Mentalizing homeostasis: The social origins of interoceptive inference

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Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition.

Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call … (2005)

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

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Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self.

Anil K. Seth (2013)

The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: 'interoceptive inference' conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model generalizes 'appraisal' theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes, and it sheds new light on the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the experience of body ownership and conscious selfhood in health and in neuropsychiatric illness. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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The neural basis of empathy.

Boris C. Bernhardt, Tania Singer (2012)

Empathy--the ability to share the feelings of others--is fundamental to our emotional and social lives. Previous human imaging studies focusing on empathy for others' pain have consistently shown activations in regions also involved in the direct pain experience, particularly anterior insula and anterior and midcingulate cortex. These findings suggest that empathy is, in part, based on shared representations for firsthand and vicarious experiences of affective states. Empathic responses are not static but can be modulated by person characteristics, such as degree of alexithymia. It has also been shown that contextual appraisal, including perceived fairness or group membership of others, may modulate empathic neuronal activations. Empathy often involves coactivations in further networks associated with social cognition, depending on the specific situation and information available in the environment. Empathy-related insular and cingulate activity may reflect domain-general computations representing and predicting feeling states in self and others, likely guiding adaptive homeostatic responses and goal-directed behavior in dynamic social contexts.

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Title: Neuropsychoanalysis

Abbreviated Title: Neuropsychoanalysis

Publisher: Informa UK Limited

ISSN (Print): 1529-4145

ISSN (Electronic): 2044-3978

Publication date Created: April 26 2017

Publication date (Print): February 28 2017

Volume: 19

Issue: 1

Pages: 3-28

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DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2017.1294031

SO-VID: 65fd1e6d-7775-4a03-bfd7-c932e95a47e7

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Mentalizing homeostasis: The social origins of interoceptive inference

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Most cited references 72

Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition.

Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self.

The neural basis of empathy.

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