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      Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

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      a , 1 , 2 , 3 , b , 4
      Scientific Reports
      Nature Publishing Group

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          Abstract

          Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the “wisdom of groups” strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.

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          Most cited references15

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          Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.

          Real populations have been shown to be heterogeneous, in which some individuals have many more contacts than others. This fact contrasts with the traditional homogeneous setting used in studies of evolutionary game dynamics. We incorporate heterogeneity in the population by studying games on graphs, in which the variability in connectivity ranges from single-scale graphs, for which heterogeneity is small and associated degree distributions exhibit a Gaussian tale, to scale-free graphs, for which heterogeneity is large with degree distributions exhibiting a power-law behavior. We study the evolution of cooperation, modeled in terms of the most popular dilemmas of cooperation. We show that, for all dilemmas, increasing heterogeneity favors the emergence of cooperation, such that long-term cooperative behavior easily resists short-term noncooperative behavior. Moreover, we show how cooperation depends on the intricate ties between individuals in scale-free populations.
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            Coevolutionary games - a mini review

            , (2010)
            Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.
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              Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics

              Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator equation, that describes mathematically the idea that those individuals performing better have more offspring and thus their frequency in the population grows. While very many interesting results have been obtained with this equation in the three decades elapsed since it was first proposed, it is important to realize the limits of its applicability. One particularly relevant issue in this respect is that of non-mean-field effects, that may arise from temporal fluctuations or from spatial correlations, both neglected in the replicator equation. This review discusses these temporal and spatial effects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics. Alongside this question, the hypothesis of linearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update is also analyzed. The discussion is presented in terms of the emergence of cooperation, as one of the current key problems in Biology and in other disciplines.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Sci Rep
                Sci Rep
                Scientific Reports
                Nature Publishing Group
                2045-2322
                14 August 2012
                2012
                : 2
                : 576
                Affiliations
                [1 ]simpleInstitute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences , Hungarian Academy of SciencesP.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
                [2 ]simpleSchool of Physics, Nankai University , Tianjin 300071, China
                [3 ]simpleDepartment of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University , Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
                [4 ]simpleFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor , Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
                Author notes
                Article
                srep00576
                10.1038/srep00576
                3418638
                22893854
                508bc8b8-8b8d-49da-8d05-437abb87b744
                Copyright © 2012, Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareALike 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

                History
                : 23 July 2012
                : 30 July 2012
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