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      COVID‐19 – how a pandemic reveals that everything is connected to everything else

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      , MBBS, MFM, PhD, DORACOG, FRACGP 1 , 2 , , , MBBS, MSc, PhD, MRCGP, FRACGP, FAFPHM 3
      Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
      John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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          Abstract

          The emergence of a coronavirus (SARS‐CoV‐2) with novel characteristics that made it highly infectious and particularly dangerous for an older age group and people with multiple morbidities brought our complex adaptive system (CAS) “society”—the economy, health systems, and individuals—to a virtual standstill. The COVID‐19 pandemic—caused by SARS‐Co‐2—is a typical wicked problem 1 —we did not see it coming, we experience its effects, and it challenges our entrained ways of thinking and acting. In our view, it is a classic example that demonstrates how suddenly changing dynamics can destabilize a system and tip it into an unstable state. COVID‐19—rather than something else—turned out to be what we colloquially call the last straw that broke the camel's back or, put in system dynamics terms, what pushed our societal systems over a tipping point. When a system suddenly tips over, the linkages between most of its agents break, and a chaotic situation ensues. Chaotic states entail a high degree of uncertainty, a state in which previously proven interventions no longer maintain the status quo. The uncertainties triggered by COVID‐19 have not only shown the fragility of health and national systems but also highlighted the intrinsic and tacit dynamics underpinning them. Most notable are the markedly different responses at the policy and community level. China drastically clamped down on all societal activities and rapidly built large new hospitals to deal with those fallen ill. Iceland rapidly tested every potential case. Sweden implemented limited social distancing measures. Italy hospitalized many mild cases in an environment of limited hospital resources, and the United States, for several weeks, denied that there is a significant problem. Each of these approaches has its own dynamics affecting individuals, communities, health systems, the economy, and the nation as a whole—new patterns emerge that become understandable with increasing knowledge (Figure 1). However, the long‐term outcomes and effects on the system as a whole will only become evident over the next months and years. 2 FIGURE 1 Emergent patterns resulting from the system dynamics triggered by COVID‐19. While we as yet have no clear understanding of the mechanisms of COVID‐19 on people, some common features emerged for those developing severe disease and high fatality outcomes. Moderate severe disease may be associated with increasing age and potential, otherwise innocent, genetic factors. As the development of immunity to SARS‐CoV‐2 is uncertain, previously infected people may continue to spread the disease and/or remain susceptible to reinfection 1 CAS ARE IN CONSTANT FLUX CASs contain many different agents that interact in non‐linear dynamic ways. They are open systems that constantly interact with their environment. Within given constraints, the self‐organizing properties of a CAS makes it resilient to most perturbations to any of its constituent parts. Nevertheless, a CAS may become unexpectedly unstable triggered by a small—often unforeseen/unforeseeable—event. The emerging dynamics then shift the system to a new—stable or unstable—state, where the relationships and the interactions between the systems’ agents have permanently changed within the context of a different set of constraints. 3 When system perturbations result in unexpected outcomes, we become aware of the ever‐present uncertainties in our lives. These experiences easily result in over‐exaggerated fear, which in turn results in ad hoc responses that invariably perpetuate and/or exacerbate the underlying system dysfunctions. 2 THE EMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO UNEXPECTED COMPLEXITY In general, we are not good at seeing and comprehending the complexities in issues, and we have great difficulties in managing their underlying dynamics into the future. The human brain has not evolved to keep all components of a problem in mind and to appreciate their changing dynamics more than two or three steps ahead. 4 At the physiological level, the experiences of failing to manage a complex problem creates cognitive dissonance and emotional distress—we experience anxiety and physical symptoms such as palpitations, sweating, and tremors. Having to solve problems with high levels of unknowns often results in interventions that are ad hoc focussed on what appears to be the most obvious without considering the wider consequences. Dörner's studies 4 in the 1980s demonstrated how people of all walks of life handle unexpected contextual problems. Most of us succumb to the logic of failure; we over‐respond and, when realizing the consequences, promptly react with an over‐response in the opposite direction and so forth. Few among us use the approach of first closely analysing the problem, second responding by introducing small interventions, and finally taking time to observe what happens. In dynamic systems, the true effects of an action are only evident after a time delay. One has to observe and evaluate a CAS' feedback to guide responses; invariably infrequent small tweaks—rather than rapid and dramatic actions—achieve a stabilization of the situation and ultimately provide the necessary space for a (re)solution to emerge. 