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      The separate roles of the reflective mind and involuntary inhibitory control in gatekeeping paranormal beliefs and the underlying intuitive confusions : Gatekeeping paranormal beliefs

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      British Journal of Psychology
      Wiley-Blackwell

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          Abstract

          Intuitive thinking is known to predict paranormal beliefs, but the processes underlying this relationship, and the role of other thinking dispositions, have remained unclear. Study 1 showed that while an intuitive style increased and a reflective disposition counteracted paranormal beliefs, the ontological confusions suggested to underlie paranormal beliefs were predicted by individual differences in involuntary inhibitory processes. When the reasoning system was subjected to cognitive load, the ontological confusions increased, lost their relationship with paranormal beliefs, and their relationship with weaker inhibition was strongly accentuated. These findings support the argument that the confusions are mainly intuitive and that they therefore are most discernible under conditions in which inhibition is impaired, that is, when thinking is dominated by intuitive processing. Study 2 replicated the findings on intuitive and reflective thinking and paranormal beliefs. In Study 2, ontological confusions were also related to the same thinking styles as paranormal beliefs. The results support a model in which both intuitive and non-reflective thinking styles and involuntary inhibitory processes give way to embracing culturally acquired paranormal beliefs.

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          Most cited references32

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          A short form for assessing individual differences in need for cognition is described.
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            A new version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), which measures rational and experiential thinking styles and includes subscales of self-reported ability and engagement, was examined in two studies. In Study 1, the two main scales were independent, and they and their subscales exhibited discriminant validity and contributed to the prediction of a variety of measures beyond the contribution of the Big Five scales. A rational thinking style was most strongly and directly related to Ego Strength, Openness, Conscientiousness, and favorable basic beliefs about the self and the world, and it was most strongly inversely related to Neuroticism and Conservatism. An experiential thinking style was most strongly directly related to Extraversion, Agreeableness, Favorable Relationships Beliefs, and Emotional Expressivity, and it was most strongly inversely related to Categorical Thinking, Distrust of Others, and Intolerance. In Study 2, a rational thinking style was inversely related and an experiential thinking style was unrelated to nonoptimal responses in a game of chance. It was concluded that the new REI is a significant improvement over the previous version and measures unique aspects of personality.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                British Journal of Psychology
                Br J Psychol
                Wiley-Blackwell
                00071269
                August 2013
                August 2013
                : 104
                : 3
                : 303-319
                Article
                10.1111/j.2044-8295.2012.02118.x
                23848383
                6e430bb2-2937-4ad3-89ab-945050c88170
                © 2013

                http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1

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