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      Juror comprehension of forensic expert testimony: A literature review and gap analysis

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          Abstract

          Forensic scientists and commentators including academics and statisticians have been embroiled in a debate over the best way to present evidence in the courtroom. Various forms of evidence presentation, both quantitative and qualitative, have been championed, yet amidst the furor over the most “correct” or “accurate” way to present evidence, the perspective of the fact-finder is often lost. Without comprehension, correctness is moot. Unbeknownst to many forensic practitioners, there is a large, though incomplete, body of literature from the cognitive psychology domain that explores the question of what jurors understand when forensic scientists testify. This body of work has begun to test different proposed methods of testimony in an effort to understand which are most effective at communicating the strength of evidence that is intended by the expert. This article is a review of that literature that is intended for the forensic scientist community. Its aim is to educate that community on the findings of completed studies and to identify suggestions for further research that will inform changes in testimony delivery and ensure that any modifications can be implemented with confidence in their effectiveness.

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          Most cited references45

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          Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions.

          The interpretation of forensic fingerprint evidence relies on the expertise of latent print examiners. The National Research Council of the National Academies and the legal and forensic sciences communities have called for research to measure the accuracy and reliability of latent print examiners' decisions, a challenging and complex problem in need of systematic analysis. Our research is focused on the development of empirical approaches to studying this problem. Here, we report on the first large-scale study of the accuracy and reliability of latent print examiners' decisions, in which 169 latent print examiners each compared approximately 100 pairs of latent and exemplar fingerprints from a pool of 744 pairs. The fingerprints were selected to include a range of attributes and quality encountered in forensic casework, and to be comparable to searches of an automated fingerprint identification system containing more than 58 million subjects. This study evaluated examiners on key decision points in the fingerprint examination process; procedures used operationally include additional safeguards designed to minimize errors. Five examiners made false positive errors for an overall false positive rate of 0.1%. Eighty-five percent of examiners made at least one false negative error for an overall false negative rate of 7.5%. Independent examination of the same comparisons by different participants (analogous to blind verification) was found to detect all false positive errors and the majority of false negative errors in this study. Examiners frequently differed on whether fingerprints were suitable for reaching a conclusion.
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            "A 30% chance of rain tomorrow": how does the public understand probabilistic weather forecasts?

            The weather forecast says that there is a "30% chance of rain," and we think we understand what it means. This quantitative statement is assumed to be unambiguous and to convey more information than does a qualitative statement like "It might rain tomorrow." Because the forecast is expressed as a single-event probability, however, it does not specify the class of events it refers to. Therefore, even numerical probabilities can be interpreted by members of the public in multiple, mutually contradictory ways. To find out whether the same statement about rain probability evokes various interpretations, we randomly surveyed pedestrians in five metropolises located in countries that have had different degrees of exposure to probabilistic forecasts--Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, Milan, and New York. They were asked what a "30% chance of rain tomorrow" means both in a multiple-choice and a free-response format. Only in New York did a majority of them supply the standard meteorological interpretation, namely, that when the weather conditions are like today, in 3 out of 10 cases there will be (at least a trace of) rain the next day. In each of the European cities, this alternative was judged as the least appropriate. The preferred interpretation in Europe was that it will rain tomorrow "30% of the time," followed by "in 30% of the area." To improve risk communication with the public, experts need to specify the reference class, that is, the class of events to which a single-event probability refers.
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              Verbal probabilities: Ambiguous, context-dependent, or both?

                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Forensic Sci Int
                Forensic Sci Int
                Forensic Science International: Synergy
                Elsevier
                2589-871X
                09 March 2019
                2019
                09 March 2019
                : 1
                : 24-34
                Affiliations
                [1]RTI International, 3040 E. Cornwallis Rd., Research Triangle Park, NC, 27709, USA
                Article
                S2589-871X(19)30068-3
                10.1016/j.fsisyn.2019.03.001
                7219164
                32411951
                5c8b91ff-8c4c-4722-94b4-f5ffa941cc40
                © 2019 The Author

                This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

                History
                : 19 October 2018
                : 1 March 2019
                : 4 March 2019
                Categories
                Policy and Management (in memory of Jay Siegel)

                Forensic science
                expert testimony,juror comprehension,verbal scale,likelihood ratio,strength of evidence,cognitive psychology

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