3 BALANCING THE NEED TO KNOW WITH THE NEED TO ACT COVID‐19 is a wicked problem 1 —there are many known unknowns, unknown knowns, and unknown unknowns. We yet do not know enough about the virus (but we are painfully learning)—the true mode and speed of infectivity, its population dynamics, and treatment; we do not know enough about the risk to the population as a whole and on any subpopulation—age groups, behavioural risk takers, and those with pre‐existing morbidities; we did not have ready‐to‐go pandemic plans—who is in charge, what are proven population control measures, what advice to provide for protection to people and health professionals and public health services, and what are potentially effective treatments. Such problems are known as VUCA problems—they entail Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity. Resolving such problems requires VUCA leadership—Vision, Understanding, Clarity, and Agility. 5 VUCA problems place health and political leaders in a difficult position as any decision will have difficult‐to‐foresee consequences. For example, imposing community‐wide (self‐) isolation entails that “almost all activities stop”, destroying the economy and resulting in high unemployment, poverty, and increasing disease burden, while implementing strategies to slow down the spread of infection will not guarantee that we will not overwhelm health systems or stabilize the pandemic. 4 INTERCONNECTEDNESS—NOT ALWAYS EVIDENT BUT ALWAYS PRESENT As all parts of a CAS at every level of organization are connected to everything else, a change in any part of the system has reverberations across the system as a whole. Two processes control the dynamics of a CAS—top‐down causation transfers information from higher system levels to lower ones, which constrains the work that lower system levels can do, that is, it limits the system's bottom‐up emergent possibilities. 6 If top‐down constraints are too tight, they can bring the system to a standstill. System stability also depends on the law of requisite variety, meaning that a system must have a sufficient repertoire of responses (capacity for self‐organization) that is at least as nuanced (and numerous) as the problems arising within its environment. 7 If the possible ways of responding are fewer than what is demanded from the system, it will fail in its entirety. Both these constraints feature in the COVID‐19 crisis. Figure 2 brings these complexities and interdependencies into a single view. It demonstrates the top‐down causation in CAS and particularly emphasizes to policy‐makers the importance not to limit system constraints to such a degree that the agents at other levels cannot do the work that needs to be done. It also points to the lack of requisite variety at multiple levels, which ultimately limit the system's options to self‐organize back to its prior stable state. These deficiencies can be identified at all three key system levels—policy, service delivery, and biology. FIGURE 2 A complex adaptive system appreciation of the COVID‐19 crisis. The virus triggered unexpected and competing challenges at the policy level with direct and indirect effects on public health policy, the political economy, and individuals (the red tension arrows). Each of these domains has its own circular feedback loops—all link back to the policy level. Ongoing research into the disease, its treatment, and prevention potentially provides “external input” into the systems, which may modify doctors' disease management and alter patients' health outcomes. As described elsewhere, 8 individual health arises at the interface between the environmental and biological domains and is—at times—supported by health care interventions. The detrimental effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic on the economy, besides that of the disease fears, increases the dysregulation of the physiological stress responses that, in turn, result in the dysregulation of upstream metabolic pathways, which have long‐term health consequences far beyond the direct effects of the pandemic While this representation is obviously a simplification, it is useful as it helps to maintain the all‐important focus on the system as a whole. 9 All systems require a central focus—for a health system, it ought to be the person. 10 Health ultimately emerges from hierarchical network interactions between the external environment and internal physiology. 8 Hence, it is the task of health professions at the health service level—the interface between policy and biology—to manage the complex task of integrating the various dimensions of a person's biomedical and social care needs. 