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      Market making and incentives design in the presence of a dark pool: a deep reinforcement learning approach

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          Abstract

          We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fees policy to attract transactions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic control problem of the market maker without the intervention of the exchange. Then we derive the equations defining the optimal contract to be set between the market maker and the exchange. This contract depends on the trading flows generated by the market maker's activity on the two venues. In both cases, we show existence and uniqueness, in the viscosity sense, of the solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations associated to the market maker and exchange's problems. We finally design deep reinforcement learning algorithms enabling us to approximate efficiently the optimal controls of the market maker and the optimal incentives to be provided by the exchange.

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          Author and article information

          Journal
          02 December 2019
          Article
          1912.01129

          http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

          Custom metadata
          31 pages
          q-fin.MF q-fin.TR

          Quantitative finance, Trading & Market microstructure

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