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      Experimental Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

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          Abstract

          Quantum key distribution is proven to offer unconditional security in communication between two remote users with ideal source and detection. Unfortunately, ideal devices never exist in practice and device imperfections have become the targets of various attacks. By developing up-conversion single-photon detectors with high efficiency and low noise, we faithfully demonstrate the measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution protocol, which is immune to all hacking strategies on detection. Meanwhile, we employ the decoy-state method to defend attacks on a nonideal source. By assuming a trusted source scenario, our practical system, which generates more than a 25 kbit secure key over a 50 km fiber link, serves as a stepping stone in the quest for unconditionally secure communications with realistic devices.

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          Most cited references 36

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          Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

          We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
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            Decoy state quantum key distribution.

            There has been much interest in quantum key distribution. Experimentally, quantum key distribution over 150 km of commercial Telecom fibers has been successfully performed. The crucial issue in quantum key distribution is its security. Unfortunately, all recent experiments are, in principle, insecure due to real-life imperfections. Here, we propose a method that can for the first time make most of those experiments secure by using essentially the same hardware. Our method is to use decoy states to detect eavesdropping attacks. As a consequence, we have the best of both worlds--enjoying unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics and yet dramatically surpassing even some of the best experimental performances reported in the literature.
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              Quantum key distribution with high loss: toward global secure communication.

              We propose a decoy-pulse method to overcome the photon-number-splitting attack for Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol in the presence of high loss: A legitimate user intentionally and randomly replaces signal pulses by multiphoton pulses (decoy pulses). Then they check the loss of the decoy pulses. If the loss of the decoy pulses is abnormally less than that of signal pulses, the whole protocol is aborted. Otherwise, to continue the protocol, they estimate the loss of signal multiphoton pulses based on that of decoy pulses. This estimation can be done with an assumption that the two losses have similar values. We justify that assumption.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                PRLTAO
                Physical Review Letters
                Phys. Rev. Lett.
                American Physical Society (APS)
                0031-9007
                1079-7114
                September 2013
                September 23 2013
                : 111
                : 13
                Article
                10.1103/PhysRevLett.111.130502
                24116758
                © 2013

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