11 4.1 The health service level Primary care services are the first contact point between a sick person and the formal health system. Health professionals have to assess the person and make decisions about further actions; in the case of COVID‐19: Does this person require investigations; does this person require isolation, and do his contacts need to be identified, screened and/or isolated; and does this person require hospitalization because of the severity of symptoms? Secondary and tertiary care services have to manage the disease‐specific features of COVID‐19 but are limited by their services' resource constraints, such as the number of hospital beds, ICU beds, and ventilators and the number of qualified staff to provide specialized care. 4.2 The policy level Pandemic planning should provide ready‐to‐go policy, principles and high‐level strategic plans that provide an epidemiology informed framework to guide population‐based actions, allow health professionals to locally adapt overarching policy decisions, and ensure required resources are in place. In return, health professionals need to have systems to reliably provide accurate data about the spread of the disease, disease burden, resource utilization, and staffing needs to inform policy decision makers. These data must be contextual—they always need to have a meaningful denominator, such as whole/affected population size or socio‐economic/age demography, and acknowledge cluster sizes and rates of spread in different environments to enable meaningful comparisons and aid informed decision making. 12 Most importantly, all observations must be communicated in a transparent fashion to ensure maximum adherence to guidelines and directives aimed to achieve pandemic control. 4.3 The biomedical level COVID‐19 creates many biomedical research challenges addressing genomic, cell, organ, and whole‐of‐person level questions. An understanding of the virus and its disease mechanisms is necessary to provide clinicians with the best evidence‐informed treatment options. 13 At the same time, these basic understandings are the necessary stepping stones to develop disease‐specific drugs to cure the disease, as well as a vaccine to stop the pandemic and prevent future recurrences. 5 SENSEMAKING IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF COMPLEX DYNAMICS, POLARITIES, AND INTERDEPENDENCIES The uncertainties created by COVID‐19 require analysis that provides the deep understanding needed to formulate and implement necessary interventions. The Cynefin framework 14 provides a conceptual map to make sense of a complex world. It shows four ways of knowing, each characterized by the strength of the relationships between observable phaenomena—the known, where cause and effect (C&E) are perceivable and predictable; the knowable, where C&E are separated over time and space; the complex, where C&E are only perceivable in retrospect and do not repeat; and the chaotic, where no C&E relationships are perceivable. COVID‐19 has tipped the health and political systems into the chaotic domain. Two possible responses can shift a systems out of this domain—by enforcing order into the known domain or by implementing actions that allow for the emergent self‐organization of a more stable state moving into the complex domain. The complex domain is the space where the best‐adapted decisions to manage rapidly emerging problems arise—informed by the knowledge generated in all other domains (Figure 3). However, certain responses can legitimately operate in known and knowable domains based on context. 15 FIGURE 3 ‐ Sensemaking dynamics of complex adaptive problems (Adapted from Martin 15 ). This Cynefin‐based model outlines the issues arising from the COVID‐19 pandemic in relation to different knowledge domains. It provides a starting point to design an anticipatory system model. Each knowledge domain has its own dynamics and strength and weaknesses in understanding the pandemic as a whole. Note the nature of the strategies required to move from one domain to its neighbouring ones. This understanding is crucial as it has major implications for decision makers (for more detail on the Cynefin model, see Kurtz and Snowden 14 ) Understanding the multifaceted dynamics of the COVID‐19 pandemic requires interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches. 16 As outlined above, there are many contradictions and tensions within the policy community; they are unavoidable, but people must ultimately make sense of the multiple dynamics in and between the different biological, social, environmental, and politico‐economic domains. 17 Sensemaking (or sense‐making) is the process of people giving meaning to their experiences. At the collective level, a transdisciplinary process involving, among others, mathematics, biology, philosophy, sociology and cognitive science, communication studies, and complexity sciences offers the best way to understand the COVID‐19 pandemic. While these discourses cannot deliver certainty, 18 they offer the best change to allow the emergence of best adapted solutions that can ultimately resolve such problems. 