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      Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test is stable across time

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      Judgment and Decision Making
      Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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          Abstract

          A widely used measure of individual propensity to utilize analytic processing is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a set of math problems with intuitively compelling but incorrect answers. Here, we ask whether scores on this measure are temporally stable. We aggregate data from 11 studies run on Amazon Mechanical Turk in which the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was administered and identify N= 3,302 unique individuals who completed the CRT two or more times. We find a strong correlation between an individual’s first and last CRT performance, r= .806. This remains true even when constraining to data points separated by over 2 years, r= .755. Furthermore, we find that CRT scores from one timepoint correlated negatively with belief in God and social conservatism from the other timepoint (and to a similar extent as scores gathered at the same timepoint). These results show that CRT scores are stable over time, and – given the stable relationship between CRT and religious belief and ideology – provide some evidence for the stability of analytic cognitive style more generally.

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          The efficient assessment of need for cognition.

          A short form for assessing individual differences in need for cognition is described.
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            Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making

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              Spontaneous giving and calculated greed.

              Cooperation is central to human social behaviour. However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework. We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring 'rational' self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Judgment and Decision Making
                Judgm. decis. mak.
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                1930-2975
                May 2018
                January 01 2023
                May 2018
                : 13
                : 3
                : 260-267
                Article
                10.1017/S1930297500007695
                489c1569-aaf4-476a-9880-beea75a3e022
                © 2018

                http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/

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