Understanding Blame Politics in China's Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: Actors, Strategies and Context

Abstract

Decentralized environmental governance theory suggests that decentralization can produce better environmental performance mainly because lower-level governments are closer to the people and environmental issues and are considered more legitimate than the national government. However, China's decentralized system of environmental governance has been often regarded as a key factor in creating pollution problems rather than in solving them. To explain this puzzle, this article, using Blame Avoidance Behaviour in government theory as a theoretical framework, examines how blame avoidance behaviour shapes China's decentralized system of environmental governance from three perspectives: first, actors and the chain of blame shaped by the hierarchical power structure among environmental policymakers and implementers; second, the strategies of discursive domination and decentralization for blaming environmental problems on local officials; and lastly, the contextual factor of “hierarchical governmental trust.” Drawing on documentary discursive analysis and extensive fieldwork, this article suggests that the dysfunction of China's decentralized environmental governance structure may in fact be an outcome of a blame-shifting game between central and local governments.

摘要

分权式环境治理理论认为地方分权有利于提升环境治理绩效, 主要原因是次级国家政府比全国性政府更接近民众和环境问题, 其获得的政治合法性更高。但是, 中国环境治理的分权系统通常被视为产生而非解决环境问题的主要原因。为了解释这个悖论, 本文以推诿政治作为理论框架, 从三个层面考察了官员的推诿行为如何塑造了中国环境治理的分权系统。首先, 环境政策制定和执行者的权力等级关系影响下的行动者及其推诿链条。其次, 将环境问题向地方官员推诿的话语主导和地方分权战略。最后, 作为情景性因素的“差序政府信任”。以文献话语分析和大量的田野调查为研究方法, 本文认为中央与地方政府的互相推诿可能在一定程度造成了中国环境治理的分权系统的功能障碍。