Type 2 tasks in the theory of signal detectability: Discrimination between correct and incorrect decisions

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Abstract

It has been known for over 40 years that there are two fundamentally different kinds of detection tasks in the theory of signal detectability. The Type 1 task is to distinguish between events defined independently of the observer; the Type 2 task is to distinguish between one's own correct and incorrect decisions about those Type 1 events. For the Type 1 task, the behavior of the detector can be summarized by the traditional receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. This curve can be compared with a theoretical ROC curve, which can be generated from overlapping probability functions conditional on the Type 1 events on an appropriate decision axis. We show how to derive the probability functions underlying Type 2 decisions from those for the Type 1 task. ROC curves and the usual measures of performance are readily obtained from those Type 2 functions, and some relationships among various Type 1 and Type 2 performance measures are presented. We discuss the relationship between Type 1 and Type 2 confidence ratings and caution against the practice of presenting transformed Type 2 ratings as empirical Type 1 ratings.

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Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence.

Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage, Heinz Kleinbölting (1991)

Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework.