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      Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle

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      PLoS Computational Biology
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          Abstract

          The free-energy principle has recently been proposed as a unified Bayesian account of perception, learning and action. Despite the inextricable link between emotion and cognition, emotion has not yet been formulated under this framework. A core concept that permeates many perspectives on emotion is valence, which broadly refers to the positive and negative character of emotion or some of its aspects. In the present paper, we propose a definition of emotional valence in terms of the negative rate of change of free-energy over time. If the second time-derivative of free-energy is taken into account, the dynamics of basic forms of emotion such as happiness, unhappiness, hope, fear, disappointment and relief can be explained. In this formulation, an important function of emotional valence turns out to regulate the learning rate of the causes of sensory inputs. When sensations increasingly violate the agent's expectations, valence is negative and increases the learning rate. Conversely, when sensations increasingly fulfil the agent's expectations, valence is positive and decreases the learning rate. This dynamic interaction between emotional valence and learning rate highlights the crucial role played by emotions in biological agents' adaptation to unexpected changes in their world.

          Author Summary

          Emotion plays a crucial role in the adaptation of humans and other animals to changes in their world. Nevertheless, emotion has been neglected in Bayesian models of learning in non-stationary environments. The free-energy principle has recently been proposed as a unified account of learning, perception and action in biological agents. In this paper, we propose a formal definition of emotional valence (i.e., the positive and negative character of emotion) in terms of the rate of change of free-energy or, under some simplifying assumptions, of prediction error over time. This formalization leads to a straightforward and simple meta-learning scheme that accounts for the complex and reciprocal interaction between cognition and emotion. We instantiate this scheme with an emotional agent who is able to dynamically assign emotional valence to every new state of the world that is visited and to experience basic forms of emotion. Crucially, our hypothetical agent uses emotional valence to dynamically adapt to unexpected changes in the world. The proposed scheme is very general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular generative model of sensory inputs.

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          Most cited references13

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          Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion.

          At the heart of emotion, mood, and any other emotionally charged event are states experienced as simply feeling good or bad, energized or enervated. These states--called core affect--influence reflexes, perception, cognition, and behavior and are influenced by many causes internal and external, but people have no direct access to these causal connections. Core affect can therefore be experienced as free-floating (mood) or can be attributed to some cause (and thereby begin an emotional episode). These basic processes spawn a broad framework that includes perception of the core-affect-altering properties of stimuli, motives, empathy, emotional meta-experience, and affect versus emotion regulation; it accounts for prototypical emotional episodes, such as fear and anger, as core affect attributed to something plus various nonemotional processes.
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            Dissociating the role of the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the computation of goal values and prediction errors.

            To make sound economic decisions, the brain needs to compute several different value-related signals. These include goal values that measure the predicted reward that results from the outcome generated by each of the actions under consideration, decision values that measure the net value of taking the different actions, and prediction errors that measure deviations from individuals' previous reward expectations. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging and a novel decision-making paradigm to dissociate the neural basis of these three computations. Our results show that they are supported by different neural substrates: goal values are correlated with activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, decision values are correlated with activity in the central orbitofrontal cortex, and prediction errors are correlated with activity in the ventral striatum.
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              Learning and inference in the brain.

              This article is about how the brain data mines its sensory inputs. There are several architectural principles of functional brain anatomy that have emerged from careful anatomic and physiologic studies over the past century. These principles are considered in the light of representational learning to see if they could have been predicted a priori on the basis of purely theoretical considerations. We first review the organisation of hierarchical sensory cortices, paying special attention to the distinction between forward and backward connections. We then review various approaches to representational learning as special cases of generative models, starting with supervised learning and ending with learning based upon empirical Bayes. The latter predicts many features, such as a hierarchical cortical system, prevalent top-down backward influences and functional asymmetries between forward and backward connections that are seen in the real brain. The key points made in article are: (i). hierarchical generative models enable the learning of empirical priors and eschew prior assumptions about the causes of sensory input that are inherent in non-hierarchical models. These assumptions are necessary for learning schemes based on information theory and efficient or sparse coding, but are not necessary in a hierarchical context. Critically, the anatomical infrastructure that may implement generative models in the brain is hierarchical. Furthermore, learning based on empirical Bayes can proceed in a biologically plausible way. (ii). The second point is that backward connections are essential if the processes generating inputs cannot be inverted, or the inversion cannot be parameterised. Because these processes involve many-to-one mappings, are non-linear and dynamic in nature, they are generally non-invertible. This enforces an explicit parameterisation of generative models (i.e. backward connections) to afford recognition and suggests that forward architectures, on their own, are not sufficient for perception. (iii). Finally, non-linearities in generative models, mediated by backward connections, require these connections to be modulatory, so that representations in higher cortical levels can interact to predict responses in lower levels. This is important in relation to functional asymmetries in forward and backward connections that have been demonstrated empirically.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: Editor
                Journal
                PLoS Comput Biol
                PLoS Comput. Biol
                plos
                ploscomp
                PLoS Computational Biology
                Public Library of Science (San Francisco, USA )
                1553-734X
                1553-7358
                June 2013
                June 2013
                13 June 2013
                : 9
                : 6
                : e1003094
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
                [2 ]Groupe d'Analyse et de Theorie Economique, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Lyon, France
                [3 ]Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, United States of America
                University of Oxford, United Kingdom
                Author notes

                The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

                Conceived and designed the experiments: MJ. Performed the experiments: MJ. Analyzed the data: MJ. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: MJ GC. Wrote the paper: MJ GC.

                Article
                PCOMPBIOL-D-12-01596
                10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094
                3681730
                23785269
                769271b6-1701-4a76-80d8-0f454c19eb1c
                Copyright @ 2013

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

                History
                : 5 October 2012
                : 28 April 2013
                Page count
                Pages: 14
                Funding
                This study was supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche Francaise ANR-11-EMCO-01001 (France) and Provincia Autonoma di Trento (PAT, Italy). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
                Categories
                Research Article
                Biology
                Neuroscience
                Animal Cognition
                Behavioral Neuroscience
                Cognitive Neuroscience
                Computational Neuroscience
                Learning and Memory
                Sensory Perception
                Social and Behavioral Sciences
                Psychology
                Behavior
                Cognitive Psychology
                Experimental Psychology
                Sensory Perception

                Quantitative & Systems biology
                Quantitative & Systems biology

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