21
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: not found
      • Article: not found

      Cognitive computational neuroscience

      ,
      Nature Neuroscience
      Springer Nature America, Inc

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisherPMC
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          To learn how cognition is implemented in the brain, we must build computational models that can perform cognitive tasks, and test such models with brain and behavioral experiments. Cognitive science has developed computational models that decompose cognition into functional components. Computational neuroscience has modeled how interacting neurons can implement elementary components of cognition. It is time to assemble the pieces of the puzzle of brain computation and to better integrate these separate disciplines. Modern technologies enable us to measure and manipulate brain activity in unprecedentedly rich ways in animals and humans. However, experiments will yield theoretical insight only when employed to test brain-computational models. Here we review recent work in the intersection of cognitive science, computational neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Computational models that mimic brain information processing during perceptual, cognitive and control tasks are beginning to be developed and tested with brain and behavioral data.

          Related collections

          Most cited references77

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          The Fusiform Face Area: A Module in Human Extrastriate Cortex Specialized for Face Perception

          Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we found an area in the fusiform gyrus in 12 of the 15 subjects tested that was significantly more active when the subjects viewed faces than when they viewed assorted common objects. This face activation was used to define a specific region of interest individually for each subject, within which several new tests of face specificity were run. In each of five subjects tested, the predefined candidate “face area” also responded significantly more strongly to passive viewing of (1) intact than scrambled two-tone faces, (2) full front-view face photos than front-view photos of houses, and (in a different set of five subjects) (3) three-quarter-view face photos (with hair concealed) than photos of human hands; it also responded more strongly during (4) a consecutive matching task performed on three-quarter-view faces versus hands. Our technique of running multiple tests applied to the same region defined functionally within individual subjects provides a solution to two common problems in functional imaging: (1) the requirement to correct for multiple statistical comparisons and (2) the inevitable ambiguity in the interpretation of any study in which only two or three conditions are compared. Our data allow us to reject alternative accounts of the function of the fusiform face area (area “FF”) that appeal to visual attention, subordinate-level classification, or general processing of any animate or human forms, demonstrating that this region is selectively involved in the perception of faces.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning.

            When we learn a new motor skill, such as playing an approaching tennis ball, both our sensors and the task possess variability. Our sensors provide imperfect information about the ball's velocity, so we can only estimate it. Combining information from multiple modalities can reduce the error in this estimate. On a longer time scale, not all velocities are a priori equally probable, and over the course of a match there will be a probability distribution of velocities. According to bayesian theory, an optimal estimate results from combining information about the distribution of velocities-the prior-with evidence from sensory feedback. As uncertainty increases, when playing in fog or at dusk, the system should increasingly rely on prior knowledge. To use a bayesian strategy, the brain would need to represent the prior distribution and the level of uncertainty in the sensory feedback. Here we control the statistical variations of a new sensorimotor task and manipulate the uncertainty of the sensory feedback. We show that subjects internally represent both the statistical distribution of the task and their sensory uncertainty, combining them in a manner consistent with a performance-optimizing bayesian process. The central nervous system therefore employs probabilistic models during sensorimotor learning.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Normalization as a canonical neural computation.

              There is increasing evidence that the brain relies on a set of canonical neural computations, repeating them across brain regions and modalities to apply similar operations to different problems. A promising candidate for such a computation is normalization, in which the responses of neurons are divided by a common factor that typically includes the summed activity of a pool of neurons. Normalization was developed to explain responses in the primary visual cortex and is now thought to operate throughout the visual system, and in many other sensory modalities and brain regions. Normalization may underlie operations such as the representation of odours, the modulatory effects of visual attention, the encoding of value and the integration of multisensory information. Its presence in such a diversity of neural systems in multiple species, from invertebrates to mammals, suggests that it serves as a canonical neural computation.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Nature Neuroscience
                Nat Neurosci
                Springer Nature America, Inc
                1097-6256
                1546-1726
                August 20 2018
                Article
                10.1038/s41593-018-0210-5
                6706072
                30127428
                5159c1bc-3ca8-4e6f-b20b-8ee0eefc287b
                © 2018

                http://www.springer.com/tdm

                History

                Comments

                Comment on this article