16 One approach to reaching best adapted solutions involves mapping out the problem to visualize its agents and their interdependencies. Mapping is the basis for multi‐stakeholder modelling of a problem; it allows the testing out of many different possible interventions and the comparison of their potential outcomes on the system as a whole. 19 However, modelling is not a panacea. As Rosen pointed out, model outputs only reflect an anticipation of a future state of a system. 20 Models are a mental representation of reality; they are not reality itself. 9 Models are never entirely valid but are useful if they can “recreate” a reasonably accurate “current state” of the system based on available data. If data about the nature of a problem are sparse, like at this point in time of the COVID‐19 pandemic, many anticipated model outcomes entail high degrees of uncertainty or are frankly misleading. Anticipatory modelling can fail if a model is not fit for purpose or outdated, uses incorrect coding of agents' state variables that determine its dynamics, neglects to take account of interactions with other systems, or is frankly based on the wrong paradigm (Stockman—personal communication). In time, real‐world feedback will provide more complete data about the dynamic behaviours of the pandemic, which will result in refined models that better anticipate the future—desirable or undesirable—outcomes. Well‐designed contextual models can provide fairly accurate projections of the to‐be‐expected real‐world outcomes of the pandemic on the health system, social activities, and the economy. However, non‐modelled interactions can have significant unintended consequences, for example, the focus on surge capacity of ICU for COVID‐19 patients can reduce resources for other services and lead to greater morbidity and mortality of aged care residents or those affected by multiple morbidities. 5.1 Polarities and interdependencies of the COVID‐19 pandemic Various interests aim to focus the debate and actions on different aspects of the pandemic. While all of them have their merits, it requires strong leadership to guide everyone through the crisis. Some of the dynamic tensions arising from issues include: Host resilience and responses Patient factors—age, years of life left, frailty, multi‐morbidity (compromised body systems), impact of common medications such as ACE‐inhibitors, polypharmacy. Social determinants—poverty, social isolation and support, housing, food security. Community susceptibility—herd immunity, individual and group vulnerabilities, ongoing infectivity, reinfection Disease dynamics—acute respiratory distress syndrome, cytokine storm, acute organ failure, recovery and long‐term sequelae Exposure intensity—asymptomatic shedding, exposure from health care workers, value of face masks and PPE types, potential of vaccination, building ventilation systems Virus characteristics and the unknown unknowns—viral genome, invasion, multiplication, persistence, seasonality, and mutations Interventions social distancing screening and contact tracing, testing for immunity clinical drug trials for treatment and prophylaxis, for example, remdesivir, chloroquine, azithromycin, or nasal sprays vaccine development Intrinsic factors—individual and public health motivations, anxieties and fears, social distancing Health services—private vs public funding, health service resourcing, ethics of rationing Resource security interruption of supply chains affecting delivery and distribution of, for example, personal protective equipment, respirators, or medications interruption to manufacturing food security Political economy—political theories and mindsets, focus on growing GDP, trade, employment and business collapse, poverty 5.2 Approaches to managing polarities and interdependencies Managing polarities and interdependencies requires neutral spaces for negotiation, discourse, and conflict resolution. Prerequisites are the acknowledgement of difference in values, respect for different perspectives, and a clear focus on the real‐world experiences of those involved. It requires communication and leadership skills to facilitate the necessary adaptive work 21 of knowledge translation amongst stakeholders. Specifically, it means facilitating the synthesis of data to information, information to knowledge, and knowledge to practical wisdom (refer to Figure 2). 22 6 KEY CHALLENGES—A COMPLEXITY SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE COVID‐19 offers a unique opportunity to reflect on two common catchphrases pertinent to a systemic understanding of our world: nothing happens in isolation, and context is everything. The challenges posed by the handling of the pandemic should also force us to reflect on our “Thinking about our own thinking – without any kind of instruction – [as it] can make us better problem solvers.” 4 What can we take away at this stage of the journey? 23 Dynamic interactions always keep social systems in a state close to instability (or dys‐equilibrium). If political and economic constraints on our societal system are too tight and lack the necessary redundancies, the system cannot adapt to the disruptions of a pandemic like COVID‐19. 