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      Biased access? Exploring selection to advisory committees

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      European Political Science Review

      Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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          Abstract

          The existing literature on bias in interest group access faces the challenge that there is often no clear benchmark for judging whether a given distribution of interest groups involved in policy making is biased. To tackle this challenge, we link two new data sets on registered European Union (EU) interest groups and membership of the advisory committees of the European Commission and examine the factors affecting selection to these committees. Our approach allows us to qualify the conclusions of the existing literature. We see that, even if business interests dominate advisory committees, they are not generally privileged over other group types in the selection processes and their degree of access varies considerably between policy areas. Instead, supranational interest groups enjoy selection privileges, which are particularly pronounced on permanent committees. Finally, we find some evidence that, even though lobbying budgets are important for getting access, their value varies across group types. In this way, our study has implications for future theory building on resource exchanges between interest group types and decision makers.

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          Most cited references 37

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          Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice

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            Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                applab
                European Political Science Review
                Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                1755-7739
                1755-7747
                August 2015
                November 13 2014
                August 2015
                : 7
                : 03
                : 343-372
                Article
                10.1017/S1755773914000228
                © 2015

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