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      Patronage, Logrolls, and “Polarization”: Congressional Parties of the Gilded Age, 1876–1896

      Studies in American Political Development
      Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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          Abstract

          According to the quantitative indicators scholars use to measure political polarization, the Gilded Age stands out for some of the most party-polarized Congresses of all time. By contrast, historians of the era depict the two major parties as presenting few programmatic alternatives to one another. I argue that a large share of the party-line votes in the Congress of this period are poorly suited to the standard conceptualization as “polarization,” meaning wide divergence on an ideological continuum structuring alternative views on national policy. Specifically, the era's continuous battles over the distribution of particularized benefits, patronage, and control of political office make little sense conceived as stemming from individual members' preferences on an underlying ideological dimension. They are better understood as fights between two long coalitions competing for power and distributive gains. In short, the Gilded Age illustrates that political parties are fully capable of waging ferocious warfare over spoils and office, even despite a relative lack of sharp party differences over national policy.

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          Most cited references18

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          Patterns of Congressional Voting

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            Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators

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              The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives

              Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on at least two propositions. First, we agree that for a political system to be viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized. That is to say, organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political activity. 1 Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak, and incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of its constituent groups. Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system to be in some sense free and democratic, means must be found for institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies, and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition within the system. 2 Our growing interest in both of these propositions, and in the problems to which they point, can begin to suggest the importance of studying one of the very few extant examples of a highly specialized political institution which over the long run has succeeded in representing a large number of diverse constituents, and in legitimizing, expressing, and containing political opposition within a complex political system—namely, the U.S. House of Representatives. The focus of my attention here will be first of all descriptive, drawing together disparate strands—some of which already exist in the literature 3 —in an attempt to show in what sense we may regard the House as an institutionalized organ of government. Not all the necessary work has been done on this rather difficult descriptive problem, as I shall indicate. Secondly, I shall offer a number of speculative observations about causes, consequences, and possible lessons to be draw from the institutionalization of the House.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                applab
                Studies in American Political Development
                Stud. Am. Pol. Dev.
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                0898-588X
                1469-8692
                October 2016
                June 6 2016
                October 2016
                : 30
                : 02
                : 116-127
                Article
                10.1017/S0898588X16000079
                5577ef9f-f8e7-4ec8-83e3-71b97cf6b146
                © 2016
                History

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