24 Health systems, and particularly their public health divisions, have been constrained by the neglect of pandemic risk planning and inadequate resourcing. Health services are constrained by a lack of surge capacity. 25 The lack of consistent population health surveillance and health‐related information systems minimize the ability to collect and utilize vital clinical and public health data in their proper context. 12 Inconsistent or non‐transparent communication hinders the collective deliberation needed to make decisions in an environment of uncertainty and competing demands. 26 The long‐term consequences of the hit‐and‐miss efforts in this crisis often remain unrecognized and thereby perpetuate socio‐economic disadvantage and health inequities for future generations. 27 7 THE WAY FORWARD We all face the challenge of adapting to the inevitable “new norms” of the emergent new societal systems characterized by different structures and dynamics. The “new norms” should emerge from our shared values and our humanitarian ability of sensemaking, which will take us forward on this quest. What we—collectively—need is a better and more widespread understanding of the sciences of CAS—they are wholes that cannot be understood by the nature and behaviour of its constituent parts; they are self‐organizing and emergent in light of challenges and changing contexts. We also need to acknowledge and mediate our “natural tendencies” to respond to unexpected complex problems in ad hoc—knee‐jerk—ways. These understandings enable different approaches to manage the chaos of this (and other) unexpected crises. In addition, it, one, supports a far more nuanced communication approach to convey the scientific insights into the virus and its dynamics and, two, dampens the heightened anxieties associated with the uncertainties inherent in the unknowns of this continually emerging pandemic.

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          Pharmacologic Treatments for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Review

          The pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by the novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) presents an unprecedented challenge to identify effective drugs for prevention and treatment. Given the rapid pace of scientific discovery and clinical data generated by the large number of people rapidly infected by SARS-CoV-2, clinicians need accurate evidence regarding effective medical treatments for this infection.
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            Coronavirus disease 2019: The harms of exaggerated information and non‐evidence‐based measures

            The evolving coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic 1 is certainly cause for concern. Proper communication and optimal decision‐making are an ongoing challenge, as data evolve. The challenge is compounded, however, by exaggerated information. This can lead to inappropriate actions. It is important to differentiate promptly the true epidemic from an epidemic of false claims and potentially harmful actions. 1 FAKE NEWS AND WITHDRAWN PAPERS Based on Altmetric scores, the most discussed and most visible scientific paper across all 20+ million papers published in the last 8 years across all science is a preprint claiming that the new coronavirus' spike protein bears “uncanny similarity” with HIV‐1 proteins. 2 The Altmetric score of this work has reached an astronomical level of 13 725 points as of 5 March 2020. The paper was rapidly criticized as highly flawed, and the authors withdrew it within days. Regardless, major harm was already done. The preprint fuelled conspiracy theories of scientists manufacturing dangerous viruses and offered ammunition to vaccine deniers. Refutation will probably not stop dispersion of weird inferences. The first report documenting transmission by an asymptomatic individual was published in the New England Journal of Medicine on January 30. However, the specific patient did have symptoms, but researchers had not asked. 3 Understanding the chances of transmission during the asymptomatic phase has major implications for what protective measures might work. Lancet published on February 24 an account from two Chinese nurses of their front‐line experience fighting coronavirus. The authors soon retracted the paper admitting it was not a first‐hand account. These examples show how sensationalism affects even top scientific venues. Moreover, peer review may malfunction when there is little evidence and strong opinions. Opinion‐based peer review may even solidify a literature of spurious statements. As outlined below, for the main features of the epidemic and the response to it, circulating estimates are often exaggerated, even when they come from otherwise excellent scientists. 2 EXAGGERATED PANDEMIC ESTIMATES An early speculation that 40%‐70% of the global population will be infected went viral. 4 Early estimates of the basic reproduction number (how many people get infected by each infected person) have varied widely, from 1.3 to 6.5. 