3
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Universal linguistic hierarchies are not innately wired. Evidence from multiple adjectives

      research-article
      1 , , 1 , 2
      PeerJ
      PeerJ Inc.
      Language, Cognition, Innateness, Development

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Background

          Linguists and psychologists have explained the remarkable similarities in the orderings of linguistic elements across languages by suggesting that our inborn ability for language makes available certain innately wired primitives. Different types of adjectives, adverbs, and other elements in the functional spine are considered to occupy fixed positions via innate hierarchies that determine orderings such as A>B>C, banning other permutations (*B>C>A). The goal of this research is to tap into the nature and rigidity of such hierarchies by comparing what happens when people process orderings that either comply with them or violate them.

          Method

          N = 170 neurotypical, adult speakers completed a timed forced choice task that featured stimuli showing a combination of two adjectives and a Spelke-object (e.g., ‘I bought a square black table’). Two types of responses were collected: (i) acceptability judgments on a 3-point Likert scale that featured the options ‘correct’, ‘neither correct nor wrong’, and ‘wrong’ and (ii) reaction times. The task featured three conditions: 1. size adjective > nationality adjective, 2. color adjective > shape adjective, 3. subjective comment adjective > material adjective. Each condition had two orders. In the congruent order, the adjective pair was ordered in agreement with what is traditionally accepted as dictated by the universal hierarchy. In the incongruent order, the ordering was reversed, thus the hierarchy was violated.

          Results

          In the first experiment, the results of n = 140 monolinguals showed that across conditions, both congruent and incongruent orders were generally accepted as correct. For 2/3 conditions, the difference in acceptability ratings between congruent and incongruent orders did not reach statistical significance. Using time as a window to processing, reaction times showed that incongruent orders do not take longer to process than congruent ones, as should be the case if the former were treated as being licensed under some type of special condition (e.g., contrastive focus) that reverses the unmarked order and legitimizes the violation of the hierarchy. In the second experiment, the results of n = 30 bidialectals, tested in both language varieties, corroborated the findings of the first experiment.

          Conclusions

          Our findings do not provide evidence for an innate hierarchy for adjective ordering that imposes one rigid, unmarked order. We discuss the importance of notions such as subjectivity and inherentness, and show that for some conditions, not only is there no evidence for a hard constraint that bans incongruent orders, but even simple preferences of congruent orders over incongruent ones are hard to discern. Capturing the bigger picture, given that both the hierarchies and their legit permutations have been described as innate, our results reduce the amount of primitives that are cast as innate, eventually offering a deflationist approach to human linguistic cognition.

          Related collections

          Most cited references57

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          Revised standards for statistical evidence.

          Recent advances in Bayesian hypothesis testing have led to the development of uniformly most powerful Bayesian tests, which represent an objective, default class of Bayesian hypothesis tests that have the same rejection regions as classical significance tests. Based on the correspondence between these two classes of tests, it is possible to equate the size of classical hypothesis tests with evidence thresholds in Bayesian tests, and to equate P values with Bayes factors. An examination of these connections suggest that recent concerns over the lack of reproducibility of scientific studies can be attributed largely to the conduct of significance tests at unjustifiably high levels of significance. To correct this problem, evidence thresholds required for the declaration of a significant finding should be increased to 25-50:1, and to 100-200:1 for the declaration of a highly significant finding. In terms of classical hypothesis tests, these evidence standards mandate the conduct of tests at the 0.005 or 0.001 level of significance.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Optimal number of response categories in rating scales: reliability, validity, discriminating power, and respondent preferences.

            Using a self-administered questionnaire, 149 respondents rated service elements associated with a recently visited store or restaurant on scales that differed only in the number of response categories (ranging from 2 to 11) and on a 101-point scale presented in a different format. On several indices of reliability, validity, and discriminating power, the two-point, three-point, and four-point scales performed relatively poorly, and indices were significantly higher for scales with more response categories, up to about 7. Internal consistency did not differ significantly between scales, but test-retest reliability tended to decrease for scales with more than 10 response categories. Respondent preferences were highest for the 10-point scale, closely followed by the seven-point and nine-point scales. Implications for research and practice are discussed.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Stuck in the middle: the use and interpretation of mid-points in items on questionnaires.

              Likert-type scales are commonly used when assessing attitudes, personality characteristics, and other psychological variables. This study examined the effect of varying the number of response options on the same set of 28 attitudinal items. Participants answered items using either a 4-point scale (forced choice), a 5-point scale that included a "neither" mid-point, or a 4-point scale with an option of "no opinion" presented after the item. The questionnaire also included an item asking participants what they believe the midpoint in a scale indicated. As predicted, participants' interpretations of the midpoint varied widely with the most common responses being: "no opinion," "don't care," "unsure," "neutral," "equal/both," and "neither." The quantitative results showed that participants' levels of item endorsement varied based on the response options offered. For example, "neither" was chosen more often than "no opinion" on all of the items.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                PeerJ
                PeerJ
                peerj
                peerj
                PeerJ
                PeerJ Inc. (San Diego, USA )
                2167-8359
                1 August 2019
                2019
                : 7
                : e7438
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Language and Culture, UiT The Arctic University of Norway , Tromsø, Norway
                [2 ]Department of Language & Literature, NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology , Trondheim, Norway
                Article
                7438
                10.7717/peerj.7438
                6679903
                4340276d-64a9-43e2-857f-064c0b14d104
                ©2019 Leivada and Westergaard

                This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, reproduction and adaptation in any medium and for any purpose provided that it is properly attributed. For attribution, the original author(s), title, publication source (PeerJ) and either DOI or URL of the article must be cited.

                History
                : 24 October 2018
                : 8 July 2019
                Funding
                Funded by: European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
                Award ID: 746652
                Funded by: UiT The Arctic University of Norway
                This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 746652. The publication charges for this article have been funded by a grant from the publication fund of UiT The Arctic University of Norway. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
                Categories
                Neuroscience
                Psychiatry and Psychology

                language,cognition,innateness,development
                language, cognition, innateness, development

                Comments

                Comment on this article