Disaster preparedness and perception of flood risk: A study in an alpine valley in Italy

Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The "analytic system" uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The "experiential system" is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it is safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.

Risk perception is sometimes measured by means of judgments about worry, sometimes as perceived risk more directly. However, perceived level of risk calls for a more intellectual judgment and worry tends to refer to emotional reactions. These two are therefore not the same and need not be strongly correlated. Results reported here show that perceived risk and worry are indeed weakly correlated, both for generalized worry and for more specific measures of worry matched with the same hazard as risk ratings. A distinction is suggested between cognitive, abstract hazards and concrete, sensory hazards, with implications for the worry-perceived risk relationship. It was furthermore found by means of cluster analysis that there were groups of subject displaying different dynamics of risk and worry.