Impulsive choice predicts short-term relapse in substance-dependent individuals attending an in-patient detoxification programme

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Abstract

Background

Impulsivity is a hallmark characteristic of substance use disorders. Recently, studies have begun to explore whether increased impulsivity in substance-dependent individuals (SDIs) is associated with a greater propensity to relapse following treatment. Despite growing recognition of its multidimensional nature, however, most studies have treated impulsivity unilaterally. Accordingly, it remains unclear whether certain facets of impulsivity are more relevant to relapse than others. The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between multiple facets of impulsivity and short-term relapse in SDIs. As a secondary aim, we explored the role of treatment retention in this relationship.

Method

A personality-based impulsivity questionnaire (UPPS) and three neurocognitive tasks of impulsivity [stop-signal task (SST), delay discounting task (DDT) and Iowa gambling task (IGT)] were administered in a heterogeneous sample of 70 SDIs shortly following their entry in an in-patient detoxification programme. Mediation analyses were performed to explore whether the effects of impulsivity on relapse were mediated by treatment retention.

Results

Performance on two neurocognitive indices of impulsive choice (i.e. delay discounting and impulsive decision-making) significantly predicted short-term relapse. The effects of delay discounting and impulsive decision-making on relapse propensity were mediated by treatment retention.

Conclusions

Neurocognitive indices of impulsivity may be more sensitive to the prediction of relapse than trait-based self-report questionnaires. Post-treatment relapse in SDIs may be reduced by targeting the processes involved in impulsive choice and by improving treatment retention in SDIs with inflated impulsivity.

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Most cited references 34

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Factor structure of the barratt impulsiveness scale

Jim Patton, Matthew S. Stanford, Ernest Barratt (1995)

The purpose of the present study was to revise the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 10 (BIS-10), identify the factor structure of the items among normals, and compare their scores on the revised form (BIS-11) with psychiatric inpatients and prison inmates. The scale was administered to 412 college undergraduates, 248 psychiatric inpatients, and 73 male prison inmates. Exploratory principal components analysis of the items identified six primary factors and three second-order factors. The three second-order factors were labeled Attentional Impulsiveness, Motor Impulsiveness, and Nonplanning Impulsiveness. Two of the three second-order factors identified in the BIS-11 were consistent with those proposed by Barratt (1985), but no cognitive impulsiveness component was identified per se. The results of the present study suggest that the total score of the BIS-11 is an internally consistent measure of impulsiveness and has potential clinical utility for measuring impulsiveness among selected patient and inmate populations.

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Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy.

A Bechara, H. Damasio, D. Tranel … (1997)

Deciding advantageously in a complex situation is thought to require overt reasoning on declarative knowledge, namely, on facts pertaining to premises, options for action, and outcomes of actions that embody the pertinent previous experience. An alternative possibility was investigated: that overt reasoning is preceded by a nonconscious biasing step that uses neural systems other than those that support declarative knowledge. Normal participants and patients with prefrontal damage and decision-making defects performed a gambling task in which behavioral, psychophysiological, and self-account measures were obtained in parallel. Normals began to choose advantageously before they realized which strategy worked best, whereas prefrontal patients continued to choose disadvantageously even after they knew the correct strategy. Moreover, normals began to generate anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs) whenever they pondered a choice that turned out to be risky, before they knew explicitly that it was a risky choice, whereas patients never developed anticipatory SCRs, although some eventually realized which choices were risky. The results suggest that, in normal individuals, nonconscious biases guide behavior before conscious knowledge does. Without the help of such biases, overt knowledge may be insufficient to ensure advantageous behavior.