5 These estimates translate into manyfold difference in the proportion of the population eventually infected and dramatically different expectations on what containment measures (or even any future vaccine) can achieve. The fact that containment measures do seem to work, means that the basic reproduction number is probably in the lower bound of the 1.3‐6.5 range, and can decrease below 1 with proper measures. The originator of the “40%‐70% of the population” estimate tweeted on March 3 a revised estimate of “20%‐60% of adults,” but this is probably still substantially exaggerated. Even after the 40%‐70% quote was revised downward, it still remained quoted in viral interviews. 6 3 EXAGGERATED CASE FATALITY RATE (CFR) Early reported CFR figures also seem exaggerated. The most widely quoted CFR has been 3.4%, reported by WHO dividing the number of deaths by documented cases in early March. 7 This ignores undetected infections and the strong age dependence of CFR. The most complete data come from Diamond Princess passengers, with CFR = 1% observed in an elderly cohort; thus, CFR may be much lower than 1% in the general population, probably higher than seasonal flu (CFR = 0.1%), but not much so. Observed crude CFR in South Korea and in Germany, 8 the countries with most extensive testing, is 0.9% and 0.2%, respectively, as of March 14, and crude CFR in Scandinavian countries is about 0.1%. Some deaths of infected, seriously ill people will occur later, and these deaths have not been counted yet. However, even in these countries many infections probably remain undiagnosed. Therefore, CFR (or, more properly called, infection fatality rate, counting as cases all infected individuals) may be even lower rather than higher than these crude estimates. 4 EXAGGERATED EXPONENTIAL COMMUNITY SPREAD At face value, the epidemic curve of new cases outside China since late February is compatible with exponential community spread. However, reading this curve is very difficult. Part of the growth of documented cases could reflect rapid increases in numbers of coronavirus tests performed. The number of tests done depends on how many test‐kits are available and how many patients seek testing. Even if bottlenecks in test availability are eventually removed, the epidemic curve may still reflect primarily population sensitization and willingness for testing rather than true epidemic growth. China data are more compatible with close contact rather than wide community spread being the main mode of transmission. 5 EXTREME MEASURES Under alarming circumstances, extreme measures of unknown effectiveness are adopted. China initially responded sluggishly, but subsequently locked down entire cities. 9 School closures, cancellation of social events, air travel curtailment and restrictions, entry control measures and border closure are applied by various countries. Italy adopted country‐level lockdown on March 8, and many countries have been following suite. Evidence is lacking for the most aggressive measures. A systematic review on measures to prevent the spread of respiratory viruses found insufficient evidence for entry port screening and social distancing in reducing epidemic spreading. 10 Plain hygienic measures have the strongest evidence. 10 , 11 Frequent hand washing and staying at home and avoiding contacts when sick are probably very useful. Their routine endorsement may save many lives. Most lives saved may actually be due to reduced transmission of influenza rather than coronavirus. Most evidence on protective measures comes from nonrandomized studies prone to bias. A systematic review of personal protective measures in reducing pandemic influenza risk found only two randomized trials, one on hand sanitizer and another on facemasks and hand hygiene in household members of people infected with influenza. 11 6 HARMS FROM NONEVIDENCE‐BASED MEASURES Given the uncertainties, one may opt for abundant caution and implement the most severe containment measures. By this perspective, no opportunity should be missed to gain any benefit, even in the absence of evidence or even with mostly negative evidence. This reasoning ignores possible harms. Impulsive actions can indeed cause major harm. One clear example is the panic shopping which depleted supplies of face masks, escalation of prices and a shortage for medical personnel. Masks, gloves and gowns are clearly needed for medical personnel, and their lack poses healthcare workers' lives at risk. Conversely, they are meaningless for the uninfected general population. However, a prominent virologist's comment 12 that people should stock surgical masks and wear them around the clock to avoid touching their nose went viral. 