kerr (1975)
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              Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United Kingdom.

              In 2004, after a series of national initiatives associated with marked improvements in the quality of care, the National Health Service of the United Kingdom introduced a pay-for-performance contract for family practitioners. This contract increases existing income according to performance with respect to 146 quality indicators covering clinical care for 10 chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient experience. We analyzed data extracted automatically from clinical computing systems for 8105 family practices in England in the first year of the pay-for-performance program (April 2004 through March 2005), data from the U.K. Census, and data on characteristics of individual family practices. We examined the proportion of patients deemed eligible for a clinical quality indicator for whom the indicator was met (reported achievement) and the proportion of the total number of patients with a medical condition for whom a quality indicator was met (population achievement), and we used multiple regression analysis to determine the extent to which practices achieved high scores by classifying patients as ineligible for quality indicators (exception reporting). The median reported achievement in the first year of the new contract was 83.4 percent (interquartile range, 78.2 to 87.0 percent). Sociodemographic characteristics of the patients (age and socioeconomic features) and practices (size of practice, number of patients per practitioner, age of practitioner, and whether the practitioner was medically educated in the United Kingdom) had moderate but significant effects on performance. Exception reporting by practices was not extensive (median rate, 6 percent), but it was the strongest predictor of achievement: a 1 percent increase in the rate of exception reporting was associated with a 0.31 percent increase in reported achievement. Exception reporting was high in a small number of practices: 1 percent of practices excluded more than 15 percent of patients. English family practices attained high levels of achievement in the first year of the new pay-for-performance contract. A small number of practices appear to have achieved high scores by excluding large numbers of patients by exception reporting. More research is needed to determine whether these practices are excluding patients for sound clinical reasons or in order to increase income. Copyright 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                BMC Health Serv Res
                BMC Health Services Research
                BioMed Central
                1472-6963
                2008
                27 March 2008
                : 8
                : 66
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Social Medicine, Academic Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, PO Box 22700, 1100 DE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
                [2 ]Health Results Team – Information Management/Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Toronto, Canada
                [3 ]Department of Economics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
                Article
                1472-6963-8-66
                10.1186/1472-6963-8-66
                2329630
                18371198
                3dd16358-5d58-4377-b0e6-ee2ce6c3fd5b
                Copyright © 2008 Custers et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

                This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

                History
                : 7 June 2007
                : 27 March 2008
                Categories
                Correspondence

                Health & Social care
                Health & Social care

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