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      Bureaucratic discretion and legislative oversight on the budget process in Mexico 2001-2012 Translated title: Discrecionalidad burocrática y supervisión legislativa del proceso presupuestario en México 2001-2012

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          Abstract

          The article analyzes the extent to which democratization increased the level of legislative control over the budget process during the first twelve years of democracy in Mexico. Two components of legislative oversight are examined in detail: Haciendas financial information available to legislators and the legislation regulating the government's capacity to allocate and reallocate federal funds. The article finds that while legislators have formal rights to control the bureaucracy, public officials have informal leverage over members of Congress, as well. By distributing resources that legislators can use for patronage purposes, bureaucrats obtain legislators' consent to implement programs at their convenience.

          Translated abstract

          El artículo analiza el grado en que la democratización incrementó el control legislativo sobre el proceso presupuestal en los primeros doce años de democracia en México. Dos componentes del control legislativo son examinados: la información financiera que Hacienda pone a disposición del Congreso y la legislación para asignar y reasignar fondos federales. Los hallazgos indican que mientras los legisladores cuentan con derechos formales para controlar a los funcionarios, éstos también tienen influencia sobre los congresistas. La burocracia obtiene consentimiento del legislativo para implementar programas a su conveniencia al distribuir recursos a los legisladores que pueden ser utilizados para fines clientelares.

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          Most cited references62

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          Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms

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            Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

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              A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                est
                Economía, sociedad y territorio
                Econ. soc. territ
                El Colegio Mexiquense A.C. (Toluca, Estado de México, Mexico )
                1405-8421
                2448-6183
                December 2015
                : 15
                : 49
                : 605-637
                Affiliations
                [01] México Distrito Federal orgnameCentro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C. México rodrigo.velazquez@ 123456cide.edu
                Article
                S1405-84212015000300002 S1405-8421(15)01504900002
                3fc208fe-4dd0-42a5-8b4e-4c07f8311126

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

                History
                : 07 July 2014
                : 09 October 2013
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 56, Pages: 33
                Product

                SciELO Mexico

                Categories
                Research articles

                Proceso presupuestal,supervisión legislativa,democratización,México,budget process,legislative oversight,Mexico,democratization

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