7 MISALLOCATION OF RESOURCES Policymakers feel pressure from opponents who lambast inaction. Also, adoption of measures in one institution, jurisdiction or country creates pressure for taking similar measures elsewhere under fear of being accused of negligence. Moreover, many countries pass legislation that allocates major resources and funding to the coronavirus response. This is justified, but the exact allocation priorities can become irrational. For example, undoubtedly research on coronavirus vaccines and potential treatments must be accelerated. However, if only part of resources mobilized to implement extreme measures for COVID‐19 had been invested towards enhancing influenza vaccination uptake, tens of thousands of influenza deaths might have been averted. Only 1%‐2% of the population in China is vaccinated against influenza. Even in the United States, despite improvements over time, most adults remain unvaccinated every year. As another example, enhanced detection of infections and lower hospitalization thresholds may increase demands for hospital beds. For patients without severe symptoms, hospitalizations offer no benefit and may only infect health workers causing shortage of much‐needed personnel. Even for severe cases, effectiveness of intensive supportive care is unknown. Excess admissions may strain health care systems and increase mortality from other serious diseases where hospital care is clearly effective. 8 LOCKDOWNS—FOR HOW LONG? An argument in favour of lockdowns is that postponing the epidemic wave (“flattening the curve”) gains time to develop vaccines and reduces strain on the health system. However, vaccines take many months (or years) to develop and test properly. Maintaining lockdowns for many months may have even worse consequences than an epidemic wave that runs an acute course. Focusing on protecting susceptible individuals may be preferable to maintaining countrywide lockdowns longterm. 9 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION The potential consequences on the global economy are already tangible. February 22‐28 was the worst week for global markets since 2008, and the worse may lie ahead. Moreover, some political decisions may be confounded with alternative motives. Lockdowns weaponized by suppressive regimes can create a precedent for easy adoption in the future. Closure of borders may serve policies focused on limiting immigration. Regardless, even in the strongest economies, disruption of social life, travel, work and school education may have major adverse consequences. The eventual cost of such disruption is notoriously difficult to project. A quote of $2.7 trillion 13 is totally speculative. Much depends on the duration of the anomaly. The global economy and society is already getting a major blow from an epidemic that otherwise (as of March 14) accounts for 0.01% of all 60 million annual global deaths from all causes and that kills almost exclusively people with relatively low life expectancy. 10 CLAIMS FOR ONCE‐IN‐A‐CENTURY PANDEMIC Leading figures insist that the current situation is a once‐in‐a‐century pandemic. 14 A corollary might be that any reaction to it, no matter how extreme, is justified. This year's coronavirus outbreak is clearly unprecedented in amount of attention received. Media have capitalized on curiosity, uncertainty and horror. A Google search with “coronavirus” yielded 3 550 000 000 results on March 3 and 9 440 000 000 results on March 14. Conversely, “influenza” attracted 30‐ to 60‐fold less attention although this season it has caused so far more deaths 15 globally than coronavirus. Different coronaviruses actually infect millions of people every year, and they are common especially in the elderly and in hospitalized patients with respiratory illness in the winter. A serological analysis 16 of CoV 229E and OC43 in 4 adult populations under surveillance for acute respiratory illness during the winters of 1999‐2003 (healthy young adults, healthy elderly adults, high‐risk adults with underlying cardiopulmonary disease and a hospitalized group) showed annual infection rates ranging from 2.8% to 26% in prospective cohorts, and prevalence of 3.3%‐11.1% in the hospitalized cohort. Case fatality of 8% has been described in outbreaks among nursing home elderly. 17 Leaving the well‐known and highly lethal SARS and MERS coronaviruses aside, other coronaviruses probably have infected millions of people and have killed thousands. However, it is only this year that every single case and every single death gets red alert broadcasting in the news. 11 COMPARISONS WITH 1918 Some fear an analogy to the 1918 influenza pandemic that killed 20‐40 million people. 18 Retrospective data from that pandemic suggest that early adoption of social distancing measures was associated with lower peak death rates. 19 However, these data are sparse, retrospective and pathogen‐specific. Moreover, total deaths were eventually little affected by early social distancing: people just died several weeks later. 19 Importantly, this year we are dealing with thousands, not tens of millions deaths. 