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Libertad de la voluntad y poderes causales Translated title: Freedom of the will and causal powers

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      Abstract

      Este trabajo discute una objeción bien conocida a la libertad de la voluntad libertaria en un mundo no determinista. En un mundo no determinista el estado de cosas total del mundo en un instante de tiempo t es compatible con diferentes estados de cosas totales alternativos en el futuro de t. Se ha argumentado que, en cuanto son posibles diferentes alternativas a una decisión libre, es una cuestión de azar y suerte que tal decisión se ha tomado. Si una decisión libre es una cuestión de suerte, entonces el agente no puede ser considerado responsable por ella. Se argumenta que la dificultad aparece en una concepción anti-realista de la causalidad, donde los hechos causales son supervenientes a regularidades o dependencias contrafácticas. Una concepción realista de la causalidad puede, por ello, explicar cómo el agente está en control causal de la decisión libre tomada, cuando la decisión no cae bajo una regularidad o una dependencia contrafáctica. Una vez considerado cómo es que el agente está en control de la decisión, se argumenta que no se puede decir que la decisión libre es una cuestión de suerte para el agente.

      Translated abstract

      This paper discusses a well-known objection to libertarian free will in a non-deterministic world. In a non-deterministic world the complete state of affairs of the world in an instant of time t is compatible with different alternative complete states of affairs in the future of t. It has been argued that, in so far as different alternatives are possible to a free decision, it is a matter of chance and luck that that decision is taken. If a free decision is a matter of luck, then the agent cannot be considered responsible for it. It is argued that the difficulty appears from an anti-realist conception of causality, where causal facts are supervenient on regularities or counterfactual dependences. A realist conception of causality can, then, explain how the agent is causally in control of the free decision taken when the decision does not fall under a regularity or a counterfactual dependence. Once considered how the agent is in control of the decision, it is argued that one cannot say that the free decision is a matter of luck for the agent.

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          Supervenience and Mind

           Jaegwon KIM,  J Kim,  J. KIM (1993)
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            Author and article information

            Affiliations
            [1 ] Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso Chile
            Contributors
            Role: ND
            Journal
            veritas
            Veritas
            Veritas
            Pontificio Seminario Mayor San Rafael Valparaíso (Valparaíso )
            0718-9273
            March 2012
            : 0
            : 26
            : 107-123
            S0718-92732012000100005 10.4067/S0718-92732012000100005

            http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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            Product Information: SciELO Chile
            Categories
            PHILOSOPHY
            RELIGION

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