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      Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

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          Abstract

          This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or “qualia,” which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

          Translated abstract

          Este artículo presenta una visión panorámica de las discusiones recientes en relación con el problema mente-cuerpo, que se encuentran en una área de intersección entre filosofía y neurociencia. Trata de las características fenoménicas de la conciencia o “qualia”, que se diferencian de varios otros temas relacionados. Sigue una discusión de los diversos argumentos escépticos, pero influyentes, que cuestionan la posibilidad de explicaciones reduccionistas de qualia en términos fisicalistas: argumentos de conocimiento, argumentos sobre lo concebible, el argumento de la realizabilidad múltiple, y el argumento del hueco explicativo. Ninguno de los argumentos resulta muy convincente. Se deduce que el fisicalismo reduccionista, aunque resulta una posición defendible, no es necesariamente la única opción. Para mantener tal punto de vista libre de dogmatismo e ingenuidad, es necesario que una constante reflexión conceptual y metodológica acompañe las investigaciones en marcha.

          Translated abstract

          Cet article est une revue des débats récents concernant la dichotomie corps-esprit, qui se trouve à l'intersection de la philosophie et de la neuroscience. II s'intéresse aux caractéristiques phénoménologiques, de la conscience ou « qualia », mise en exergue par rapport à d'autres sujets. S'ensuit une analyse des différents arguments sceptiques influents qui evoquent la possibilité d'explications réductrices des qualia en des termes physicalistes: arguments de connaissance, arguments de concevabilité, l'argument d'une faisabilité multiple et l'argument d'un fossé explicatif. Aucun de ces arguments n'est très convaincant. Ces arguments ne signifient pas que le physicalisme réducteur est le seul choix, mais il apparaît défendable. Cependant, il est nécessaire de conserver une réflexion méthodologique et conceptuelle constante, en accord avec la recherche actuelle, afin de se garder à la fois du dogmatisme et de la naïveté.

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          Most cited references77

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          MATERIALISM AND QUALIA: THE EXPLANATORY GAP

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            What Mary Didn't Know

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              Consciousness cannot be separated from function.

              Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Dept of Philosophy, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
                Journal
                Dialogues Clin Neurosci
                Dialogues Clin Neurosci
                Dialogues Clin Neurosci
                Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience
                Les Laboratoires Servier (France )
                1294-8322
                1958-5969
                March 2012
                March 2012
                : 14
                : 1
                : 55-63
                Affiliations
                Dept of Philosophy, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
                Author notes
                Article
                3341650
                22577305
                6a04c08a-cb20-405c-ab01-2e180f146300
                Copyright: © 2012 LLS

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

                History
                Categories
                Basic Research

                Neurosciences
                qualia,consciousness,multiple realization,reductionism,conceivability argument,philosophy of mind,knowledge argument,relation between philosophy and neuroscience,explanatory gap

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