12 LEARNING FROM COVID‐19 The Box 1 summarizes the problems with inaccurate and exaggerated information in the case of COVID‐19. Even if COVID‐19 is not a 1918‐recap in infection‐related deaths, some coronavirus may match the 1918 pandemic in future seasons. Thus, we should learn and be better prepared. Questions about transmission, duration of immunity, effectiveness of different containment and mitigation methods, the role of children in viral spread, and assessment of the effectiveness of vaccines and drugs are essential to settle timely. BOX 1 Problems with early estimates and responses to the COVID‐19 epidemic A highly flawed nonpeer‐reviewed preprint claiming similarity with HIV‐1 drew tremendous attention, and it was withdrawn, but conspiracy theories about the new virus became entrenched Even major peer‐reviewed journals have already published wrong, sensationalist items Early estimates of the projected proportion of global population that will be infected seem markedly exaggerated Early estimates of case (infection) fatality rate may be markedly exaggerated The proportion of undetected infections is unknown but probably varies across countries and may be very large overall Reported epidemic curves are largely affected by the change in availability of test kits and the willingness to test for the virus over time Of the multiple measures adopted, a few have strong evidence, and many may have obvious harms Panic shopping of masks and protective gear and excess hospital admissions may be highly detrimental to health systems without offering any concomitant benefit Extreme measures such as lockdowns may have major impact on social life and the economy (and those also lives lost), and estimates of this impact are entirely speculative Comparisons with and extrapolations from the 1918 influenza pandemic are precarious, if not outright misleading and harmful This research agenda requires carefully collected, unbiased data to avoid unfounded inferences. Larger‐scale diagnostic testing should help get more unbiased estimates of cases, basic reproduction number and infection fatality rate. The research agenda also deserves proper experimental studies. Besides candidate vaccines and drugs, randomized trials should evaluate also the real‐world effectiveness of simple measures (eg face masks in different settings), least disruptive social distancing measures and healthcare management policies for documented cases. If COVID‐19 is indeed the pandemic of the century, we need the most accurate evidence to handle it. Open data sharing of scientific information is a minimum requirement. This should include data on the number and demographics of tested individuals per day in each country and the demographics and background diseases of patients requiring hospital care and intensive care and those who die. Proper prevalence studies and trials are also indispensable. If COVID‐19 is not as grave as it is depicted, high evidence standards are equally relevant. Exaggeration and overreaction may seriously damage the reputation of science, public health, media and policymakers. It may foster disbelief that will jeopardize the prospects of an appropriately strong response if and when a more major pandemic strikes in the future. CONFLICT OF INTEREST None.
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              The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                jp.sturmberg@gmail.com
                Journal
                J Eval Clin Pract
                J Eval Clin Pract
                10.1111/(ISSN)1365-2753
                JEP
                Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
                John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Chichester, UK )
                1356-1294
                1365-2753
                06 July 2020
                : 10.1111/jep.13419
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ] School of Medicine and Public Health, Faculty of Health and Medicine University of Newcastle Callaghan New South Wales Australia
                [ 2 ] International Society for Systems and Complexity Sciences for Health Waitsfield VT USA
                [ 3 ] Department of Medicine Nursing and Allied Health Monash University Clayton Victoria Australia
                Author notes
                [*] [* ] Correspondence

                Joachim P. Sturmberg, School of Medicine and Public Health, Faculty of Health and Medicine, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, New South Wales, Australia.

                Email: jp.sturmberg@ 123456gmail.com

                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2219-6281
                https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8174-7859
                Article
                JEP13419
                10.1111/jep.13419
                7362160
                32633056
                4e0f18f3-6439-44e8-aa91-60dd2df92bb9
                © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

                This article is being made freely available through PubMed Central as part of the COVID-19 public health emergency response. It can be used for unrestricted research re-use and analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source, for the duration of the public health emergency.

                History
                : 30 April 2020
                : 09 May 2020
                : 11 May 2020
                Page count
                Figures: 3, Tables: 0, Pages: 7, Words: 4240
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