Surviving threats: neural circuit and computational implications of a new taxonomy of defensive behaviour

Recent behavioral studies in both humans and rodents have found evidence that performance in decision-making tasks depends on two different learning processes; one encoding the relationship between actions and their consequences and a second involving the formation of stimulus-response associations. These learning processes are thought to govern goal-directed and habitual actions, respectively, and have been found to depend on homologous corticostriatal networks in these species. Thus, recent research using comparable behavioral tasks in both humans and rats has implicated homologous regions of cortex (medial prefrontal cortex/medial orbital cortex in humans and prelimbic cortex in rats) and of dorsal striatum (anterior caudate in humans and dorsomedial striatum in rats) in goal-directed action and in the control of habitual actions (posterior lateral putamen in humans and dorsolateral striatum in rats). These learning processes have been argued to be antagonistic or competing because their control over performance appears to be all or none. Nevertheless, evidence has started to accumulate suggesting that they may at times compete and at others cooperate in the selection and subsequent evaluation of actions necessary for normal choice performance. It appears likely that cooperation or competition between these sources of action control depends not only on local interactions in dorsal striatum but also on the cortico-basal ganglia network within which the striatum is embedded and that mediates the integration of learning with basic motivational and emotional processes. The neural basis of the integration of learning and motivation in choice and decision-making is still controversial and we review some recent hypotheses relating to this issue.

Cross-cultural research on facial expression and the developments of methods to measure facial expression are briefly summarized. What has been learned about emotion from this work on the face is then elucidated. Four questions about facial expression and emotion are discussed: What information does an expression typically convey? Can there be emotion without facial expression? Can there be a facial expression of emotion without emotion? How do individuals differ in their facial expressions of emotion?

If subjects are shown an angry face as a target visual stimulus for less than forty milliseconds and are then immediately shown an expressionless mask, these subjects report seeing the mask but not the target. However, an aversively conditioned masked target can elicit an emotional response from subjects without being consciously perceived. Here we study the mechanism of this unconsciously mediated emotional learning. We measured neural activity in volunteer subjects who were presented with two angry faces, one of which, through previous classical conditioning, was associated with a burst of white noise. In half of the trials, the subjects' awareness of the angry faces was prevented by backward masking with a neutral face. A significant neural response was elicited in the right, but not left, amygdala to masked presentations of the conditioned angry face. Unmasked presentations of the same face produced enhanced neural activity in the left, but not right, amygdala. Our results indicate that, first, the human amygdala can discriminate between stimuli solely on the basis of their acquired behavioural significance, and second, this response is lateralized according to the subjects' level of awareness of the stimuli.